O público e o privado na gestão da escola pública brasileira - um estudo sobre o programa “excelência em gestão educacional” da Fundação Itaú Social

O presente trabalho objetiva analisar as implicações do Programa “Excelência em Gestão Educacional” da Fundação Itaú Social na gestão da escola pública brasileira, em termos de orientações teórico- metodológicas contidas em documentos balizadores da parceria firmada. Para tanto, foi feita uma pesquisa documental que, por meio de análise de conteúdo, buscou analisar os documentos referentes a esse programa. As análises desenvolvidas mostraram que o modelo de gestão defendido pela Fundação Itaú para a educação brasileira é o das escolas charter americanas, escolas financiadas pelo setor público, mas administradas pelo setor privado. Tais escolas são apresentadas como tendo melhorado significativamente os índices educacionais nos EUA. No entanto, constatou-se que a realidade concreta não condiz com a apresentada pelo Programa Excelência em Gestão, pois o modelo de gestão baseada nos parâmetros do mercado, que associa conceitos como qualidade, participação, descentralização, autonomia e avaliação à ideia de gerenciamento de recursos com vista à produtividade do sistema educacional, não foi capaz de melhorar o sistema educacional americano. Muito pelo contrário, agravou ainda mais a crise da educação pública naquele País. No Brasil, já existem experiências nesse sentido e as análises sobre as escolas charter que foram implantadas em Pernambuco revelaram que as mesmas adotam na sua gestão padrões gerenciais trazidos do mundo empresarial. Assim, verificou-se a introdução de princípios de mercado como o da gestão gerencial, da definição de metas e resultados, expressos nos seus planejamentos estratégicos, da remuneração por mérito para os professores e a generalização dos testes de avaliação, dentre outros. Nesse contexto, a autonomia escolar é entendida como maior responsabilização dos professores e diretores pelo sucesso ou fracasso da escola, e, sobretudo do gestor, como liderança de todo o processo. Além disso, nessas escolas não existe autonomia pedagógica, pois o projeto pedagógico é elaborado de acordo com critérios de produtividade definidos previamente pelo órgão responsável pela implantação dessas escolas (PROCENTRO). A participação que se desenvolve nesse contexto não passa de um mero processo de colaboração, de mão única, de adesão, de obediência às decisões que são tomadas de cima para baixo. Fica claro que esse modelo de gestão e de escola não contribui para a democratização das relações de poder na escola e consequentemente para a formação da cidadania.

'Defending the rights'. An integrated model of collective action for "public water" in Italy

In many communities, supplying water for the people is a huge task and the fact that this essential service can be carried out by the private sector respecting the right to water, is a debated issue. This dissertation investigates the mechanisms through which a 'perceived rights violation' - which represents a specific form of perceived injustice which derives from the violation of absolute moral principles – can promote collective action. Indeed, literature on morality and collective action suggests that even if many people apparently sustain high moral principles (like human rights), only a minority decides to act in order to defend them. Taking advantage of the political situation in Italy, and the recent mobilization for "public water" we hypothesized that, because of its "sacred value", the perceived violation of the right to water facilitates identification with the social movement and activism. Through five studies adopting qualitative and quantitative methods, we confirmed our hypotheses demonstrating that the perceived violation of the right to water can sustain activism and it can influence vote intentions at the referendum for 'public water'. This path to collective action coexists with other 'classical' predictors of collective action, like instrumental factors (personal advantages, efficacy beliefs) and anger. The perceived rights violation can derive both from personal values (i.e. universalism) and external factors (i.e. a mobilization campaign). Furthermore, we demonstrated that it is possible to enhance the perceived violation of the right to water and anger through a specifically designed communication campaign. The final chapter summarizes the main findings and discusses the results, suggesting some innovative line of research for collective action literature.

The role of collective action in the provision of agri-environmental public goods: theoretical development through case studies in Italy

