Organized crime: securities, thefts and frauds (second series) : hearings ... Ninety-third Congress, first session, pursuant to section 4, Senate Resolution 46, 93d Congress.

Hearings held June 29-

Europol and the EU’s fight against organized crime: exploring the potential of experimentalist governance

While issues relating to the development, legitimacy and accountability of the European Police Office, Europol, have been intensively discussed in political and academic circles, the actual impact of Europol on policy-making in the European Union has yet to receive scholarly attention. By investigating the evolution and the role of Europol's organized crime reports, this article elaborates on whether Europol has been able to exert an influence beyond its narrowly defined mandate. Theoretically informed by the assumptions of experimentalist governance, the article argues that the different legal systems and policing traditions of EU member states have made it difficult for the EU to agree on a common understanding on how to fight against organized crime. This lack of consensus, which has translated into a set of vague and broadly formulated framework goals and guidelines, has enabled Europol to position its Organized Crime Threat Assessments as the point of reference in the respective EU policy-making area. Europol's interest in improving its institutional standing thereby converged with the interest of different member states to use Europol as a socialization platform to broadcast their ideas and to ‘Europeanize’ their national counter-organized crime policy.

The external dimension of the EU’s fight against organized crime:the search for coherence between rhetoric and practice

SSince the external dimension of the European Union’s Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) began to be considered, a substantial amount of literature has been dedicated to discussing how the EU is cooperating with non-member states in order to counter problems such as terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration. According to the EU, the degree of security interconnectedness has become so relevant that threats can only be adequately controlled if there is effective concerted regional action. This reasoning has led the EU to develop a number of instruments, which have resulted in the exporting of certain elements of its JHA policies, either through negotiation or socialization. Although the literature has explored how this transfer has been applied to the field of terrorism and immigration, very little has been written on the externalisation of knowledge, practice and norms in the area of organized crime. This article proposes to bridge this gap by looking at EU practice in the development of the external dimension of organized crime policies, through the theoretical lens of the EU governance framework.

Organized crime legislation in the European Union. Harmonization and approximation of criminal law, national legislations and the EU framework decision on the fight against organised crime, by Francesco Calderoni

Book review: Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London, and New York, Springer, 2010, 189 pp., £93.55 (hardcover), ISBN 978-3-642-04330-7, e-ISBN 978-3-642-04331-4

Rio and the Reds: The Comando Vermelho, Organized Crime and Brazil’s Economic Ascent [Student’s Paper Series]

Brazil’s growing status as a potential world power cannot obscure the characteristics of its other reality: that of a country with vast inequalities and high crime rates. The Comando Vermelho, the most prominent organized crime syndicate in Rio de Janeiro, besieges the beauty and charm that attracts tourists to this city. The CV arose not only as a product of the political dictatorship of the seventies, but also of the disenfranchised urban poor crammed into Rio’s favela slums. Today, the CV presents a powerful challenge to the State’s control of parts of Rio territory. As Brazil’s soft power projection grows, it is seriously challenged by its capacity to eliminate organized crime. Economic growth is not sufficient to destroy a deeply embedded organization like the CV. In fact, Brazil’s success may yet further retrench the CV’s activities. Culpability for organized crime cannot be merely limited to the gangs, but must also be shared among the willing consumers, among whom can be found educated and elite members of society, as well as the impoverished and desperate. The Brazilian government needs a top-down response addressing the schism between rich and poor. However, Brazil’s citizens must also take responsibility and forge a bottom-up response to the drug- and corruption-riddled elements of its most respected members of society. Brazil must target reform across public health, housing, education and above all, law enforcement. Without such changes, Brazil will remain a two-track democracy. Rio’s wealthy will still be able to revel in the city’s beauty albeit from behind armored cars and fortified mansions, while the city’s poor will yield – either as victims or perpetrators – to the desperate measures of organized crime.

Methadone maintenance and drug-related crime

Using data from an evaluation of methadone maintenance treatment, this study investigated factors associated with continued involvement irt crime during treatment, and in particular whether there appeared to be differences in effectiveness of treatment between different methadone clinics. The methodology was an observational study, in which 304 patients attending three low-intervention, private methadone clinics in Sydney were interviewed on three occasions over a twelve month period. Outcome measures were self-reported criminal activity and police department records of convictions. By self-report, crime dropped, promptly and substantially on entry to treatment, to a level of acquisitive crime about one-eighth that reported during the last addiction period. Analysis of official records indicated that rates of acquisitive convictions were significantly lower in the in-treatment period compared to prior to entry to treatment, corroborating the changes suggested by self-report. Persisting involvement in crime in treatment was predicted by two factors: the cost of persisting use of illicit drugs, particularly cannabis, and ASPD symptom count. Treatment factors also were independently predictive of continued involvement in crime. By both self-report and official records, and adjusting for subject factors, treatment at one clinic teas associated with greater involvement in crime. This clinic operated in a chaotic and poorly organized way. it is concluded that crime during methadone treatment is substantially lower than during street addiction, although the extent of reduction depends on the quality of treatment being delivered.

Organized crime [microform] : 25 years after Valachi : hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundredth Congress, second session, April 11, 15, 21, 22, 29, 1988.

CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 89 S401-14

Investigation of organized crime in interstate commerce. Hearings before a Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, United States Senate, Eighty-first Cingress, second session, pursuant to S. Res. 202 ...

pt.1.Florida.--pt.1A.Florida.--pt.2.Federal communications, etc.--pt.3.Black market operations.--pt.4.Missouri.--pt.4A.Missouri.--pt.5.Illinois.--pt.6.Ohio-Kentucky.--pt.7.New York-New Jersey.--pt.8.Louisiana.--pt.9.Michigan.--pt.10.Nevada-California.--pt.11.Pennsylvania.--pt.12.U.S.Treasury dept.,etc.--pt.13.Miscellaneous witnesses.--pt.14.Narcotics.--pt.15.Kentucky.--pt.16.Florida.--pt.17.Maryland and District of Columbia.--pt.18.New York and New Jersey.--pt.19.Pennsylvania.

Annual report of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program.

Vols. for Mar. 1984- cover 1983-

Organized crime--stolen securities : hearings ... Ninety-second Congress, first session, pursuant to section 4, Senate Resolution 31, 92d Congress ...

Hearings held June 8-Aug. 4, 1971.

Analysing the European Union's responses to organized crime through different securitization lenses

In the past 30 years, organized crime (OC) has shifted from being an issue of little, or no concern, to being considered one of the key security threats facing the European Union (EU), the economic and political fabric of its society and its citizens. The purpose of this article is to understand how OC has come to be understood as one of the major security threats in the EU, by applying different lenses of Securitization Theory (ST). More specifically, the research question guiding this article is whether applying different ST approaches can lead us to draw differing conclusions as to whether OC has been successfully securitized in the EU. Building on the recent literature that argues that this theoretical framework has branched out into different approaches, this article wishes to contrast two alternative views of how a security problem comes into being, in order to verify whether different approaches can lead to diverging conclusions regarding the same phenomenon. The purpose of this exercise is to contribute to the further development of ST by pointing out that the choice in approach bears direct consequences on reaching a conclusion regarding the successful character of a securitization process. Starting from a reflection on ST, the article proceeds with applying a “linguistic approach” to the case study, which it then contrasts with a “sociological approach”. The article proposes that although the application of a “linguistic approach” seems to indicate that OC has become securitized in the EU, it also overlooks a number of elements, which the “sociological approach” renders visible and which lead us to refute the initial conclusion.