209 resultados para Discretionary Accruals
Resumo:
O presente estudo tem como objetivo analisar se as empresas que têm implementado um Sistema de Gestão da Qualidade, certificadas segundo a norma da International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9001, apresentam também uma boa qualidade da informação financeira. Neste sentido, pretende-se testar a expectável relação positiva entre a certificação de qualidade de uma empresa e a qualidade da sua informação financeira. Para isso, identificaram-se as empresas que possuem certificação do Sistema de Gestão de Qualidade, segundo a norma ISO 9001, enquanto a qualidade da informação financeira foi aferida utilizando como proxy os accruals discricionários estimados através do modelo Jones (1991). Utiliza-se um modelo logit para testar a relação pretendida, tendo como variável dependente a variável binária relativa à certificação de qualidade e como principal variável explicativa a qualidade da informação financeira. Com base nos resultados obtidos foi possível verificar a existência de uma relação positiva e estatisticamente significativa entre certificação de qualidade das empresas e a sua qualidade da informação financeira.
Resumo:
This study explores whether firms have differential price-earnings multiples associated with their means of achieving a sequential pattern of increasing positive earnings. Our main findings show that market participants assign higher price-earnings multiples to firms when their pattern of increasing earnings is supported by the same pattern of increasing cash flows. Market participants assign lower price-earnings multiples to firms suspect of having engaged in accrual-based earnings management, sales manipulation, and overproduction to achieve the earnings pattern. We find, however, that market participants do not penalize firms suspect of having achieved the earnings pattern through the opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenses.
Resumo:
In this paper we test for the impact of the regulatory environment on a bank’s discretionary provisioning practices. We develop a model that structures the dynamics of the provision policy for the two classes of provisions: generic provisions and specific provisions. The model is tested using a comprehensive database of all financial institutions operating in Portugal for 1990-2000. This unique dataset comprises banks subject to the Portuguese rules as well as bank subsidiaries subject to their home-country regulation and we were able to identify distinct behaviours between them. Our results show the importance of handling he two types of provisions separately. They support the hypothesis that banks have a discretionary behaviour in setting up their provisions, and find evidence of income smoothing and capital management. We also find that the regulatory regime impacts on discretionary provisioning policies because banks when forced to increase one type of provision react by reducing the iscretionary component of the other, a finding we designated as a substitution effect.
Resumo:
For the last two decades, the primary instruments for UK regional policy have been discretionary subsidies. Such aid is targeted at “additional” projects - projects that would not have been implemented without the subsidy - and the subsidy should be the minimum necessary for the project to proceed. Discretionary subsidies are thought to be more efficient than automatic subsidies, where many of the aided projects are non-additional and all projects receive the same subsidy rate. The present paper builds on Swales (1995) and Wren (2007a) to compare three subsidy schemes: an automatic scheme and two types of discretionary scheme, one with accurate appraisal and the other with appraisal error. These schemes are assessed on their expected welfare impacts. The particular focus is the reduction in welfare gain imposed by the interaction of appraisal error and the requirements for accountability. This is substantial and difficult to detect with conventional evaluation techniques.
Resumo:
This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policy- makers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fi scal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with signifi cant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.
Resumo:
Official calculations of automatic stabilizers are seriously flawed since they rest on the assumption that the only element of social spending that reacts automatically to the cycle is unemployment compensation. This puts into question many estimates of discretionary fiscal policy. In response, we propose a simultaneous estimate of automatic and discretionary fiscal policy. This leads us, quite naturally, to a tripartite decomposition of the budget balance between revenues, social spending and other spending as a bare minimum. Our headline results for a panel of 20 OECD countries in 1981-2003 are .59 automatic stabilization in percentage-points of primary surplus balances. All of this stabilization remains following discretionary responses during contractions, but arguably only about 3/5 of it remains so in expansions while discretionary behavior cancels the rest. We pay a lot of attention to the impact of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP on the EU members of our sample and to real time data.
Resumo:
Official calculations of automatic stabilizers are seriously flawed since they rest on the assumption that the only element of social spending that reacts automatically to the cycle is unemployment compensation. This puts into question many estimates of discretionary fiscal policy. In response, we propose a simultaneous estimate of automatic and discretionary fiscal policy. This leads us, quite naturally, to a tripartite decomposition of the budget balance between revenues, social spending and other spending as a bare minimum. Our headline results for a panel of 20 OECD countries in 1981-2003 are .59 automatic stabilization in percentage-points of primary surplus balances. All of this stabilization remains following discretionary responses during contractions, but arguably only about 3/5 of it remains so in expansions while discretionary behavior cancels the rest. We pay a lot of attention to the impact of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP on the EU members of our sample and to real time data.
Resumo:
Official calculations of automatic stabilizers are seriously flawed since they rest on the assumption that the only element of social spending that reacts automatically to the cycle is unemployment compensation. This puts into question many estimates of discretionary fiscal policy. In response, we propose a simultaneous estimate of automatic and discretionary fiscal policy. This leads us, quite naturally, to a tripartite decomposition of the budget balance between revenues, social spending and other spending as a bare minimum. Our headline results for a panel of 20 OECD countries in 1981-2003 are .59 automatic stabilization in percentage-points of primary surplus balances. All of this stabilization remains following discretionary responses during contractions, but arguably only about 3/5 of it remains so in expansions while discretionary behavior cancels the rest. We pay a lot of attention to the impact of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP on the EU members of our sample and to real time data.
Resumo:
Discretionary policymakers cannot manage private-sector expectations and cannot coordinate the actions of future policymakers. As a consequence, expectations traps and coordination failures can occur and multiple equilibria can arise. To utilize the explanatory power of models with multiple equilibria it is first necessary to understand how an economy arrives to a particular equilibrium. In this paper we employ notions of learnability and self-enforceability to motivate and identify equilibria of particular interest. Central among these criteria are whether the equilibrium is learnable by private agents and jointly learnable by private agents and the policymaker. We use two New Keynesian policy models to identify the strategic interactions that give rise to multiple equilibria and to illustrate our methods for identifying equilibria of interest. Importantly, unless the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is learnable by private agents, we find little reason to expect coordination on that equilibrium.
Resumo:
Within Data Envelopment Analysis, several alternative models allow for an environmental adjustment. The majority of them deliver divergent results. Decision makers face the difficult task of selecting the most suitable model. This study is performed to overcome this difficulty. By doing so, it fills a research gap. First, a two-step web-based survey is conducted. It aims (1) to identify the selection criteria, (2) to prioritize and weight the selection criteria with respect to the goal of selecting the most suitable model and (3) to collect the preferences about which model is preferable to fulfil each selection criterion. Second, Analytic Hierarchy Process is used to quantify the preferences expressed in the survey. Results show that the understandability, the applicability and the acceptability of the alternative models are valid selection criteria. The selection of the most suitable model depends on the preferences of the decision makers with regards to these criteria.