Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

An Economic Theory of Mortgage Redemption Laws

Redemption laws give mortgagors the right to redeem their property following default for a statutorily set period of time. This paper develops a theory that explains these laws as a means of protecting landowners against the loss of non-transferable values associated with their land. A longer redemption period reduces the risk that this value will be lost but also increases the likelihood of default. The optimal redemption period balances these effects. Empirical analysis of cross-state data from the early twentieth century suggests that these factors, in combination with political considerations, explain the existence and length of redemption laws.

An Economic Theory of Mortgage Redemption Laws

Redemption laws give mortgagors the right to redeem their property following default for a statutorily set period of time. This paper develops a theory that explains these laws as a means of protecting landowners against the loss of nontransferable values associated with their land. A longer redemption period reduces the risk that this value will be lost but also increases the likelihood of default. The optimal redemption period balances these effects. Empirical analysis of cross-state data from the early twentieth century suggests that these factors, in combination with political considerations, explain the existence and length of redemption laws.

Are Shirking and Leisure Substitutable? An Empirical Test of Efficiency Wages Based on Urban Economic Theory

Recent theoretical work has examined the spatial distribution of unemployment using the efficiency wage model as the mechanism by which unemployment arises in the urban economy. This paper extends the standard efficiency wage model in order to allow for behavioral substitution between leisure time at home and effort at work. In equilibrium, residing at a location with a long commute affects the time available for leisure at home and therefore affects the trade-off between effort at work and risk of unemployment. This model implies an empirical relationship between expected commutes and labor market outcomes, which is tested using the Public Use Microdata sample of the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. The empirical results suggest that efficiency wages operate primarily for blue collar workers, i.e. workers who tend to be in occupations that face higher levels of supervision. For this subset of workers, longer commutes imply higher levels of unemployment and higher wages, which are both consistent with shirking and leisure being substitutable.

Mixed Public-Private Enterprises in Europe: Economic Theory and an Empirical Analysis of Italian Water Utilities. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 4/July 2006

Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives (respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector.

Economics of business cycles,

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The economic theory of a socialist economy.

Mode of access: Internet.

E-commerce business profile.

"This publication has been made available through a partnership of the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity's Illinois Entrepreneurship Network Business Information Center, the Small Business Development Center Network and the U.S. Small Business Administration."--p. [4] of cover.

The Quarterly review of economics and business.

Mode of access: Internet.

Can the Paks-2 Nuclear Power Plant operate without State aid? A business economic analysis

Many studies have investigated the prospects for returns, the budgetary and financing background and energy management effects of the new nuclear power plant units to be built at Paks. This document seeks to complement previous economics-based studies by adding a new criterion. The key question in our analysis is whether the power plant company will be capable of independent operations in an economic sense - or will its survival depend on further additional aid by the owner, i.e. via the central budget, after its commissioning? We shall examine from a corporate perspective in what ways the already disclosed financing terms and conditions may affect the everyday operations of the power plant company.

Empirical study of exchange rates in Brazil, Canada and the Caribbean

This dissertation examines the monetary models of exchange rate determination for Brazil, Canada, and two countries in the Caribbean, namely, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica. With the exception of Canada, the others adopted the floating regime during the past ten years.^ The empirical validity of four seminal models in exchange rate economics were determined. Three of these models were entirely classical (Bilson and Frenkel) or Keynesian (Dornbusch) in nature. The fourth model (Real Interest Differential Model) was a mixture of the two schools of economic theory.^ There is no clear empirical evidence of the validity of the monetary models. However, the signs of the coefficients of the nominal interest differential variable were as predicted by the Keynesian hypothesis in the case of Canada and as predicted by the Chicago theorists in the remaining countries. Moreover, in case of Brazil, due to hyperinflation, the exchange rate is heavily influenced by domestic money supply.^ I also tested the purchasing power parity (PPP) for this same set of countries. For both the monetary as well as the PPP hypothesis, I tested for co-integration and applied ordinary least squares estimation procedure. The error correction model was also used for the PPP model, to determine convergence to equilibrium.^ The validity of PPP is also questionable for my set of countries. Endogeinity among the regressors as well as the lack of proper price indices are the contributing factors. More importantly, Central Bank intervention negate rapid adjustment of price and exchange rates to their equilibrium value. However, its forecasting capability for the period 1993-1994 is superior compared to the monetary models in two of the four cases.^ I conclude that in spite of the questionable validity of these models, the monetary models give better results in the case of the "smaller" economies like the Dominican Republic and Jamaica where monetary influences swamp the other determinants of exchange rate. ^

