982 resultados para Economic Adjustment Programme
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Shipping list no.: 92-190-P.
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Since the late 1970's, but particularly since the mid-1980s, the economy of Nicaragua has had persistent and large macroeconomic imbalances, while GDP per-capita has declined to 1950s' levels. By the second half of the 1990s, huge fiscal deficits and a reduction of foreign financing resulted in record hyperinflation. The Sandinista government's (1979–1990) harsh stabilization program in 1988–89 had only modest and short-lived success. It was doomed by their inability to lower the public sector deficit due to the war, plus diminishing financial support from abroad. Hyperinflation stopped only after their 1990 electoral defeat ended the war and massive aid began to flow in. Five years later, macroeconomic stability is still very fragile. A sluggish recovery of export agriculture plus import liberalization, have impeded a reduction of huge trade and current account deficits. Facing the prospects of diminished aid flows, the government's strategy has hinged on the achievement of a real devaluation through a crawling-peg adjustment of the nominal rate. However, at the end of 1995 the situation of the external accounts was still critical, and the modest progress achieved was attributable to cyclical terms-of-trade improvement and changes in the political outlook of agricultural producers. Using a Computable General Equilibrium Model and a Social Accounting Matrix constructed for this dissertation, the importance of structural rigidities in production and demand in explaining such outcome is shown. It is shown that under the plausible structural assumptions incorporated in the model, the role of devaluation in the adjustment process is restricted by structural rigidities. Moreover, contrary to the premise of the orthodox economic thinking behind the economic program, it is the contractionary effect of devaluation more than its expenditure-switching effects that provide the basis for is use in solving the external sector's problems. A fixed nominal exchange rate is found to lead to adverse results. The broader conclusion that emerges from the study is that a new social compact and a rapid increase in infrastructure spending plus fiscal support for the traditional agro-export activities is at the center of a successful adjustment towards external viability in Nicaragua. ^
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In the run-up to the Greek elections on January 25th and the subsequent renegotiation of the country's economic adjustment programme with the troika, Daniel Gros writes in this Commentary that "nobody officially wants Grexit": not Syriza, which wants Greece to stay in the euro. It is ‘only’ asking for a reduction in Greece’s official debt and an end to austerity. The German government also does not favour Grexit because European unification remains the central project for German policy-makers across all mainstream parties. Only some protest parties and vocal economists think Greece (and Germany) would better off with a new Drachma. In his view, the substantive issues are thus the demands for a reduction of the official debt of Greece and an end to austerity, both of which he describes as eminently fudgeable. In any event, change in policy will be minor if a Syriza government is as successful in fulfilling its promise to spend as the previous government was in promising not to spend.
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Includes bibliography
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Adjustement is an ongoing process by which factors of reallocated to equalize their returns in different uses. Adjustment occurs though market mechanisms or intrafirm reallocation of resources as a result of changes in terms of trade, government policies, resource availability, technological change, etc. These changes alter production opportunities and production, transaction and information costs, and consequently modify production functions, organizational design, etc. In this paper we define adjustment (section 2); review empirical estimates of the extent of adjustment in Canada and abroad (section 3); review selected features of the trade policy and adjustment context of relevance for policy formulation among which: slow growth, a shift to services, a shift to the Pacific Rim, the internationalization of production, investment distribution communications the growing use of NTB's, changes in foreign direct investment patterns, intrafirm and intraindustry trade, interregional trade flows, differences in micro economic adjustment processes of adjustment as between subsidiaries and Canadian companies (section 4); examine methodologies and results of studies of the impact of trade liberalization on jobs (section 5); and review the R. Harris general equilibrium model (section 6). Our conclusion emphasizes the importance of harmonizing commercial and domestic policies dealing with adjustment (section 7). We close with a bibliography of relevant publications.
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Since the implementation of Ghana's national Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), policies associated with the programme have been criticized for perpetuating poverty within the country's subsistence economy. This article brings new evidence to bear on the contention that the SAP has both fuelled the uncontrolled growth of informal, poverty-driven artisanal gold mining and further marginalized its impoverished participants. Throughout the adjustment period, it has been a central goal of the government to promote the expansion of large-scale gold mining through foreign investment. Confronted with the challenge of resuscitating a deteriorating gold mining industry, the government introduced a number of tax breaks and policies in an effort to create an attractive investment climate for foreign multinational mining companies. The rapid rise in exploration and excavation activities that has since taken place has displaced thousands of previously-undisturbed subsistence artisanal gold miners. This, along with a laissez faire land concession allocation procedure, has exacerbated conflicts between mining parties. Despite legalizing small-scale mining in 1989, the Ghanaian government continues to implement procedurally complex and bureaucratically unwieldy regulations and policies for artisanal operators which have the effect of favouring the interests of established large-scale miners.
