The transcendence of time in the epistemology of observation from a phenomenological standpoint

In this article I deal with time as a notion of epistemological content associated though with the notion of a subjective consciousness co-constitutive of physical reality. In this phenomenologically grounded approach I attempt to establish a 'metaphysical' aspect of time, within a strictly epistemological context, in the sense of an underlying absolute subjectivity which is non-objectifiable within objective temporality and thus non-susceptible of any ontological designation. My arguments stem, on the one hand, from a version of quantum-mechanical theory (History Projection Operator theory, HPO theory) in view of its formal treatment of two different aspects of time within a quantum context. The discrete, partial-ordering properties (the notions of before and after) and the dynamical-parameter properties reflected in the wave equations of motion. On the other hand, to strengthen my arguments for a transcendental factor of temporality, I attempt an interpretation of some relevant conclusions in the work of J. Eccles ([5]) and of certain results of experimental research of S. Deahaene et al. ([2]) and others.

Notes on Peirce's semiotics and epistemology. 'Notas sobre la semiótica y la epistemología de Peirce'.

Resumen tomado de la publicación

‘God’s Truth’: Kant, Mill and moral epistemology in Oliver Twist

This essay aims to demonstrate how Dickens’s search for ‘truth’ (and his understanding of what that abstraction consists of) entered into and emerged from one of the key philosophical discussions of the early nineteenth century: namely whether moral knowledge is the sum of one’s experiences or whether there are such things as a priori or ‘natural’ principles of ethics that transcend human practice.

Poverty-of-the-stimulus and SLA epistemology: considering L2 knowledge of aspectual phrasal semantics

Coupling a review of previous studies on the acquisition of grammatical aspects undertaken from contrasting paradigmatic views of second language acquisition (SLA) with new experimental data from L2 Portuguese, the present study contributes to this specific literature as well as general debates in L2 epistemology. We tested 31 adult English learners of L2 Portuguese across three experiments, examining the extent to which they had acquired the syntax and (subtle) semantics of grammatical aspect. Demonstrating that many individuals acquired target knowledge of what we contend is a poverty-of-the-stimulus semantic entailment related to the checking of aspectual features encoded in Portuguese preterit and imperfect morphology, namely, a [±accidental] distinction that obtains in a restricted subset of contexts, we conclude that UG-based approaches to SLA are in a better position to tap and gauge underlying morphosyntactic competence, since based on independent theoretical linguistic descriptions, they make falsifiable predictions that are amenable to empirical scrutiny, seek to describe and explain beyond performance, and can account for L2 convergence on poverty-of-the-stimulus knowledge as well as L2 variability/optionality.

Linguistic epistemology and the notion of monolingualism

This article has several interrelated goals, all of which relate to an attempt at understanding why monolingualism is taken to be the default norm in linguistic inquiry (from sociolinguistics to formal linguistic theorizing). With others, I will take the position that comparing instances of multilingualism to so-called monolingualism is an unfair and inevitably inaccurate comparison since, among other variables, the social environments and access to input of multilinguals compared to monolinguals is most often unavoidably different (cf. Cruz-Ferreira 2006; Edwards 2004). Additionally, I will attempt to demonstrate that even so-called monolinguals have access to a variety of grammars related to different registers of speech and, therefore, are not truly monolingual in the sense that they poses one monolithic grammatical competence. Taken together, the present discussion questions both the default status of monolingualism as well as the functional adequacy of the term monolingualism.

Beyond description to pattern: The contribution of Batesonian epistemology to critical realist research

This paper proposes a limitation to epistemological claims to theory building prevalent in critical realist research. While accepting the basic ontological and epistemological positions of the perspective as developed by Roy Bhaskar, it is argued that application in social science has relied on sociological concepts to explain the underlying generative mechanisms, and that in many cases this has been subject to the effects of an anthropocentric constraint. A novel contribution to critical realist research comes from the work and ideas of Gregory Bateson. This is in service of two central goals of critical realism, namely an abductive route to theory building and a commitment to interdisciplinarity. Five aspects of Bateson’s epistemology are introduced: (1) difference, (2) logical levels of abstraction, (3) recursive causal loops, (4) the logic of metaphor, and (5) Bateson’s theory of mind. The comparison between Bateson and Bhaskar’s ideas is seen as a form of double description, illustrative of the point being raised. The paper concludes with an appeal to critical realists to start exploring the writing and outlook of Bateson himself.

Pluralism in economics: from epistemology to hermeneutics

The objective of this paper is to bring elements from the philosophical movement of hermeneutics and pragmatism to the discussion on methodology in economics, with a specific concern on the theory of truth. Our aim is to present the concept of the hermeneutic space, developed by the philosopher Richard Rorty, as a rational justification for pluralism in economics. We consider the hermeneutic space an interesting concept which should allow us to overcome the void left by the incapacity of epistemological theories to explain the evolution of sciences. It defends the idea that our culture, values and ways of interpreting things are what build the sciences, not any closed epistemological method. In this sense, pluralism is nothing more than letting the hermeneutic space work, without epistemological barriers, and understanding that this is desirable for the future development of economics as a science. This approach differs from all other methodological justifications for pluralism because it does not rely on any epistemological method, but assumes that the hermeneutic space can entirely fulfill the gap created by them