The applied computer science of economic analyses: Internet prioritization and Internet pricing, and software engineering and software pricing for the mass market

This research examines evolving issues in applied computer science and applies economic and business analyses as well. There are two main areas. The first is internetwork communications as embodied by the Internet. The goal of the research is to devise an efficient pricing, prioritization, and incentivization plan that could be realistically implemented on the existing infrastructure. Criteria include practical and economic efficiency, and proper incentives for both users and providers. Background information on the evolution and functional operation of the Internet is given, and relevant literature is surveyed and analyzed. Economic analysis is performed on the incentive implications of the current pricing structure and organization. The problems are identified, and minimally disruptive solutions are proposed for all levels of implementation to the lowest level protocol. Practical issues are considered and performance analyses are done. The second area of research is mass market software engineering, and how this differs from classical software engineering. Software life-cycle revenues are analyzed and software pricing and timing implications are derived. A profit maximizing methodology is developed to select or defer the development of software features for inclusion in a given release. An iterative model of the stages of the software development process is developed, taking into account new communications capabilities as well as profitability. ^

Planning and evaluation of Business English course in compliance with internationalization in Taiwan: A case study of Tainan Women's College of Arts & Technology

In compliance with the economic internationalization movement and the development of Asia-Pacific Regional Operation Center (APROC) in Taiwan, international business has become more and more important. To sustain favorable trade balances every year and the promotion of APROC in Taiwan, more and more talent with knowledge and skills of Business English are needed. As a consequence, it is necessary to make Business English curriculum appropriate to meet the emerging needs.^ Two groups, experimental and control, received the revised or traditional Business English course to answer the question, "Does the Business English curriculum at Tainan Woman's College of Arts & Technology (TWCAT) meet the needs of students?" Ninety-five subjects were randomly selected from the commercial departments at TWCAT and then randomly assigned to the two groups. In addition, the Business English scores of the subjects' previous semester were collected and analyzed to justify the random selection and assignment. The finding was that their initial equivalence was proved.^ A questionnaire for students and another one for the business community were administered to facilitate data collection and analysis. The results of the questionnaires were used to modify the curriculum content of Business English.^ A final-term examination was given to the subjects at the end of the pilot study of Business English in early May of 1998. The resulting scores of the examination were used to determine if there was a significant difference in learning achievement between the students of the two groups.^ Using Independent Samples Test, significant results indicated that the experimental group had higher level of learning Business English than the control group. The finding supports the hypothesis of this study.^ Recommendations based on these results are that the revised curriculum be adapted and used by TWCAT because it better meets student needs. ^

An evaluation of exchange rate policy and economic adjustment in Nicaragua, 1993--1995

Since the late 1970's, but particularly since the mid-1980s, the economy of Nicaragua has had persistent and large macroeconomic imbalances, while GDP per-capita has declined to 1950s' levels. By the second half of the 1990s, huge fiscal deficits and a reduction of foreign financing resulted in record hyperinflation. The Sandinista government's (1979–1990) harsh stabilization program in 1988–89 had only modest and short-lived success. It was doomed by their inability to lower the public sector deficit due to the war, plus diminishing financial support from abroad. Hyperinflation stopped only after their 1990 electoral defeat ended the war and massive aid began to flow in. Five years later, macroeconomic stability is still very fragile. A sluggish recovery of export agriculture plus import liberalization, have impeded a reduction of huge trade and current account deficits. Facing the prospects of diminished aid flows, the government's strategy has hinged on the achievement of a real devaluation through a crawling-peg adjustment of the nominal rate. However, at the end of 1995 the situation of the external accounts was still critical, and the modest progress achieved was attributable to cyclical terms-of-trade improvement and changes in the political outlook of agricultural producers. Using a Computable General Equilibrium Model and a Social Accounting Matrix constructed for this dissertation, the importance of structural rigidities in production and demand in explaining such outcome is shown. It is shown that under the plausible structural assumptions incorporated in the model, the role of devaluation in the adjustment process is restricted by structural rigidities. Moreover, contrary to the premise of the orthodox economic thinking behind the economic program, it is the contractionary effect of devaluation more than its expenditure-switching effects that provide the basis for is use in solving the external sector's problems. A fixed nominal exchange rate is found to lead to adverse results. The broader conclusion that emerges from the study is that a new social compact and a rapid increase in infrastructure spending plus fiscal support for the traditional agro-export activities is at the center of a successful adjustment towards external viability in Nicaragua. ^