The thesis aims at analysing the role of collective action as a viable alternative to the traditional forms of intervention in agriculture in order to encourage the provision of agri-environmental public goods. Which are the main benefits of collective action, in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, compared to traditional market or public intervention policies? What are the drivers that encourage farmers to participate into collective action? To what extent it is possible to incorporate collective aspects into policies aimed at providing agri-environmental public goods? With the objective of addressing these research questions, the thesis is articulated in two levels: a theoretical analysis on the role of collective action in the provision of public goods and a specific investigation of two local initiative,s were an approach collective management of agro-environmental resources was successfully implemented. The first case study concerns a project named “Custodians of the Territory”, developed by the local agency in Tuscany “Comunità Montana Media Valle del Serchio”, which settled for an agreement with local farmers for a collective provision of environmental services related to the hydro-geological management of the district. The second case study is related to the territorial agri-environmental agreement experimented in Valdaso (Marche), where local farmers have adopted integrated pest management practices collectively with the aim of reducing the environmental impact of their farming practices. The analysis of these initiatives, carried out through participatory methods (Rapid Rural Appraisal), allowed developing a theoretical discussion on the role of innovative tools (such as co-production and co-management) in the provision of agri-environmental public goods. The case studies also provided some recommendations on the government intervention and policies needed to promote successful collective action for the provision of agri-environmental public goods.

A threshold hypothesis of institutional change: collective action in the Italian Alps during the 13th - 19th centuries.

This dissertation is about collective action issues in common property resources. Its focus is the “threshold hypothesis,” which posits the existence of a threshold in group size that drives the process of institutional change. This hypothesis is tested using a six-century dataset concerning the management of the commons by hundreds of communities in the Italian Alps. The analysis seeks to determine the group size threshold and the institutional changes that occur when groups cross this threshold. There are five main findings. First, the number of individuals in villages remained stable for six centuries, despite the population in the region tripling in the same period. Second, the longitudinal analysis of face-to-face assemblies and community size led to the empirical identification of a threshold size that triggered the transition from informal to more formal regimes to manage common property resources. Third, when groups increased in size, gradual organizational changes took place: large groups split into independent subgroups or structured interactions into multiple layers while maintaining a single formal organization. Fourth, resource heterogeneity seemed to have had no significant impact on various institutional characteristics. Fifth, social heterogeneity showed statistically significant impacts, especially on institutional complexity, consensus, and the relative importance of governance rules versus resource management rules. Overall, the empirical evidence from this research supports the “threshold hypothesis.” These findings shed light on the rationale of institutional change in common property regimes, and clarify the mechanisms of collective action in traditional societies. Further research may generalize these conclusions to other domains of collective action and to present-day applications.

Institutions as key drivers of collective action in WUAs [Water User Associations] of Uzbekistan

This paper presents a multifactor approach for performance assessment of Water Users Associations (WUAs) in Uzbekistan in order to identify the drivers for improved and effi cient performance of WUAs. The study was carried out in the Fergana Valley where the WUAs were created along the South Fergana Main Canal during the last 10 years. The farmers and the employees of 20 WUAs were questioned about the WUAs’ activities and the quantitative and qualitative data were obtained. This became a base for the calculation of 36 indicators divided into 6 groups: Water supply, technical conditions, economic conditions, social and cultural conditions, organizational conditions and information conditions. All the indicators assessed with a differentiated point system adjusted for subjectivity of several of them give the total maximal result for the associations of 250 point. The WUAs of the Fergana Valley showed the score between 145 and 219 points, what refl ects a highly diverse level of the WUAs performance in the region. The analysis of the indicators revealed that the key points of the WUA’s success are the organizational and institutional conditions including the participatory factors and awareness of both the farmers and employees about the work of WUA. The research showed that the low performance of the WUAs is always explained by the low technical and economic conditions along with weak organization and information dissemination conditions. It is clear that it is complicated to improve technical and economic conditions immediately because they are cost-based and cost-induced. However, it is possible to improve the organizational conditions and to strengthen the institutional basis via formal and information institutions which will gradually lead to improvement of economic and technical conditions of WUAs. Farmers should be involved into the WUA Governance and into the process of making common decisions and solving common problems together via proper institutions. Their awareness can also be improved by leading additional trainings for increasing farmers’ agronomic and irrigation knowledge, teaching them water saving technologies and acquainting them with the use of water measuring equipment so it can bring reliable water supply, transparent budgeting and adequate as well as equitable water allocation to the water users.

Wanting to Get More or Protecting One's Assets: Age-Differential Effects of Gain Versus Loss Perceptions on the Willingness to Engage in Collective Action

OBJECTIVES: The present research examined motivational differences across adulthood that might contribute to age-related differences in the willingness to engage in collective action. Two experiments addressed the role of gain and loss orientation for age-related differences in the willingness to engage in collective action across adulthood. METHOD: In Experiment 1, N = 169 adults (20-85 years) were confronted with a hypothetical scenario that involved either an impending increase or decrease of health insurance costs for their respective age group. In Experiment 2, N = 231 adults (18-83 years) were asked to list an advantage or disadvantage they perceived in being a member of their age group. Subsequently, participants indicated their willingness to engage in collective action on behalf of their age group. RESULTS: Both experiments suggest that, with increasing age, people are more willing to engage in collective action when they are confronted with the prospect of loss or a disadvantage. DISCUSSION: The findings highlight the role of motivational processes for involvement in collective action across adulthood. With increasing age, (anticipated) loss or perceived disadvantages become more important for the willingness to participate in collective action.

