The role of deposit insurance and bank’s asset size in the 2008 financial crisis

In this paper we analyze the role of deposit insurance in providing the market with liquidity in times of financial turmoil. To do so, we look at the variation in insured and uninsured deposits between 2005Q3 and 2011Q3, controlling for liquidity, solvency and capital adequacy indicators, and find evidence that deposit insurance does provide some confidence in keeping funds in banks in times of turmoil. Additionally we follow an event study methodology to assess the impact of deposit insurance oriented policies on bank holding companies stock market returns, and find a TBTF effect.

European deposit insurance: financing the transition. CEPS Commentary, 6 September 2012

Arguing that the planned move to put the ECB in charge of banking supervision would be incomplete without a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA), Daniel Gros and Dirk Schoenmaker spell out in a new CEPS Commentary some underlying principles to guide a gradual transition under which only future risks would be shared while past losses would remain at the national level. They show that ultimately such a new institution would serve as a genuine source of confidence in the European banking system.

A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund - An Update. CEPS Policy Brief No. 283, 11 September 2012

Cross-border banking is currently not stable in Europe. Cross-border banks need a European safety net. Moreover, a truly integrated European level banking system may help to break the diabolical loop between the solvency of the domestic banking system and the fiscal standing of the national sovereign. This policy paper first sketches the building blocks of a banking union. Importantly, a new European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA) should start simultaneously with the ECB assuming supervisory powers. A combination of European supervision and local resolution cannot work because it is not ‘incentive compatible’. Next, this paper proposes a transition period to gradually phase in the European deposit insurance coverage. Finally, we calculate that a European Deposit Insurance Fund would amount to about €30-50 billion for the 75 euro area banks that were subject to the EBA stress tests. This Fund could be created over a period of time through risk-based deposit insurance premiums levied on these banks. Once up and running, the Fund would then turn into a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund to also deal with the resolution of one or more of these European banks.

The Optimal Capital Structure of Banks: Balancing Deposit Insurance, Capital Requirements and Tax-Advantaged Debt

The capital structure and regulation of financial intermediaries is an important topic for practitioners, regulators and academic researchers. In general, theory predicts that firms choose their capital structures by balancing the benefits of debt (e.g., tax and agency benefits) against its costs (e.g., bankruptcy costs). However, when traditional corporate finance models have been applied to insured financial institutions, the results have generally predicted corner solutions (all equity or all debt) to the capital structure problem. This paper studies the impact and interaction of deposit insurance, capital requirements and tax benefits on a bankÇs choice of optimal capital structure. Using a contingent claims model to value the firm and its associated claims, we find that there exists an interior optimal capital ratio in the presence of deposit insurance, taxes and a minimum fixed capital standard. Banks voluntarily choose to maintain capital in excess of the minimum required in order to balance the risks of insolvency (especially the loss of future tax benefits) against the benefits of additional debt. Because we derive a closed- form solution, our model provides useful insights on several current policy debates including revisions to the regulatory framework for GSEs, tax policy in general and the tax exemption for credit unions.

Market discipline by depositors : impact of deposit insurance on the Indonesian banking sector

This paper investigates market discipline by depositors in the Indonesian banking sector. Does depositor discipline fulfill its role in Indonesia? Does deposit insurance affect depositor behavior thereby imposing discipline on banks? These questions are empirically examined using panel data on Indonesian commercial banks from 1998 to 2009. In Indonesia deposit insurance was introduced in 2005. Depositor discipline is examined by two measures: change in the amount of deposits and interest rate. The empirical results show that depositors pay attention to bank soundness and riskiness and select banks based on the bank's condition with particular attention paid to equity ratio. It is found that depositors impose discipline on banks, but it varies according to regulatory and economic circumstances.

Completing the Banking Union: Deposit Insurance. CEPS Policy Brief No. 335, 3 December 2015

It is generally agreed that a Banking Union should have common or ‘single’ institutions responsible for carrying out three basic functions: supervision, resolution and deposit insurance. So far, however, agreement has been reached in the EU on only the first two of these functions. The Commission has now presented its proposal on how to complete the Banking Union with a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). It is an innovative and courageous proposal. It is courageous because it will clearly be very controversial in a number of member states (especially Germany) and it is innovative because it proposes a three-stage process, starting with re-insurance, then switching to co-insurance and finally to full direct insurance of deposits via a ‘single’ Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). This final stage should be reached in 2024, which is also the date at which the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) will become the only source of financing for bank resolution. The Commission’s proposal calls for integrating the decision-making for EDIS into the decision-making entity for the SRF, namely the existing Single Resolution Board (SRB). This makes sense if one views resolution and deposit insurance as two highly interlinked dimensions of dealing with banks in trouble. In this view the two dimensions should be bundled into one institution – and one suspects that over time the two funds (the SRF and the DIF) could be merged into one. This Policy Brief argues that re-insurance should not be considered as a transitory phase, but could also provide a solution for the long run. ‘Experience rating’ could be used to ensure a proper pricing of risk and to protect the interests of the depositors in countries with safer banking systems. Moreover, EDIS should have a decision-making structure separate from and independent of the SRM, since it has mainly a macroeconomic function.

The International Banking Facility Deposit Insurance Act : hearing before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, on H.R. 4879 ... November 4, 1981.

Item 1013-A, 1013-B (microfiche)

Federal crime insurance : hearing before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, second session, on H.R. 5995 ... July 26, 1984.

Item 1013-A, 1013-B (microfiche)

All risk crop insurance.

Cover title.

Management audit : regulation of grain dealers and warehousemen and the administration of the Grain Insurance Fund : Illinois Department of Agriculture and the Grain Insurance Corporation.

"The audit was conducted pursuant to Legislative Audit Commission Resolution Number 125, which was adopted December 11, 2002. This audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and the audit standards promulgated by the Office of the Auditor General at 74 Ill. Adm. Code 420.310. This audit report is transmitted in conformance with Section 3-14 of the Illinois State Auditing Act."--Cover letter.

Recommendations and findings to improve the federal crop insurance program : principal report of the Commission for the Improvement of the Federal Crop Insurance Program.

Mode of access: Internet.

Hearing to review the federal crop insurance program : hearing before the Subcommittee on General Farm Commodities and Risk Management of the Committee on Agriculture, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, May 14, 2007.

"Serial no. 110-22."

Nomination of Sanford [i.e. Stanford] G. Ross and David M. Walker : hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, One Hundred First Congress, second session, on the nomination of Stanford G. Ross and David M. Walker, to be members of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund, and the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund for a term of four years, July 24, 1990.

Mode of access: Internet.