Alternative continuation method for loading margin improvement and transmission losses reduction

This paper presents an alternative methodology for loading margin improvement and total real power losses reduction by using a continuation method. In order to attain this goal, a parameterizing equation based on the total real power losses and the equations of the reactive power at the slack and generation buses are added to the conventional power flow equations. The voltages at these buses are considered as control variables and a new parameter is chosen to reduce the real power losses in the transmission lines. The results show that this procedure leads to maximum loading point increase and consequently, in static voltage stability margin improvement. Besides, this procedure also takes to a reduction in the operational costs and, simultaneously, to voltage profile improvement. Another important result of this methodology is that the resulting operating points are close to that provided by an optimal power flow program. © 2004 IEEE.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Uptake, metabolism and disposition of xenobiotic chemicals in fish : Wisconsin power plant impact study /

"Grant no. R803971."

Ecological studies of fish near a coal-fired generating station and related laboratory studies : Wisconsin power plant impact study /

"Grant no. R803971."

Potential of spark ignition engine, electronic engine and transmission control. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Office of Research and Development, Washington, D.C.

Rural electric generating and transmission cooperative Clinton impact study /

"ILENR/RE-SP-87/03."

Organizational maintenance manual : tractor, full tracked, low speed, diesel engine, medium drawbar pull, oscillating track, 74-inch minimum gage, power shift transmission, w/bulldozer, hydraulic tilting w/backrip, scarifier, w/winch reversible, rear, 1 drum (Allis-Chalmers model HD16M) FSN 2410-078-6483 ....

"September 1965."

In tune with the Infinite; or, Fullness of peace, power, and plenty;

On cover: "The life books."

Papers in connection with the construction of the Canadian Pacific railway, between the dominion, imperial, and provincial governments ...

"Extract from Journals of the Legislative assembly of 5th May, 1880."

The patrol officers and Tom Kabu: power and prestige in the Purari Delta

In 1946, Tom Kabu returned to the Gulf of Papua determined to reinvent the communities of the Purari Delta. A man of quiet determination, in the first few years he and his followers resisted the assistance of the Australian Administration in Palma and New Guinea. Kabu's popularity in the villages of the Purari, coupled with his independent stance, caused resentment within the local expatriate community. The field staff working for the Department of District Services and Native Affairs especially felt threatened by Kabu's influence and sought to regain government control by opposing his ventures. Through the study of patrol reports written by these officers, this paper seeks to examine the reasons for this resentment and the methods employed by the officers to crush Kabu's company.

Wireless power and data transfer via a common inductive link using frequency division multiplexing

For wireless power transfer (WPT) systems, communication between the primary side and the pickup side is a challenge because of the large air gap and magnetic interferences. A novel method, which integrates bidirectional data communication into a high-power WPT system, is proposed in this paper. The power and data transfer share the same inductive link between coreless coils. Power/data frequency division multiplexing technique is applied, and the power and data are transmitted by employing different frequency carriers and controlled independently. The circuit model of the multiband system is provided to analyze the transmission gain of the communication channel, as well as the power delivery performance. The crosstalk interference between two carriers is discussed. In addition, the signal-to-noise ratios of the channels are also estimated, which gives a guideline for the design of mod/demod circuits. Finally, a 500-W WPT prototype has been built to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed WPT system.

Wireless Networks with Energy Harvesting and Power Transfer: Joint Power and Time Allocation

In this letter, we consider wireless powered communication networks which could operate perpetually, as the base station (BS) broadcasts energy to the multiple energy harvesting (EH) information transmitters. These employ “harvest then transmit” mechanism, as they spend all of their energy harvested during the previous BS energy broadcast to transmit the information towards the BS. Assuming time division multiple access (TDMA), we propose a novel transmission scheme for jointly optimal allocation of the BS broadcasting power and time sharing among the wireless nodes, which maximizes the overall network throughput, under the constraint of average transmit power and maximum transmit power at the BS. The proposed scheme significantly outperforms “state of the art” schemes that employ only the optimal time allocation. If a single EH transmitter is considered, we generalize the optimal solutions for the case of fixed circuit power consumption, which refers to a much more practical scenario.

