The EU-Ukraine-Russia Sanctions Triangle. CEPS Commentary, 13 October 2014

The EU and the US have been stepping up sanctions against Russia because the Kremlin has broken every basic rule of the pan-European security order enshrined in the Helsinki Treaty of 1975. The effective closure of financial markets for Russia’s big businesses now has serious bite. The Kremlin’s counter-sanctions are marginal. Russia’s actual and threatened trade sanctions against Ukraine, alongside its aggression over Crimea and east Ukraine, mean that it has cast itself in the image of an enemy for most Ukrainians. Europe’s trust of the Kremlin has sunk to its lowest level since pre-Gorbachev times. If Russia were to switch to a sincerely cooperative, long-term peace mode with Ukraine, the EU and the US would no doubt be happy to scrap the sanctions. In the absence of this, however, the logic would be for the EU and the US to sustain the most significant economic sanctions for as long as it takes, with preparedness to intensify them.

Russian sanctions against Moldova. Minor effects, major potential. OSW COMMENTARY No. 152, 2014-11-06

Russia has been Moldova’s main trade partner and Russian capital has accounted for a large part of its foreign investments, dominating in the energy and the banking sectors. Moreover, Russia has been a key job market for Moldovan expatriate workers. In the economic sphere, this is making Moldova unilaterally dependent on Russia. Moscow has been attempting to exploit this situation to put pressure on the authorities in Chișinău for quite some time. In recent months Russia has increasingly used instruments for exerting economic pressure on Moldova, as a means of responding to the current authorities’ pro-Western policy. A key element of this policy was Moldova’s signing on 27 June 2014 of the Association Agreement with the EU (which came into force on 1 September 2014). Over the last year, Russia has implemented a number of import restrictions on Moldovan goods. The aim of the Russian actions is to fuel social disappointment, and ultimately – to prevent the pro-European coalition currently in power from winning the parliamentary elections scheduled for 30 November 2014. Another aim might be to convince the Moldovan authorities to suspend the implementation of the Association Agreement – a plan openly put forward by Vladimir Putin during the CIS summit in Minsk on 10 October 2014. So far, however, the Russian economic sanctions have failed to produce the expected results. Support for the pro-European parties has been high, and there is little chance that the pro-Russian groups might achieve a parliamentary majority. It is not inconceivable, then, that in the upcoming months Moscow might decide to resort to other, more potent instruments of economic pressure such as speculation on the financial market, carried out as part of its de facto control over the banking sector. Another possibility is further tightening of trade restrictions, issuing expatriate workers from Russia or using Moldova’s dependence on Russian energy.

The economic and financial crisis in Russia – background, symptoms and prospects for the future. OSW Report 02/2015

The crisis in Russia’s financial market, which started in mid-December 2014, has exposed the real scale of the economic problems that have been growing in Russia for several years. Over the course of the last year, Russia’s basic macroeconomic indicators deteriorated considerably, the confidence of its citizens in the state and in institutions in charge of economic stability declined, the government and business elites became increasingly dissatisfied with the policy direction adopted by the Kremlin, and fighting started over the shrinking resources. According to forecasts obtained from both governmental and expert communities, Russia will fall into recession in 2015. The present situation is the result of the simultaneous occurrence of three unfavourable trends: the fact that the Russian economy’s resource-based development model has reached the limits of its potential due to structural weaknesses, the dramatic decline in oil prices in the second half of 2014, and the impact of Western economic sanctions. Given the inefficiency of existing systemic mechanisms, in the coming years the Russian leadership will likely resort to ad hoc solutions such as switching to a more interventionist “manual override” mode in governing the state. In the short term, this will allow them to neutralise the most urgent problems, although an effective development policy will be impossible without a fundamental change of the political and economic system in Russia.

Foreign aid : questions on the Central American regional program need to be resolved : report to the Honorable Patrick Leahy, United States Senate /

"B-221422"--P. [1].

Second Central American Integration Fund loan : proposal and recommendations for the review of the Development Loan Committee /

"AID-DLC/P-560 revised."

Alternatives to bilateral economic aid.

At head of title: 93d Congress, 1st session. Committee print.

A comparative analysis of policies and other factors which affect the role of the private sector in economic development /

"PN-AAL-031"--Cover.

"New directions" in development assistance [microform] : implementation in four Latin American countries : report of a Staff Survey Mission to Colombia, Bolivia, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, pursuant to H. Res. 267 ... August 31, 1975.

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.

Economic policies and programs in South America

Mode of access: Internet.

President Kennedy's inter-American program for social progress : questions & answers.

Mode of access: Internet.

International technical and cultural cooperation : United States participation, 1938-1948 : report for the U.S. Delegation to the 9th International Conference of American States.

Mode of access: Internet.

The Inter-American Foundation and the small and micro-enterprise sector /

Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-71).

Inter-American Development Bank loans to Guatemala : hearing before the Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, December 8, 1981.

Item 1013-A, 1013-B (microfiche)

Egypt's capacity to absorb and use economic assistance effectively : report of the Comptroller General of the United States.

"B-125010."

U.S. policy for the East Asia regional economic development program--what should it be? Department of State, Agency for International Development : report to the Congress /

Publication date stamped on cover.