Alpine Common Property Institutions under Change: Conditions for Successful and Unsuccessful Collective Action by Alpine Farmers in the Canton of Grisons, Switzerland

The protection and sustainable management of alpine summer pastures has been stated as a goal in Swiss national law since 1996, and direct payments from the state for summer pasturing have been tied to sustainability criteria since 2000. This reflects the increasing value of the alpine cultural landscape as a public good. However, provision of this public good remains in the hands of local farmers and their local common pool resource (CPR) institutions for managing alpine pastures. These institutions are increasingly struggling to maintain their institutional arrangements, particularly regarding the work needed to maintain the pastures. This paper examines two cases of local CPR institutions for managing alpine pastures in the Swiss Canton of Grisons that manifest different institutional developments in light of changing conditions. The differences in how these institutions reacted to change and the impacts this has had on the provision of the CPR are explained by focusing on relative prices, bargaining power, and ideology as drivers of institutional change that are often neglected within common property research. Key words: summer pasture management, institutional change, bargaining power, ideology

Collective action and civil disobedience: the anti-GMO campaign of the Faucheurs volontaires

Civil disobedience has hitherto enjoyed only a relatively marginal place in the repertoires of French social movements, but has recently emerged as a key rallying frame for social mobilization, especially among environmental and counter-globalization movements. This paper examines the theory and practice of civil disobedience in the French context through an analysis of one such movement, the anti-GM Faucheurs Volontaires. Discussing the highly controversial campaign's positioning as 'civic disobedience', the article examines contested discourses of violence surrounding crop destruction, and the state responses to action, before asking what the campaign's claims to Republican civism mean for traditional notions of the relationship between state and challenging groups in France. It argues that framing action as civil disobedience is central to attempts to construct political and popular legitimacy, in terms of the campaign's national, international, and sectoral goals.

Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action���. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action��� more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.

Assessment of institutional contexts for collective action, and stakeholder receptiveness to integrated research-extension approaches on Lac Ntomba, Lac Maï-Ndombe and the Maringa-Lopori-Wamba watersheds

The WorldFish Center has been collaborating with its partners (AWF and WWF) in the Maringa-Lopori-Wamba (MLW) and the Lac Tele-Lac Ntomba (LTL) Landscapes to develop participatory monitoring systems for aquatic ecosystems. This requires rigorous data collection regarding fishing effort and catch, and the establishment of community partnerships; enabling WorldFish Center researchers to understand and counteract the institutional legacies of previous NGO interventions. In the MLW, fisherfolk livelihoods are severely limited due to their extreme isolation from markets and government services. However, fisherfolk have some experience dealing with natural resource conservation or extraction entities as well as humanitarian agencies. Their history has left them slightly skeptical but reasonably willing to collaborate with incoming NGOs. Around Lac Ntomba, fisherfolk have had more extensive interactions with conservation and humanitarian NGOs, but despite their proximity to the Congo River, they appear to have very limited access to distant markets. As past benefits from NGO activities have been captured by local village elites many fishers are highly skeptical and even antagonistic toward NGOs in general, and see little benefits from collaborating with each other or NGOs. Similarly to the MLW and Lac Ntomba, Lac Maï-Ndombe fisherfolk were disillusioned by past NGO activities. However, in this area levels of fish catch are greater than in the other watersheds, and many fishers make regular trips to major markets in Kinshasa, Kikwit and Tchikapa. Consequently, while there are significant divisions to be addressed in Lac Maï-Ndombe, fisherfolk in general are more interested in exploring options for improving livelihoods. In order to overcome these hurdles, the WorldFish Center has introduced an integrated research-extension approach in its interactions with these communities. The teams conducted demonstrations of technological innovations that could significantly improve on present post-harvest fish processing practices, in particular: a solar fish drying tent and a fish smoking barrel.

Leadership in collective action

We extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal platform contains a degree of publicness that increases in group size and divides the private benefits uniformly, a success-maximizing leader uses incentives and distorts the platform towards more private benefits - a distortion that increases with group size. In both settings we obtain the anti-Olson type result that win probability increases with group size.