Ambiguity, social opinion and the use of common property resources

In this paper we argue that ambiguity, combined with social opinion formation, can be used as the foundation of a game-theoretic equilibrium concept that transcends the standard Nash equilibrium concept, applied to a model of the tragedy of the commons. Our approach sheds light on the international environmental crisis and the relevant ongoing international negotiations. We conclude that social opinion formation in most cases has a significant impact on equilibrium common property resource usage.

Information aggregation and belief elicitation in experimental parimutuel betting markets

This paper studies the impact of belief elicitation on informational efficiency and individual behavior in experimental parimutuel betting markets. In one treatment, groups of eight participants, who possess a private signal about the eventual outcome, play a sequential betting game. The second treatment is identical, except that bettors are observed by eight other participants who submit incentivized beliefs about the winning probabilities of each outcome. In the third treatment, the same individuals make bets and assess the winning probabilities of the outcomes. Market probabilities more accurately reflect objective probabilities in the third than in the other two treatments. Submitting beliefs reduces the favorite-longshot bias and making bets improves the accuracy of elicited beliefs. A level-k framework provides some insights about why belief elicitation improves the capacity of betting markets to aggregate information. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Learning, fatigue and preference formation in discrete choice experiments

While the repeated nature of Discrete Choice Experiments is advantageous from a sampling efficiency perspective, patterns of choice may differ across the tasks, due, in part, to learning and fatigue. Using probabilistic decision process models, we find in a field study that learning and fatigue behavior may only be exhibited by a small subset of respondents. Most respondents in our sample show preference and variance stability consistent with rational pre-existent and
well formed preferences. Nearly all of the remainder exhibit both learning and fatigue effects. An important aspect of our approach is that it enables learning and fatigue effects to be explored, even though they were not envisaged during survey design or data collection.

Stability in a Network Economy: The Role of Institutions

We consider an economy in which agents are embedded in a network of potential value-generating relationships. Agents are assumed to be able to participate in three types of economic interactions: Autarkic self-provision; bilateral interaction; and multilateral collaboration through endogenously provided platforms.
We introduce two stability concepts and provide sufficient and necessary conditions on the network structure that guarantee existence, in cases of the absence of externalities, link-based externalities and crowding externalities. We show that institutional arrangements based on socioeconomic roles and leadership guarantee stability. In particular, the stability of more complex economic outcomes requires more strict and complex institutional rules to govern economic interactions. We investigate strict social hierarchies, tiered leadership structures and global market places.

Eliciting and estimating valid subjective probabilities: An experimental investigation of the Exchangeability Method.

Using a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether incentive compatibility affects subjective probabilities elicited via the exchangeability method (EM), an elicitation technique consisting of several chained questions. We hypothesize that subjects who are aware of the chaining strategically behave and provide invalid subjective probabilities, while subjects who are not aware of the chaining state their real beliefs and provide valid subjective probabilities. The validity of subjective probabilities is investigated using de Finetti's notion of coherence, under which probability estimates are valid if and only if they obey all axioms of probability theory.
Four experimental treatments are designed and implemented. Subjects are divided into two initial treatment groups: in the first, they are provided with real monetary incentives, and in the second, they are not. Each group is further sub-divided into two treatment groups, in the first, the chained structure of the experimental design is made clear to the subjects, while, in the second, the chained structure is hidden by randomizing the elicitation questions.
Our results suggest that subjects provided with monetary incentives and randomized questions provide valid subjective probabilities because they are not aware of the chaining which undermines the incentive compatibility of the exchangeability method.

Influencia de la comunidad de clústers en las relaciones estratégicas comunitarias y el marketing compartido

Un clúster es entendido por la gran mayoría como un gran conglomerado de empresas que giran en torno a un objetivo, en su gran mayoría económico. Su intención es competir con otros conglomerados en cuanto a precios y cantidades, ya que de manera individual no podrían. En consecuencia, esta unión se utiliza en un principio para crear ventajas tanto competitivas como comparativas en contra de la competencia, lo cual genera un valor a esta unión, con el fin de producir fidelidad en el cliente y recordación de todos los productos que tal unión brinde. Según estudios realizados por diversos autores, en muchas ocasiones, los clúster no se crean con una finalidad económica, sino como desarrollo de un perfil comunitario que ayude a la sociedad y las organizaciones que la componen. La base de las relaciones se centra en la comunicación y en las diversas técnicas que existen en ese ámbito para asegurar la sostenibilidad de la organización. Dentro de estas relaciones, se le da un reconocimiento a la educación y la cultura en donde se encuentra ubicado el clúster, ya que las estrategias que se implementen se relacionan directamente con las necesidades de los clientes, generando en el pensamiento de la comunidad la perdurabilidad y sostenibilidad como efecto del desarrollo social.