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In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) the technological advances of the Green Revolution (GR) have not been very successful. However, the efforts being made to re-introduce the revolution call for more socio-economic research into the adoption and the effects of the new technologies. The paper discusses an investigation on the effects of GR technology adoption on poverty among households in Ghana. Maximum likelihood estimation of a poverty model within the framework of Heckman's two stage method of correcting for sample selection was employed. Technology adoption was found to have positive effects in reducing poverty. Other factors that reduce poverty include education, credit, durable assets, living in the forest belt and in the south of the country. Technology adoption itself was also facilitated by education, credit, non-farm income and household labour supply as well as living in urban centres. Inarguably, technology adoption can be taken seriously by increasing the levels of complementary inputs such as credit, extension services and infrastructure. Above all, the fundamental problems of illiteracy, inequality and lack of effective markets must be addressed through increasing the levels of formal and non-formal education, equitable distribution of the 'national cake' and a more pragmatic management of the ongoing Structural Adjustment Programme.
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography
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In this study, projects are not regarded as isolated economic units; they are considered within the context of the entire economic system of which they will form a part. Thus the Manual presents both macroeconomic and microeconomic concepts. From this it must not be inferred that the Manual attempts to offer a combined microeconomic and macroeconomic theory. It seeks to contribute more to an appreciation of the problem than to its solution, thus widening the outlook of those who prepare projects so that they may make the greatest possible compilation of useful data for their economic appraisal.
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The initial ‘framing’ (in the summer of 2012) of the ‘genuine EMU’ for the wider public suggested to design an entire series of ‘unions’. So many ‘unions’ are neither necessary nor desirable – only some are and their design matters. The paper critically discusses first the negative fall-out of the crisis for EMU, and subsequently assesses the fiscal and the banking unions as accomplished so far, without going into highly specific technical details. The assessment is moderately positive, although there is ample scope for further improvement and a risk for short-term turbulence once the ECB has finished its tests and reviews. What about the parade of other ’unions’ such as economic union, social union and political union? The macro-economic imbalances procedure (MIP) and possibly the ESRB have overcome the pre-crisis disregard of macro competitiveness. The three components of ‘economic union’ (single market, economic policy coordination and budgetary disciplines) have all been strengthened. The last two ‘unions’, on the other hand, would imply a fundamental change in the conferral of powers to the EU/ Eurozone, with drastic and possibly very serious long-run implications, including a break-up of the Union, if such proposals would be pushed through. The cure is worse than the disease. Whereas social union is perhaps easier to dismiss as a ‘misfit’ in the EU, the recent popularity of suggesting a ‘political union’ is seen as worrisome. Probably, nobody knows what a ‘political union’ is, or, at best, it is a highly elastic notion: it might be thought necessary for reasons of domestic economic reforms in EU countries, for a larger common budget, for some EU tax power, for (greater) risk pooling, for ‘symmetric’ macro-economic adjustment and for some ultimate control of the ECB in times of crisis. Taking each one of these arguments separately, a range of more typical EU solutions might be found without suggesting a ‘political union’. Just as ‘fiscal capacity’ was long an all-or-nothing taboo for shifting bank resolution to the EU level, now solved with a modest common Fund and carefully confined but centralised powers, the author suggests that other carefully targeted responses can be designed for the various aspects where seen as indispensable, including the political say of a lender-of-last-resort function of the ECB. Hence, neither a social nor a political union worthy of the name ought to be pursued. Yet, political legitimacy matters, both with national parliaments and the grassroots. National parliaments will have to play a larger role.
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In contrast to his contribution just a month ago, which examined how a Greek parallel currency to the euro could allow the Greek government to gain some room for manoeuver in fiscal policy while at the same time continuing the adjustment programme demanded by the country’s creditors, Thomas Mayer explores in the present note the question of how the Greek population could still keep the euro after a default of its government. Contrary to general belief, he finds that Grexit and the reintroduction of the euro as a foreign currency would probably be positive for the Greek economy, although its creditors would be hard hit. It is therefore primarily in their interest that default and Grexit are avoided.
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"April 1983."
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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics