Nomination of Sanford [i.e. Stanford] G. Ross and David M. Walker : hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, One Hundred First Congress, second session, on the nomination of Stanford G. Ross and David M. Walker, to be members of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund, and the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund for a term of four years, July 24, 1990.

Mode of access: Internet.

Long-range cost estimates for old-age, survivors, and disability insurance system, 1969 /

Sept. 1969.

Long-range estimates of the financial status of the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance program, 1983 /

"April 1984"

Social Security Act amendments of 1949 : hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, Eighty-first Congress, first session, on H.R. 2892, a bill to amend the Social Security Act to enable states to establish more adequate public-welfare programs, and for other purposes, and other bills [and] H.R. 2893, a bill to extend and improve the old-age and survivors insurance system, to add protection against disability, and for other purposes, and other bills.

Considers legislation to extend and improve the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance system, and to add disability protection. Includes H. Rpt. 80-2168, "Social Security Act Amendments, 1948," on H.R. 6777, June 2, 1948 (p. 1096-1158), pt.2.

Essays on the Effects of Social Insurance for Disability

This dissertation examines how social insurance, family support and work capacity enhance individuals' economic well-being following significant health and income shocks. I first examine the extent to which the liquidity-enhancing effects of Worker's Compensation (WC) benefits outweigh the moral hazard costs. Analyzing administrative data from Oregon, I estimate a hazard model exploiting variation in the timing and size of a retroactive lump-sum WC payment to decompose the elasticity of claim duration with respect to benefits into the elasticity with respect to an increase in cash on hand, and a decrease in the opportunity cost of missing work. I find that the liquidity effect accounts for 60 to 65 percent of the increase in claim duration among lower-wage workers, but less than half of the increase for higher earners. Using the framework from Chetty (2008), I conclude that the insurance value of WC exceeds the distortionary cost, and increasing the benefit level could increase social welfare. Next, I investigate how government-provided disability insurance (DI) interacts with private transfers to disabled individuals from their grown children. Using the Health and Retirement Study, I estimate a fixed effects, difference in differences regression to compare transfers between DI recipients and two control groups: rejected applicants and a reweighted sample of disabled non-applicants. I find that DI reduces the probability of receiving a transfer by no more than 3 percentage points, or 10 percent. Additional analysis reveals that DI could increase the probability of receiving a transfer in cases where children had limited prior information about the disability, suggesting that DI could send a welfare-improving information signal. Finally, Zachary Morris and I examine how a functional assessment could complement medical evaluations in determining eligibility for disability benefits and in targeting return to work interventions. We analyze claimants' self-reported functional capacity in a survey of current DI beneficiaries to estimate the share of disability claimants able to do work-related activity. We estimate that 13 percent of current DI beneficiaries are capable of work-related activity. Furthermore, other characteristics of these higher-functioning beneficiaries are positively correlated with employment, making them an appropriate target for return to work interventions.

Measuring the biases in self-reported disability status : Evidence from aggregate data

Self-reported health status measures are generally used to analyse Social Security Disability Insurance's (SSDI) application and award decisions as well as the relationship between its generosity and labour force participation. Due to endogeneity and measurement error, the use of self-reported health and disability indicators as explanatory variables in economic models is problematic. We employ county-level aggregate data, instrumental variables and spatial econometric techniques to analyse the determinants of variation in SSDI rates and explicitly account for the endogeneity and measurement error of the self-reported disability measure. Two surprising results are found. First, it is shown that measurement error is the dominating source of the bias and that the main source of measurement error is sampling error. Second, results suggest that there may be synergies for applying for SSDI when the disabled population is larger. © 2011 Taylor & Francis.

The knowledge of doing: Exploring the knowledge of support to older people with an intellectual disability

This ethnography presents a contextualised understanding of frontline knowledge used in the support to people ageing with an intellectual disability who live in accommodation and support services in south-east Queensland. The study identified that disability support workers accessed a range of knowledges which they synthesised into a dynamic and responsive locale knowledge, and subsequently translated into everyday acts of support within contexts of multi-faceted complexity. Findings from the study have numerous implications for the knowledge development activities of formal service and educational systems within Australia's newly implemented National Disability Insurance Scheme.

