Dynamics in the governance of collective irrigation systems: Evidence from field experiments in Nicaragua.

In this paper, we investigate the real demand for climate protection when the purely individual perspective of existing revealed preference studies is relaxed. This is achieved in two treatments; first, we determine the information subjects receive about the demand revealed by other subjects in a similar decision making situation, second, collective action is implemented whereby all subjects are required to purchase the group?s median quantity at a given price. Participants in the experiment were offered the opportunity to contribute to climate protection by purchasing European Union Allowances. Allowances purchased were withdrawn from the European Emissions Trading Scheme. In our experiment, information about other subjects? behaviour has no treatment effect on the demand for climate protection. Under collective action however, the probability of purchasing allowances is higher compared to the reference treatment situation, an individual contribution mechanism. Furthermore, we observe a strong correlation between subjects? demand and their expectations about other participants? behaviour. When collective action is not available, subjects? e xpectations are consistent with free rider behaviour.

Using economic instruments to address emissions from air transport in the European Union

Air transport has become a vital component of the global economy. However, greenhouse-gas emissions from this sector have a significant impact on global climate, being responsible for over 3.5% of all anthropogenic radiative forcing. Also, the accrued visibility of aircraft emissions greatly affects the public image of the industry. In this context, incentive-based regulations, in the form of price or quantity controls, can be envisaged as alternatives to mitigate these emissions. The use of environmental charges in air transport, and the inclusion of the sector in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), are considered under a range of scenarios. The impacts of these measures on demand are estimated, and results suggest that they are likely to be minimal-mainly due to the high willingness to pay for air transport. In particular, in the EU ETS scenario currently favoured by the EU, demand reductions are less than 2%. This may not be true in the longer run, for short trips, or if future caps become more stringent. Furthermore, given current estimates of the social Cost Of CO2 as well as typical EU ETS prices, supply-side abatement would be too costly to be encouraged by these policies in the short term. The magnitude of aviation CO2 emissions in the EU is estimated, both in physical and monetary terms; the results are consistent with Eurocontrol estimates and, for the EU-25, the total social cost of these emissions represents only 0.03% of the region`s GDP. It is concluded that the use of multisector policies, such as the EU ETS, is unsuitable for curbing emissions from air transport, and that stringent emission charges or an isolated ETS would be better instruments. However, the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS has advantages under target-oriented post-2012 scenarios, such as policy-costs dilution, certainty in reductions, and flexibility in abatement allocation. This solution is also attractive to airlines, as it would improve their public image but require virtually no reduction of their own emissions, as they would be fully capable of passing on policy costs to their customers.

The Sustainability Impact of the EU Emissions Trading System on the European Industry. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 17/2007

This BEEP explains the mechanism of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) for the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide and explore into its likely sustainability impact on European industry. In doing so, it focuses on energy-intensive industries like cement, steel and aluminium production as well as on the emerging hydrogen economy. The BEEP concludes that at the moment it is still very inconsistently implemented and has a fairly narrow scope regarding greenhouse gases and involved sectors. It may also give an incentive to relocate for energy-intensive industries. In its current format, the EU ETS does not yet properly facilitate long term innovation dynamics such as the transition to a hydrogen economy. Nevertheless, the EU ETS is foremost a working system that – with some improvements – has the potential to become a pillar for effective and efficient climate change policy that also gives incentives for investment into climate friendly policies.

Essays on emissions trading markets

This dissertation is a collection of three economics essays on different aspects of carbon emission trading markets. The first essay analyzes the dynamic optimal emission control strategies of two nations. With a potential to become the largest buyer under the Kyoto Protocol, the US is assumed to be a monopsony, whereas with a large number of tradable permits on hand Russia is assumed to be a monopoly. Optimal costs of emission control programs are estimated for both the countries under four different market scenarios: non-cooperative no trade, US monopsony, Russia monopoly, and cooperative trading. The US monopsony scenario is found to be the most Pareto cost efficient. The Pareto efficient outcome, however, would require the US to make side payments to Russia, which will even out the differences in the cost savings from cooperative behavior. The second essay analyzes the price dynamics of the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a voluntary emissions trading market. By examining the volatility in market returns using AR-GARCH and Markov switching models, the study associates the market price fluctuations with two different political regimes of the US government. Further, the study also identifies a high volatility in the returns few months before the market collapse. Three possible regulatory and market-based forces are identified as probable causes of market volatility and its ultimate collapse. Organizers of other voluntary markets in the US and worldwide may closely watch for these regime switching forces in order to overcome emission market crashes. The third essay compares excess skewness and kurtosis in carbon prices between CCX and EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme) Phase I and II markets, by examining the tail behavior when market expectations exceed the threshold level. Dynamic extreme value theory is used to find out the mean price exceedence of the threshold levels and estimate the risk loss. The calculated risk measures suggest that CCX and EU ETS Phase I are extremely immature markets for a risk investor, whereas EU ETS Phase II is a more stable market that could develop as a mature carbon market in future years.

