The Relay Selection and Transmission Trade-off in Cooperative Communication Systems

A common and practical paradigm in cooperative communication systems is the use of a dynamically selected `best' relay to decode and forward information from a source to a destination. Such systems use two phases - a relay selection phase, in which the system uses transmission time and energy to select the best relay, and a data transmission phase, in which it uses the spatial diversity benefits of selection to transmit data. In this paper, we derive closed-form expressions for the overall throughput and energy consumption, and study the time and energy trade-off between the selection and data transmission phases. To this end, we analyze a baseline non-adaptive system and several adaptive systems that adapt the selection phase, relay transmission power, or transmission time. Our results show that while selection yields significant benefits, the selection phase's time and energy overhead can be significant. In fact, at the optimal point, the selection can be far from perfect, and depends on the number of relays and the mode of adaptation. The results also provide guidelines about the optimal system operating point for different modes of adaptation. The analysis also sheds new insights on the fast splitting-based algorithm considered in this paper for relay selection.

Power and Discrete Rate Adaptation for Energy Harvesting Wireless Nodes

Energy Harvesting (EH) nodes, which harvest energy from the environment in order to communicate over a wireless link, promise perpetual operation of a wireless network with battery-powered nodes. In this paper, we address the throughput optimization problem for a rate-adaptive EH node that chooses its rate from a set of discrete rates and adjusts its power depending on its channel gain and battery state. First, we show that the optimal throughput of an EH node is upper bounded by the throughput achievable by a node that is subject only to an average power constraint. We then propose a simple transmission scheme for an EH node that achieves an average throughput close to the upper bound. The scheme's parameters can be made to account for energy overheads such as battery non-idealities and the energy required for sensing and processing. The effect of these overheads on the average throughput is also analytically characterized.

Power and delay optimal policies for wireless systems

In this paper we consider a single discrete time queue with infinite buffer. The channel may experience fading. The transmission rate is a linear function of power used for transmission. In this scenario we explicitly obtain power control policies which minimize mean power and/or mean delay. There may also be peak power constraint.

Low Complexity Power and Scheduling Policies for Wireless Networks to Provide Quality of Service

We consider optimal power allocation policies for a single server, multiuser system. The power is consumed in transmission of data only. The transmission channel may experience multipath fading. We obtain very efficient, low computational complexity algorithms which minimize power and ensure stability of the data queues. We also obtain policies when the users may have mean delay constraints. If the power required is a linear function of rate then we exploit linearity and obtain linear programs with low complexity.

Reflection and transmission of Gaussian beam from a uniaxial crystal slab

We investigate the characteristics of Gaussian beams reflected and transmitted from a uniaxial crystal slab with an arbitrary orientation of its optical axis. The formulas of the total electric and magnetic fields inside and outside the slab are derived by use of Maxwell's equations and by matching the boundary conditions at the interfaces. Numerical simulations are presented and the field values as well as the power densities are computed. Negative refractions are demonstrated when the beam is transmitted through a uniaxial crystal slab. Beam splitting of the reflected beam is observed and is explained by the resonant transmission for plane waves. Dependences of the lateral shift on the incident angle and beam width are discussed. Negative and positive lateral shifts are observed due to the spatial anisotropic properties.

Linking energy policy, electricity generation and transmission using strong sustainability and co-optimization

The design of a sustainable electricity generation and transmission system is based on the established science of anthropogenic climate change and the realization that depending on imported fossil-fuels is becoming a measure of energy insecurity of supply. A model is proposed which integrates generation fuel mix composition, assignment of plants and optimized power flow, using Portugal as a case study. The result of this co-optimized approach is an overall set of generator types/fuels which increases the diversity of Portuguese electricity supply, lowers its dependency on imported fuels by 14.62% and moves the country towards meeting its regional and international obligations of 31% energy from renewables by 2020 and a 27% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2012, respectively. The quantity and composition of power generation at each bus is specified, with particular focus on quantifying the amount of distributed generation. Based on other works, the resultant, overall distributed capacity penetration of 19.02% of total installed generation is expected to yield positive network benefits. Thus, the model demonstrates that national energy policy and technical deployment can be linked through sustainability and, moreover, that the respective goals may be mutually achieved via holistic, integrated design. ©2009 IEEE.