On blame-freeness and reciprocity: an experimental study

The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward nice or kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question as to how to define kindness. In this paper we offer a new definition of kindness that we call “blame-freeness.” Put most simply, blame-freeness states that in judging whether player i has been kind or unkind to player j in a social situation, player j would have to put himself in the strategic position of player i, while retaining his preferences, and ask if he would have acted in a manner that was worse than i did under identical circumstances. If j would have acted in a more unkind manner than i acted, then we say that j does not blame i for his behavior. If, however, j would have been nicer than i was, then we say that “j blames i” for his actions (i’s actions were blameworthy). We consider this notion a natural, intuitive and empirically relevant way to explain the motives of people engaged in reciprocal behavior. After developing the conceptual framework, we then test this concept in a laboratory experiment involving tournaments and find significant support for the theory.

Does uncertainty cause inertia in decision making? An experimental study of the role of regret aversion and indecisiveness

Previous research has shown that often there is clear inertia in individual decision making---that is, a tendency for decision makers to choose a status quo option. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate two potential determinants of inertia in uncertain environments: (i) regret aversion and (ii) ambiguity-driven indecisiveness. I use a between-subjects design with varying conditions to identify the effects of these two mechanisms on choice behavior. In each condition, participants choose between two simple real gambles, one of which is the status quo option. I find that inertia is quite large and that both mechanisms are equally important.

Consumption and social identity: evidence from India

We examine spending on consumption items which have signaling value in social interactions across groups with distinctive social identities in India, where social identities are defined by caste and religious affiliations. Using nationally representative micro data on household consumption expenditures, we find that disadvantaged caste groups such as Other Backward Castes spend 8 percent more on visible consumption than Brahmin and High Caste groups while social groups such as Muslims spend 14 percent less, after controlling for differences in permanent income, household assets and household demographic composition. The differences across social groups are significant and robust and these differences persist within different sub populations. We find that the higher spending of OBC households on visible consumption is diverted from education spending, while Muslim households divert spending from visible consumption and education towards greater food spending. Additionally, we find that these consumption patterns can be partly explained as a result of the status signaling nature of the consumption items. We also discuss alternative sources of differences in consumption patterns across groups which stem from religious observance.

Gender differences in ultimatum games: despite rather than due to risk attitudes

We analyze experimental data obtained from an ultimatum game framed as a situation of employee-employer negotiation over salaries. Parallel to this, we elicit subjects' risk attitudes. In the existing literature, it has often been conjectured that gender differences in strategic environments are partly due to differences in risky decision making. Our evidence suggests that both gender and risk-related effects co-exist in ultimatum bargaining. However, differences in risk attitudes cannot explain gender effects in ultimatum bargaining.

Accounting for risk aversion in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games: an experimental test

We apply experimental methods to study the role of risk aversion on players’ behavior in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games. Faced with quantitatively equal discount factors, the most risk-averse players will choose Nash strategies more often in the presence of uncertainty than when future profits are discounted in a deterministic way. Overall, we find that risk aversion relates negatively with the frequency of collusive outcomes.

Contract cheating & the market in essays

We conduct the first empirical economic investigation of the decision to cheat by University students. We investigate student demand for essays, using hypothetical discrete choice experiments in conjunction with consequential Holt-Laury gambles to derive subjects risk preferences. Students stated willingness to participate in the essay market, and their valuation of purchased essays, vary with the characteristics of student and institutional environment. Risk preferring students, those working in a non-native language, and those believing they will attain a lower grade are willing to pay more. Purchase likelihoods and essay valuations decline as the probability of detection and associated penalty increase.