An empirical analysis of the money demand function in India

This paper empirically analyzes India’s money demand function during the period of 1980 to 2007 using monthly data and the period of 1976 to 2007 using annual data. Cointegration test results indicated that when money supply is represented by M1 and M2, a cointegrating vector is detected among real money balances, interest rates, and output. In contrast, it was found that when money supply is represented by M3, there is no long-run equilibrium relationship in the　money demand function. Moreover, when the money demand function was estimated using　dynamic OLS, the sign onditions of the coefficients of output and interest rates were found to be　consistent with theoretical rationale, and statistical significance was confirmed when money supply was represented by either M1 or M2. Consequently, though India’s central bank presently uses M3 as an indicator of future price movements, it is thought appropriate to focus on M1 or M2, rather than M3, in managing monetary policy.

Ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement in trade credit supply: theory and evidence from China

If payment of goods is easily default, economic transaction may deeply suffer from the risk. This risky environment formed a mechanism that governs how economic transaction is realized, subsequently how trade credit is given. This paper distinguished ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement, then modeled that bargaining power reduces trade credit ex ante, and ex post enforcement power and cash in hand of buyer can enhances both trade amount and trade credit in a presence of default risk. We modeled this relationship in order to organize findings from previous literature and from our original micro data on detailed transaction in China to consistently understand the mechanism governing trade credit. Then empirically tested a structure from the theoretical prediction with data. Results show that ex post enforcement power of seller mainly determines size of trade credit and trade amount, cash in hand of buyer can substitute with enforcement power; Bargaining power of seller is exercised to reduces trade credit and trade amount for avoiding default risk, but it simultaneously improves enforcement power as well. We found that ex post enforcement power consists of (ex ante) bargaining power on between two parties and intervention from the third party. However, its magnitude is far smaller than the direct impact to reduce trade credit and trade amount.

Deposit dollarization in Myanmar

Myanmar has peculiar conditions of deposit dollarization that were shaped by administrative controls. On the one hand, restrictive controls encouraged the accumulation of foreign currency deposits (FCD). On the other hand, foreign currency loans (FCL) were not practiced officially; therefore, FCD was not utilized for credit. Given the adverse effects and persistence of dollarization in other dollarized economies and the recent recovery of local currency deposits in Myanmar, this paper opts for the prohibition of FCL and offers policy measures for de-dollarization.

Evidence that risk adjustment is unnecessary in estimates of the User cost of money

Investors value the special attributes of monetary assets (e.g., exchangeability, liquidity, and safety) and pay a premium for holding them in the form of a lower return rate -- The user cost of holding monetary assets can be measured approximately by the difference between the returns on illiquid risky assets and those of safer liquid assets -- A more appropriate measure should adjust this difference by the differential risk of the assets in question -- We investigate the impact that time non-separable preferences has on the estimation of the risk-adjusted user cost of money -- Using U.K. data from 1965Q1 to 2011Q1, we estimate a habit-based asset pricing model with money in the utility function and find that the risk adjustment for risky monetary assets is negligible -- Thus, researchers can dispense with risk adjusting the user cost of money in constructing monetary aggregate indexes