Enhancement of the far-field output power and the beam properties of plasmonic very small aperture lasers

The properties of plasmonic very small aperture lasers are shown: these integrate surface plasmon structures with very small aperture lasers. The transmission field can be confined to a spot of subwavelength width in the far field, and according to the finite difference time domain simulation results the focal length of the spot can be modulated using different ring periods. Scanning of the subwavelength gating in the far field has been realized numerically. Such a device can be used with a high-resolution far-field scanning optical microscope.

Fabrication process and power and lifetime characteristics of very-small-aperture laser

High output power very-small-aperture laser has been created on 650 nm edge emitting laser diodes. The far-field output power is 0.4 mW at the 25 mA driving current, and the highest output power exceeds 1 mW. The special fabrication process is described and the failure mechanism leading to the short lifetime of the devices is discussed.

Reflection and Transmission at a Phase Discontinuous Interface

In this paper we extend the derivation of the modified form Snells's law that occurs when an additional phase profile is introduced at the material interface. We show that this permits electromagnetic (EM) beam steering, negative refraction and retrodirective action opportunities for such engineered surfaces even if they are immersed in a uniform dielectric. Simple expressions for the retrodirected and negatively refracted beams are derived along with the propagation conditions that occur at the boundary interface inside the critical angle range. It is also demonstrated how the transmission and reflected power levels are affected by the additional phase taper introduced at the surface.

A congestion management and transmission price simulator for competitive electricity markets

In a liberalized electricity market, the Transmission System Operator (TSO) plays a crucial role in power system operation. Among many other tasks, TSO detects congestion situations and allocates the payments of electricity transmission. This paper presents a software tool for congestion management and transmission price determination in electricity markets. The congestion management is based on a reformulated Optimal Power Flow (OPF), whose main goal is to obtain a feasible solution for the re-dispatch minimizing the changes in the dispatch proposed by the market operator. The transmission price computation considers the physical impact caused by the market agents in the transmission network. The final tariff includes existing system costs and also costs due to the initial congestion situation and losses costs. The paper includes a case study for the IEEE 30 bus power system.

Water-power at Niagara Falls to be successfully utilized : its objects, facilities and resources, inducements for manufacturers, etc. /

The lithograph, "General view of lands, tunnel and docks of Niagara River Hydraulic Tunnel, Power and Sewer Company," called for p. [4] in the Index, has been removed and encapsulated, and is shelved separately.

Power system transmission network expansion planning using AC model

An optimisation technique to solve transmission network expansion planning problem, using the AC model, is presented. This is a very complex mixed integer nonlinear programming problem. A constructive heuristic algorithm aimed at obtaining an excellent quality solution for this problem is presented. An interior point method is employed to solve nonlinear programming problems during the solution steps of the algorithm. Results of the tests, carried out with three electrical energy systems, show the capabilities of the method and also the viability of using the AC model to solve the problem.

Alternative continuation method for loading margin improvement and transmission losses reduction

This paper presents an alternative methodology for loading margin improvement and total real power losses reduction by using a continuation method. In order to attain this goal, a parameterizing equation based on the total real power losses and the equations of the reactive power at the slack and generation buses are added to the conventional power flow equations. The voltages at these buses are considered as control variables and a new parameter is chosen to reduce the real power losses in the transmission lines. The results show that this procedure leads to maximum loading point increase and consequently, in static voltage stability margin improvement. Besides, this procedure also takes to a reduction in the operational costs and, simultaneously, to voltage profile improvement. Another important result of this methodology is that the resulting operating points are close to that provided by an optimal power flow program. © 2004 IEEE.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Uptake, metabolism and disposition of xenobiotic chemicals in fish : Wisconsin power plant impact study /

"Grant no. R803971."