Tempo e saberes: a constituição do professor experiente em matemática

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Drought coping and adaptation strategies: Understanding adaptations to climate change in agro-pastoral livestock production in Makueni district, Kenya

Using drought as a lens, this article analyses how agro-pastoralists in Makueni district, Kenya adapt their livestock production to climate variability and change. Data were collected from a longitudinal survey of 127 agro-pastoral households. Approximately one-third of the households have inadequate feeds, and livestock diseases are major challenges during non-drought and drought periods. Agro-pastoralists’ responses to drought are reactive and mainly involve intensifying exploitation of resources and the commons. Proactive responses such as improving production resources are few. Poverty, limited responses to market dynamics and inadequate skills constrain adaptations. Many agro-pastoralists’ attachment to livestock deters livestock divestment, favouring disadvantageous sales that result in declining incomes. To improve adaptive capacity, interventions should expose agro-pastoralists to other forms of savings, incorporate agro-pastoralists as agents of change by building their capacity to provide extension services, and maintain infrastructure. Securing livestock mobility, pasture production and access is crucial under the variable social-ecological conditions.

Assessing the efficacy of structural merger remedies:choosing between theories of harm?

Previous empirical assessments of the effectiveness of structural merger remedies have focused mainly on the subsequent viability of the divested assets. Here, we take a different approach by examining how competitive are the market structures which result from the divestments. We employ a tightly specified sample of markets in which the European Commission (EC) has imposed structural merger remedies. It has two key features: (i) it includes all mergers in which the EC appears to have seriously considered, simultaneously, the possibility of collective dominance, as well as single dominance; (ii) in a previous paper, for the same sample, we estimated a model which proved very successful in predicting the Commission’s merger decisions, in terms of the market shares of the leading firms. The former allows us to explore the choices between alternative theories of harm, and the latter provides a yardstick for evaluating whether markets are competitive or not – at least in the eyes of the Commission. Running the hypothetical post-remedy market shares through the model, we can predict whether the EC would have judged the markets concerned to be competitive, had they been the result of a merger rather than a remedy. We find that a significant proportion were not competitive in this sense. One explanation is that the EC has simply been inconsistent – using different criteria for assessing remedies from those for assessing the mergers in the first place. However, a more sympathetic – and in our opinion, more likely – explanation is that the Commission is severely constrained by the pre-merger market structures in many markets. We show that, typically, divestment remedies return the market to the same structure as existed before the proposed merger. Indeed, one can argue that any competition authority should never do more than this. Crucially, however, we find that this pre-merger structure is often itself not competitive. We also observe an analogous picture in a number of markets where the Commission chose not to intervene: while the post-merger structure was not competitive, nor was the pre-merger structure. In those cases, however, the Commission preferred the former to the latter. In effect, in both scenarios, the EC was faced with a no-win decision. This immediately raises a follow-up question: why did the EC intervene for some, but not for others – given that in all these cases, some sort of anticompetitive structure would prevail? We show that, in this sample at least, the answer is often tied to the prospective rank of the merged firm post-merger. In particular, in those markets where the merged firm would not be the largest post-merger, we find a reluctance to intervene even where the resulting market structure is likely to be conducive to collective dominance. We explain this by a willingness to tolerate an outcome which may be conducive to tacit collusion if the alternative is the possibility of an enhanced position of single dominance by the market leader. Finally, because the sample is confined to cases brought under the ‘old’ EC Merger Regulation, we go on to consider how, if at all, these conclusions require qualification following the 2004 revisions, which, amongst other things, made interventions for non-coordinated behaviour possible without requiring that the merged firm be a dominant market leader. Our main conclusions here are that the Commission appears to have been less inclined to intervene in general, but particularly for Collective Dominance (or ‘coordinated effects’ as it is now known in Europe as well as the US.) Moreover, perhaps contrary to expectation, where the merged firm is #2, the Commission has to date rarely made a unilateral effects decision and never made a coordinated effects decision.

Re-examining the BMW-Rover affair:a case study of corporate, strategic and government failure?

This paper analyses corporate and government strategies during the purchase, period of control and divestment by BMW of the car manufacturer Rover over the period 1994 to 2000. This paper examines three types of ‘failure’. It views BMW’s purchase of Rover as a ‘corporate failure’, with British Aerospace keen to sell Rover to raise cash and with BMW not realising the real condition of Rover. It then moves on to examine BMW’s ‘divide and rule’ strategies with regard to working conditions and subsidy-seeking and its decision to sell Rover as an example of ‘strategic failure’. Finally, it considers the ‘hands-off’ nature of British policy towards such transnational firms, and BMW in particular, as an example of ‘government failure’. This paper concludes by raising the possibility of an EU-wide policy towards transnationals, especially in terms of monitoring the activities of such firms.