Essays on Emissions Trading Markets

This dissertation is a collection of three economics essays on different aspects of carbon emission trading markets. The first essay analyzes the dynamic optimal emission control strategies of two nations. With a potential to become the largest buyer under the Kyoto Protocol, the US is assumed to be a monopsony, whereas with a large number of tradable permits on hand Russia is assumed to be a monopoly. Optimal costs of emission control programs are estimated for both the countries under four different market scenarios: non-cooperative no trade, US monopsony, Russia monopoly, and cooperative trading. The US monopsony scenario is found to be the most Pareto cost efficient. The Pareto efficient outcome, however, would require the US to make side payments to Russia, which will even out the differences in the cost savings from cooperative behavior. The second essay analyzes the price dynamics of the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a voluntary emissions trading market. By examining the volatility in market returns using AR-GARCH and Markov switching models, the study associates the market price fluctuations with two different political regimes of the US government. Further, the study also identifies a high volatility in the returns few months before the market collapse. Three possible regulatory and market-based forces are identified as probable causes of market volatility and its ultimate collapse. Organizers of other voluntary markets in the US and worldwide may closely watch for these regime switching forces in order to overcome emission market crashes. The third essay compares excess skewness and kurtosis in carbon prices between CCX and EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme) Phase I and II markets, by examining the tail behavior when market expectations exceed the threshold level. Dynamic extreme value theory is used to find out the mean price exceedence of the threshold levels and estimate the risk loss. The calculated risk measures suggest that CCX and EU ETS Phase I are extremely immature markets for a risk investor, whereas EU ETS Phase II is a more stable market that could develop as a mature carbon market in future years.

Fossil fuel dependence and interfuel substitution in the electricity sector of Western European countries between 1990-2011

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The Emission Trading Scheme reform: will the Commission's proposal save the system? EPC Policy Brief, 29 May 2015

The European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), proposed by the Commission in 2001, entered into force in 2005. It was the flagship instrument of an ambitious policy aiming to reduce the emission of greenhouse gasses in the EU by making emission allowances a freely tradable ‘financial commodity’. However, in recent years, the cracks in the system have begun to show as the price of these CO2 emission allowances has dropped. In this Policy Brief, Jørgen Knud Henningsen argues that the envisaged ETS reform may not be enough to address the system’s shortcomings, and that there should be a more open discussion about its potential if it is to contribute to the EU’s goal of a largely de-carbonised economy by 2050.

Something Worth Fighting For: The Evolution of Lobbying Coalitions in the Emissions Trading System. Bruges Political Research Papers 50/2015.

This thesis attempts to understand who fought for influence within the European Union’s policy area of the Emissions Trading System (ETS). The ETS is a key aspect of the European Union’s (EU) climate change policy and is particularly important in light of the conclusions at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris. It was first established in 2003 with Directive 2003/87/EC and completed its first major revision in 2008 with Directive 2009/29/EC. Between these two key Directives, the interplay between industrial and environmental incentives means that the ETS has created a dynamic venue for divergent interest groups. So as to identify the relevant actors, this paper applies the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) of Sabatier. Using position papers, semi-structured interviews, and unpublished documents from the EU institutions, this paper answers it primary research question in its identification of an economy-first and an environment-first lobbying coalition. These coalitions have expanded over time with the environment-first coalition incorporating Greenpeace and the economy-first coalition expanding even further in both scope and speed. However, the economy-first coalition has been susceptible to industry-specific interests. In its application of the ACF, the research shows that a hypothesised effect between the ACF’s external events and these lobbying coalitions is inconclusive. Other hypotheses stemming from the ACF relating to electricity prices and the 2004 enlargement seem to be of significance for the relative composition of the lobbying coalitions. This paper finds that there are certain limitations within the ACF. The findings of this thesis provide a unique insight into how lobbying coalitions within a key EU policy area can form and develop.

WTO law issues of emissions trading

Based on existing research in the interface of emissions trading schemes (ETSs) and WTO law, the paper looks more closely at the design elements of an ETS that are most vulnerable to a WTO challenge, including border adjustment on importation and exportation, recycling of revenues and cross-border linking. The analysis of WTO consistency of various ETS regulatory components reveals significant legal uncertainty. One explanation is that an ETS is not yet fully established as a regulatory tool. It does not have a fixed design and its design elements vary significantly with a scheme. Moreover, ETS-related issues have never been raised in WTO disputes. This makes it hard to predict with confidence the outcome of scrutiny of an ETS by a WTO adjudicative body. In this respect, the availability of environmental and/or health exceptions for justification of ETS-related measures is of great importance.

Des enjeux juridiques concernant l'efficacité des systèmes d'échange de droits d'émission

Ce mémoire décrit et analyse différents types de systèmes d'échange de droits d'émission utilisés dans le cadre de politiques de gestion de la pollution atmosphérique. L'objectif premier est de répertorier des enjeux juridiques étant liés à l'efficacité de ces systèmes. Dans un premier temps, nous nous attardons à la structure et aux mécanismes internes des systèmes d'échange de droits d'émission. Tout d'abord, nous soulignons le fondement théorique de ce type de système. Nous évaluons par la suite la structure et certains litiges liés au système d'échange américain dans le cadre des émissions de dioxyde de soufre. Dans un deuxième temps, nous continuons la description de systèmes en nous attardant plus spécifiquement aux interactions entre les systèmes d'échange de droits d'émission et les autres politiques et règlementations environnementales (incluant d'autres systèmes d'échange d'émission) visant la même problématique environnementale.

The evolution and consequences of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)

"Jon B. Skjaerseth, professeur associé, Fridtjof Nansen Institute (Norvège), a présenté dans le cadre du panel Gestion des risques environnementaux par les institutions financières,  une conférence intitulée ""The evolution and consequences of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)""."

Backloading: A necessary, but not sufficient first step. CEPS Special Report No. 72, 20 November 2012

In July 2012, the European Commission issued an invitation for public consultation to review the ‘auctioning time profile’ for the EU Emissions Trading Scheme” in order to collect views from stakeholders and experts in the field of the EU carbon market on a draft for a future amendment of the Commission Regulation on the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances. In this submission, the CEPS Carbon Market Forum addresses the following questions and offers its views on the Commission’s proposed amendments: Is back loading a good idea? Is there a need for following up the back loading with structural measures? What should the number be? If this cannot be addressed, what are the considerations for deciding upon that number? What price expectations are linked to the number? On what basis are they construed?

The Clean Development Mechanism as ethical development? Reconciling emissions trading and local development

This paper examines the ethics of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in its architecture, processes and outcomes and its potential to allocate resources to the poor as ‘ethical development’. Two specific examples of CDM projects help us to explore some of the quandaries that seem to be quickly defining operating procedure for the CDM in its efforts to bring entitlementsto the poor. The paper concludes with reflections on the normative and social complications of the CDM and closes with three key areas of further investigation.

The Effectiveness of the Clean Development Mechanism – A law and economics analysis

Climate change has been acknowledged as a threat to humanity. Most scholars agree that to avert dangerous climate change and to transform economies into low-carbon societies, deep global emission reductions are required by the year 2050. Under the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the only market-based instrument that encourages industrialised countries to pursue emission reductions in developing countries. The CDM aims to pay the incremental finance necessary to operationalize emission reduction projects which are otherwise not financially viable. According to the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM should finance projects that are additional to those which would have happened anyway, contribute to sustainable development in the countries hosting the projects, and be cost-effective. To enable the identification of such projects, an institutional framework has been established by the Kyoto Protocol which lays out responsibilities for public and private actors. This thesis examines whether the CDM has achieved these objectives in practice and can thus be considered an effective tool to reduce emissions. To complete this investigation, the book applies economic theory and analyses the CDM from two perspectives. The first perspective is the supply-dimension which answers the question of how, in practice, the CDM system identified additional, cost-effective, sustainable projects and, generated emission reductions. The main contribution of this book is the second perspective, the compliance-dimension, which answers the question of whether industrialised countries effectively used the CDM for compliance with their Kyoto targets. The application of the CDM in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is used as a case-study. Where the analysis identifies inefficiencies within the supply or the compliance dimension, potential improvements of the legal framework are proposed and discussed.