Unemployment Benefits and Reservation Wages: Key Elasticities from a Stripped-Down Job Search Approach

This paper exploits survey information on reservation wages and data on actual wages from the European Community Household Panel to deduce, in the manner of Lancaster and Chesher, additional parameters of a stylized structural search model; specifically, reservation wage and transition/duration elasticities. The informational requirements of this approach are minimal, thereby facilitating comparisons between countries. Further, its policy content is immediate in so far as the impact of unemployment benefit rules and measures increasing the arrival rate of job offers are concerned. These key elasticities are computed for the United Kingdom and 11 other European nations.

Six ways to leave unemployment

This paper uses a unique Portuguese dataset to examine the effect of access to unemployment benefits (UBs) and their maximum potential duration on escape rates from unemployment. In examining the time profile of transitions out of unemployment, the principal contributions of the paper are twofold. First, it provides a detailed state space of potential outcomes: open-ended employment, fixed-term contracts, part-time work, government-provided jobs, self employment, and labour force withdrawal. Second, it is able to exploit major exogenous discontinuities in the maximum duration of unemployment benefits to identify disincentive effects. While confirming strong disincentive effects, it is shown that use of an aggregate hazard function regression model compounds very different and even contradictory effects of the determinants of unemployment.

Does Job Search Monitoring Intensity Affect Unemployment? Evidence from Northern Ireland

Because unemployment benefit reforms typically package together a number of changes, few existing evaluations have been able to isolate the effects of changes in job search monitoring intensity on benefit recipient stocks or flows. Those few studies that do so draw mixed conclusions. This paper provides new estimates of monitoring impacts by exploiting plausibly exogenous periods where search monitoring has been temporarily withdrawn - with the regime otherwise unchanged - during a series of benefit office refurbishments in Northern Ireland. As we would expect from search theory, withdrawal of monitoring significantly increases the stock of unemployment benefit recipients via reduced outflows. © The London School of Economics and Political Science 2008.

Job search monitoring intensity, unemployment exit and job entry: Quasi-experimental evidence from the UK

Because unemployment benefit reforms tend to package together changes to job search requirements, monitoring and assistance, few existing studies have been able to empirically isolate the effects of job search monitoring intensity on the behaviour of unemployment benefit claimants. This paper exploits periods where monitoring has been temporarily withdrawn during a series of Benefit Office refurbishments - with the regime otherwise unchanged - to allow such identification. During these periods of zero monitoring the hazard rates for exits from claimant unemployment and for job entry both fall. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Calculus of variations on time scales and applications to economics

We consider some problems of the calculus of variations on time scales. On the beginning our attention is paid on two inverse extremal problems on arbitrary time scales. Firstly, using the Euler-Lagrange equation and the strengthened Legendre condition, we derive a general form for a variation functional that attains a local minimum at a given point of the vector space. Furthermore, we prove a necessary condition for a dynamic integro-differential equation to be an Euler-Lagrange equation. New and interesting results for the discrete and quantum calculus are obtained as particular cases. Afterwards, we prove Euler-Lagrange type equations and transversality conditions for generalized infinite horizon problems. Next we investigate the composition of a certain scalar function with delta and nabla integrals of a vector valued field. Euler-Lagrange equations in integral form, transversality conditions, and necessary optimality conditions for isoperimetric problems, on an arbitrary time scale, are proved. In the end, two main issues of application of time scales in economic, with interesting results, are presented. In the former case we consider a firm that wants to program its production and investment policies to reach a given production rate and to maximize its future market competitiveness. The model which describes firm activities is studied in two different ways: using classical discretizations; and applying discrete versions of our result on time scales. In the end we compare the cost functional values obtained from those two approaches. The latter problem is more complex and relates to rate of inflation, p, and rate of unemployment, u, which inflict a social loss. Using known relations between p, u, and the expected rate of inflation π, we rewrite the social loss function as a function of π. We present this model in the time scale framework and find an optimal path π that minimizes the total social loss over a given time interval.

The Inflation Bias When the Central Bank Targets, the Natural Rate of Unemployment

This paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemployment rate. Preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive unemployment deviations from the natural rate are weighted more (or less) severely than negative deviations in the central banker's loss function. The bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment. The time-series predictions of the model are evaluated using data from G7 countries. Econometric estimates support the prediction that the conditional variance of unemployment and the rate of inflation are positively related.

Unemployment insurance : severance payments and informality in developing countries

We analyze whether the introduction or an increase of unemployment insurance (UI hereafter) beneÖts in developing countries reduces the e§ort made by unemployed workers to secure a new job in the formal sector. We adopt a comparative static approach and we consider the consequences of an increase of current UI beneÖts on unemployed workersídecision variables in this same period, i.e. we focus on an intra-temporal trade-o§, allowing us to assume away moral hazard complications. When there is no informal sector, unemployed workers may devote their time between e§ort to secure a new job in the formal sector and leisure. In the presence of an informal sector, unemployed workers may also devote time to remunerated informal activities. Consequently, the amount of e§ort devoted to secure a new (formal) job generates an opportunity cost, which ceteris paribus, reduces the amount of time devoted to remunerated activities in the informal sector. We show that in the presence of an informal sector, an increase of current UI beneÖts decreases this marginal opportunity cost and therefore unambiguously increases the e§ort undertaken to secure a new job in the formal sector. This intra-temporal e§ect is the only one at play in presence of one-shot UI beneÖts or with severance payments mechanism.

Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector

We study the effect of UI benefits in a typical developing country where the informal sector is sizeable and persistent. In a partial equilibrium environment, ruling out the macroeconomic consequences of UI benefits, we characterize the stationary equilibrium of an economy where policyholders may be employed in the formal sector, short-run unemployed receiving UI benefits or long-run unemployed without UI benefits. We perform comparative static exercises to understand how UI benefits affect unemployed worker´s effort to secure a formal job, their labor supply in the informal sector and leisure time. Our model reveals that an increase in UI benefits generates two opposing effects for the short-run unemployed. First, since search efforts cannot be monitored it generates moral hazard behaviours that lower effort. Second, it generates an income effect as it reduces the marginal cost of searching for a formal job and increases effort.The overall effect is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these two effects. Additionally, we show that an increase in UI benefits increases the efforts of long-run unemployed workers. We provide a simple simulation exercise which suggests that the income effect pointed out is not necessarily of second-order importance in comparison with moral hazard strength. This result softens the widespread opinion, usually based on the microeconomic/partial equilibrium argument that the presence of dual labor markets is an obstacle to providing UI in developing countries.

Growth, migration and unemployment across Swedish municipalities

Fundamental questions in economics are why some regions are richer than others, why their economic growth rates vary, whether their growth tends to converge and the key factors that contribute to the variations. These questions have not yet been fully addressed, but changes in the local tax base are clearly influenced by the average income growth rate, net migration rate, and changes in unemployment rates. Thus, the main aim of this paper is to explore in depth the interactive effects of these factors (and local policy variables) in Swedish municipalities, by estimating a proposed three-equation system. Our main finding is that increases in local public expenditures and income taxes have negative effects on subsequent local income growth. In addition, our results support the conditional convergence hypothesis, i.e. that average income tends to grow more rapidly in relatively poor local jurisdictions than in initially “richer” jurisdictions, conditional on the other explanatory variables.

Essays in Behavioral Personnel Economics

The thesis contemplates 4 papers and its main goal is to provide evidence on the prominent impact that behavioral analysis can play into the personnel economics domain.The research tool prevalently used in the thesis is the experimental analysis.The first paper provide laboratory evidence on how the standard screening model–based on the assumption that the pecuniary dimension represents the main workers’choice variable–fails when intrinsic motivation is introduced into the analysis.The second paper explores workers’ behavioral reactions when dealing with supervisors that may incur in errors in the assessment of their job performance.In particular,deserving agents that have exerted high effort may not be rewarded(Type-I errors)and undeserving agents that have exerted low effort may be rewarded(Type-II errors).Although a standard neoclassical model predicts both errors to be equally detrimental for effort provision,this prediction fails when tested through a laboratory experiment.Findings from this study suggest how failing to reward deserving agents is significantly more detrimental than rewarding undeserving agents.The third paper investigates the performance of two antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on schooling achievement.The study is conducted through a field experiment.Students randomized to the main treatments have been incentivized to cooperate or to compete in order to earn additional exam points.Consistently with the theoretical model proposed in the paper,the level of effort in the competitive scheme proved to be higher than in the cooperative setting.Interestingly however,this result is characterized by a strong gender effect.The fourth paper exploits a natural experiment setting generated by the credit crunch occurred in the UK in the2007.The economic turmoil has negatively influenced the private sector,while public sector employees have not been directly hit by the crisis.This shock–through the rise of the unemployment rate and the increasing labor market uncertainty–has generated an exogenous variation in the opportunity cost of maternity leave in private sector labor force.This paper identifies the different responses.

Essays on Unemployment Insurance

Can the potential availability of unemployment insurance (UI) affect the behavior of employed workers and the duration of their employment spells? After discussing few straightforward reasons why UI may affect employment duration, I apply a regression kink design (RKD) to address this question using linked employer-employee data from the Brazilian labor market. Exploiting the UI schedule, I find that potential benefit level significantly affects the duration of employment spells. This effect is local to low skilled workers and, surprisingly, indicates that a 1\% increase in unemployment benefits increases job duration by around 0.3\%. Such result is driven by the fact that higher UI decreases the probability of job quits, which are not covered by UI in Brazil. These estimates are robust to permutation tests and a number of falsification tests. I develop a reduced-form welfare formula to assess the economic relevance of this result. Based on that, I show that the positive effect on employment duration implies in a higher optimal benefit level. Moreover, the formula shows that the elasticity of employment duration impacts welfare just with the same weight as the well-known elasticity of unemployment duration to benefit level.

How Do We Teach Economics?

The teaching of economics in Hungary has changed fundamentally since the 1980s for two main reasons. Firstly, the transformation towards a market economy has changed the needs of students, and secondly, there has been a move to harmonise Hungarian methods of teaching with Western ones. The number of institutions involved in economics education has increased substantially to meet new demand and these institutions offer a wide range of programs, though the topics covered tend to be more practically based than previously. A survey of students set out to evaluate economics as a profession by investigating social esteem, financial compensation, career prospects, and mobility within the profession. Amongst full-time students there was a strong correlation between the parents' background and the students' career prospects. Full-time students were more optimistic than part-time students, although the latter had a higher opinion of the academic level of their educational establishments. A second survey, this time of economics teachers, revealed the disturbing fact that teachers rated themselves in the last but one position according to social esteem and felt that society had a poor opinion of them. Fifty percent expressed a desire to leave the profession and 70% supplemented their income with work outside their school, rarely within the domain of economics. The final part of the research analysed the situation in private educational institutions, nothing that unemployment retraining grants offered by the Ministry of Labour have created an incentive for private entrepreneurs to organise courses and that the quality of these courses varies considerably.