479 resultados para Doha
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Incluye bibliografía
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Incluye Bibliografía
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This research seeks to provide an explanation for variations of “politics” of preference formation in international trade negotiations. Building on the ‘policy determines politics’ argument, I hypothesize the existence of a causal relationship between issue-characteristics and their variations with politics dynamics and their variations. More specifically, this study seeks to integrate into a single analytical framework two dimensions along which variations in the “politics of preference formation” can be organized: configurations of power relationships among the relevant actors in the structures within which they interact as well as the logic and the motivations of the actors involved in the policy making process. To do so, I first construct a four-cell typology of ‘politics of preference formation’ and, then, I proceed by specifying that the type of state-society configurations as well as the type of actors’ motivations in the “politics of preference formation” depend, respectively, on the degree to which a policy issue is perceived as politically salient and on the extent to which the distributional implications of such an issue can be calculated by the relevant stakeholders in the policy making process. The empirical yardstick against which the validity of the theoretical argument proposed is tested is drawn from evidence concerning the European Union’s negotiating strategy in four negotiating areas in the context of the so-called WTO’s Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations: agriculture, competition, environment and technical assistance and capacity building.
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The history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations is full of anecdotes on missed deadlines, failed ministerial conferences, and brinkmanship situations. Tactics such as walking away from the table or sleep-depriving night sessions are legendary in the context of attempting to overcome impasse in negotiations. This article traces and explains the recurrent deadlock in the Doha Round negotiations. It identifies four structural/contextual factors – ideas, institutions, interests, and information – as necessary for understanding and anticipating potential deadlocks. The article also offers a definition of deadlock, and discusses a set of factors highlighted in the international relations literature that explain the existence and persistence of deadlock. With the help of game theory, it then illustrates the challenges faced by actors during trade negotiations. The article concludes by outlining two general scenarios for the Doha Development Agenda and discusses their implications for the World Trade Organization.
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Turkish agriculture has been experiencing a period of unique policy experiment over the last couple years. A World Bank-initiated project, called the Agricultural Reform Implementation Project (ARIP), has been at the forefront of policy change. It was initially promoted by the Bank as an exemplary reform package which could also be adopted by other developing countries. It was introduced in 2001 as part of a major International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank-imposed program of “structural adjustment” after the country had been hit by a major financial crisis. The project has finally come to an end in 2009, and there is now an urgent need for a retrospective assessment of its overall impact on the agricultural sector. Has it fulfilled its ambitious objective of reforming and restructuring Turkish agriculture? Or should it be recorded as a failure of the neo-liberal doctrine? This book aims at finding answers to these questions by investigating the legacy of ARIP from a multi-disciplinary perspective.