The Eligibility Definition Used in the Social Security Administration’s Disability Programs Needs to be Changed

In its October 2003 report on the definition of disability used by the Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s) disability programs [i.e., Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for people with disabilities], the Social Security Advisory Board raises the issue of whether this definition is at odds with the concept of disability embodied in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and, more importantly, with the aspirations of people with disabilities to be full participants in mainstream social activities and lead fulfilling, productive lives. The Board declares that “the Nation must face up to the contradictions created by the existing definition of disability.” I wholeheartedly agree. Further, I have concluded that we have to make fundamental, conceptual changes to both how we define eligibility for economic security benefits, and how we provide those benefits, if we are ever to fulfill the promise of the ADA. To convince you of that proposition, I will begin by relating a number of facts that paint a very bleak picture – a picture of deterioration in the economic security of the population that the disability programs are intended to serve; a picture of programs that purport to provide economic security, but are themselves financially insecure and subject to cycles of expansion and cuts that undermine their purpose; a picture of programs that are facing their biggest expenditure crisis ever; and a picture of an eligibility determination process that is inefficient and inequitable -- one that rations benefits by imposing high application costs on applicants in an arbitrary fashion. I will then argue that the fundamental reason for this bleak picture is the conceptual definition of eligibility that these programs use – one rooted in a disability paradigm that social scientists, people with disabilities, and, to a substantial extent, the public have rejected as being flawed, most emphatically through the passage of the ADA. Current law requires eligibility rules to be based on the premise that disability is medically determinable. That’s wrong because, as the ADA recognizes, a person’s environment matters. I will further argue that programs relying on this eligibility definition must inevitably: reward people if they do not try to help themselves, but not if they do; push the people they serve out of society’s mainstream, fostering a culture of isolation and dependency; relegate many to a lifetime of poverty; and undermine their promise of economic security because of the periodic “reforms” that are necessary to maintain taxpayer support. I conclude by pointing out that to change the conceptual definition for program eligibility, we also must change our whole approach to providing for the economic security of people with disabilities. We need to replace our current “caretaker” approach with one that emphasizes helping people with disabilities help themselves. I will briefly describe features that such a program might require, and point out the most significant challenges we would face in making the transition.

People making choices: the support needs and preferences of people with psychosocial disability: project summary

The aim of this project was to improve understanding of the choices that people with psychosocial disability would make about support for priority life goals if they were offered individualised funding packages. This was timely given the inclusion of psychosocial disability in the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), which has been designed to enable Australians with disability the opportunity to exercise choice and control in the pursuit of their goals and the planning and delivery of their supports (Commonwealth of Australia, 2013b).

RP93-395 Liability Insurance and the Family Child Care Provider

Life other small business owners, family child care providers need adequate life, health, and disability insurance to protect their families from the loss of their income. However, child care providers also face unique risks. Perhaps the most important of these risks is the financial loss that would result if the provider were found liable or responsible for the injury or death of a child or a child's parent. If a claim were filed against you as a provider, three different types of financial losses are possible: medical expenses, damages awarded to the victim or his/her family after a lawsuit, and court costs related to your defense. This booklet will help you to: (1) evaluate options for insuring a family child care operation, and (2) evaluate available liability insurance policies.

Selected data on initial operations under the disability freeze provision of the Social Security Amendments of 1954.

Mode of access: Internet.

Allegations of bias within the social security disability program : hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, second session, September 22, 1992.

Shipping list no.: 93-0203-P.

Supplemental security income : disability program vulnerable to applicant fraud when middlemen are used : report to the Chairman, Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate /

"B-257888"--P. 1.

Social security disability : disappointing results from SSA's efforts to improve the disability claims process warrant immediate attention : report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Social Security, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representative /

"GAO-02-322."

Minimum benefit provision of the disability retirement program [microform] : hearing before the Subcommittee on Compensation and Employee Benefits of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, second session, February 26, 1980.

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.