A novel methodology for analysis of large scale interconnected power and gas systems

The European Union continues to exert a large influence on the direction of member states energy policy. The 2020 targets for renewable energy integration have had significant impact on the operation of current power systems, forcing a rapid change from fossil fuel dominated systems to those with high levels of renewable power. Additionally, the overarching aim of an internal energy market throughout Europe has and will continue to place importance on multi-jurisdictional co-operation regarding energy supply. Combining these renewable energy and multi-jurisdictional supply goals results in a complicated multi-vector energy system, where the understanding of interactions between fossil fuels, renewable energy, interconnection and economic power system operation is increasingly important. This paper provides a novel and systematic methodology to fully understand the changing dynamics of interconnected energy systems from a gas and power perspective. A fully realistic unit commitment and economic dispatch model of the 2030 power systems in Great Britain and Ireland, combined with a representative gas transmission energy flow model is developed. The importance of multi-jurisdictional integrated energy system operation in one of the most strategically important renewable energy regions is demonstrated.

The force, power, and energy of the 100 meter sprint

At the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, Usain Bolt broke the world record for the 100 m sprint. Just one year later, at the 2009 World Championships in Athletics in Berlin he broke it again. A few months after Beijing, Eriksen [Am. J. Phys. 77, 224-228 (2009)] studied Bolt's performance and predicted that Bolt could have run about one-tenth of a second faster, which was confirmed in Berlin. In this paper we extend the analysis of Eriksen to model Bolt's velocity time dependence for the Beijing 2008 and Berlin 2009 records. We deduce the maximum force, the maximum power, and the total mechanical energy produced by Bolt in both races. Surprisingly, we conclude that all of these values were smaller in 2009 than in 2008.

Physiological and perceived exertion responses at intermittent critical power and intermittent maximal lactate steady state

Okuno, NM, Perandini, LAB, Bishop, D, Simoes, HG, Pereira, G, Berthoin, S, Kokubun, E, and Nakamura, FY. Physiological and perceived exertion responses at intermittent critical power and intermittent maximal lactate steady state. J Strength Cond Res 25(7): 2053-2058, 2011-The aim of this study was to compare the power outputs of the intermittent critical power (CPi) with the intermittent maximal lactate steady state (MLSSi) and to compare the physiological and perceptual responses exercising at CPi and MLSSi. Ten subjects performed intermittent trials on a cycle ergometer to determine CPi and MLSSi using 30: 30 seconds of effort and pause. The oxygen uptake ((V) over dotO(2)), heart rate (HR), blood lactate concentration ([Lac]), and rating of perceived exertion (RPE) responses were compared during 30-minute cycling at CPi and MLSSi. The CPi (267 6 45 W) was similar to MLSSi (254 6 39 W), and they were correlated (r = 0.88; p<0.05). The (V) over dotO(2) and HR responses stabilized throughout exercising at CPi (2.52 +/- 0.52 L.min(-1); 156 +/- 8 b.min(-1)) and MLSSi (2.41 +/- 0.32 L.min(-1); 152 +/- 10 b.min(-1)). These physiological variables were similar between conditions. However, the [Lac] and RPE were higher from the middle to the end of exercise duration at CPi ([Lac] = 6.9 +/- 2.6 mM; RPE = 17.1 +/- 2.1 a.u.) compared to MLSSi ([Lac] = 5.1 +/- 0.9 mM; RPE = 15.7 +/- 1.8 a.u.). Therefore, CPi intensity determined from 30: 30 seconds of effort and rest periods on a cycle ergometer is equivalent to the MLSSi, and there is a physiological steady state throughout both exercise intensities, although the [Lac] and RPE responses at CPi are higher than at MLSSi. Thus, the CPi and MLSSi may be used as tools for intermittent training evaluation and prescription.