Bank dividends and signaling to information-sensitive depositors

Esta tese investiga se a composição do endividamento dos bancos afeta sua política de dividendos. Identificou-se que investidores sensíveis a informações (investidores institucionais) são alvos de sinalização através de dividendos por parte dos bancos. Utilizando uma base de dados exclusiva de bancos brasileiros, foi possível identificar vários tipos de credores, especificamente, investidores institucionais, empresas não financeiras e pessoas físicas, que são alvos potenciais de sinalização por dividendos. Adicionalmente, a existência de vários bancos de capital fechado, controlados e geridos por um pequeno grupo de acionistas, em que a sinalização direcionada a acionistas é implausível, permite inferir que bancos que utilizam mais fundos de investidores sensíveis a informações (institucionais) pagam mais dividendos, controlando por diversas características. Durante a crise financeira, este comportamento foi ainda mais pronunciado. Esta relação reforça o papel dos dividendos como uma forma custosa e crível de comunicar sobre a qualidade dos ativos dos bancos. A hipótese de que os dividendos podem ser utilizados como uma forma de expropriação dos depositantes por parte dos acionistas é refutada, uma vez que, se fosse esse o caso, observar-se-ia esse maiores dividendos em bancos com depositantes menos sensíveis a informação. Além disso, foi verificada uma relação negativa entre o pagamento de dividendos e o custo de captação (juros pagos em certificados de depósito bancário) e uma relação positiva de dividendos com o tamanho e com os lucros passados, e que os bancos de capital fechado pagam mais dividendos do que os de capital aberto, uma descoberta que também se alinha com a ideia de que os depositantes seriam os alvos da sinalização por dividendos. Finalmente, encontrou-se também uma relação negativa entre dividendos e adequação de capital do bancos, o que indica que pressões regulatórias podem induzir os bancos a pagar menos dividendos e que o pagamento de dividendos é negativamente relacionado com o crescimento da carteira de crédito, o que é consistente com a ideia de que os bancos com maiores oportunidades de investimento retêm seus lucros para aumentar seu patrimônio líquido e sua capacidade de conceder crédito.

Predictable dividends and returns

The conventional wisdom is that the aggregate stock price is predictable by the lagged pricedividend ratio, and that aggregate dividends follow approximately a random-walk. Contrary to this belief, this paper finds that variation in the aggregate dividends and price-dividend ratio is related to changes in expected dividend growth. The inclusion of labor income in a cointegrated vector autoregression with prices and dividends allows the identification of predictable variation in dividends. Most of the variation in the price-dividend ratio is due to changes in expected returns, but this paper shows that part of variation is related to transitory dividend growth shocks. Moreover, most of the variation in dividend growth can be attributed to these temporary changes in dividends. I also show that the price-dividend ratio (or dividend yield) can be constructed as the sum of two distinct, but correlated, variables that separately predict dividend growth and returns. One of these components, which could be called the expected return state variable, predicts returns better than the price-dividend ratio does.

Do dividends signal more earnings? a theoretical analysis

The signaling models have contributed to the literature of corporate finance by the formalization of "the informational content of dividends hypothesis". However, these models are under criticism of empirical works, as weak evidences were found supporting one of the main predictions: the positive relation between changes in dividends and changes in earnings. We claim that the failure to verify this prediction does not invalidate the signaling approach. The mo deIs developed up to now assume or derive utility functions with the single-crossing property. We show that signaling is possible in the absence of this property and, in this case, changes in dividend and changes in earnings can be positively or negatively related.

Safety belts: the uncollected dividends. A manual for use by state legislators and state officials on techniques to increase safety belt usage. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

Corporate profits : profits before tax, profits tax liability, and dividends.

"May 1985."

A letter to the Right Hon. Henry Labouchere, M.P., President of the Board of Trade, etc. etc. : on railways, their accounts and dividends, their progress, present position, and future prospects, their effects on trade and commerce : with suggestions for government assistance and the amendment of the General Railway Act of 1845 /

Mode of access: Internet.

The bubble of the age; or, The fallacy of railway investment, railway accounts, and railway dividends.

Mode of access: Internet.

Hand-book of securities : description; income; prices; dividends /

Description based on: Jan. 1925.

Moral hazard, dividends, and risk in banks

In non-financial firms, higher risk taking results in lower dividend payout ratios. In banking, public guarantees may result in a positive relationship between dividend payout ratios and risk taking. I investigate the interplay between dividend payout ratios and bank risk-taking allowing for the effect of charter values and capital adequacy regulation. I find a positive relationship between bank risk-taking and dividend payout ratios. Proximity to the required capital ratio and a high charter value reduce the impact of bank risk-taking on the dividend payout ratio. My results are robust to different proxies for the dividend payout ratio and bank risk-taking. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

CEO power, government monitoring, and bank dividends

We investigate the role of CEO power and government monitoring on bank dividend policy for a sample of 109 European listed banks for the period 2005-2013. We employ three main proxies for CEO power: CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and unforced CEO turnover. We show that CEO power has a negative impact on dividend payout ratios and on performance, suggesting that entrenched CEOs do not have the incentive to increase payout ratios to discourage monitoring from minority shareholders. Stronger internal monitoring by board of directors, as proxied by larger ownership stakes of the board members, increases performance but decreases payout ratios. These findings are contrary to those from the entrenchment literature for non-financial firms. Government ownership and the presence of a government official on the board of directors of the bank, also reduces payout ratios, in line with the view that government is incentivized to favor the interest of bank creditors before the interest of minority shareholders. These results show that government regulators are mainly concerned about bank safety and this allows powerful CEOs to distribute low payouts at the expense of minority shareholders.

Aggregate dividends and consumption smoothing

We show that net equity payouts from the corporate sector play a crucial role in helping individuals manage their consumption path across the business cycle. In particular, we show that, as investors' desire to smooth consumption increases, optimal aggregate dividends become both more volatile and more counter-cyclical to help counterbalance pro-cyclical labor income. These findings are robust to whether or not agency conflicts exist in the economy.

Losses, dividend reductions, and market reaction associated with past earnings and dividends patterns

This paper examines investors' reactions to dividend reductions or omissions conditional on past earnings and dividend patterns for a sample of eighty-two U.S. firms that incurred an annual loss. We document that the market reaction for firms with long patterns of past earnings and dividend payouts is significantly more negative than for firms with lessestablished past earnings and dividends records. Our results can be explained by the following line of reasoning. First, consistent with DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992), a loss following a long stream of earnings and dividend payments represents an unreliable indicator of future earnings. Thus, established firms have higher loss reliability than less-established firms. Second, because current earnings and dividend policy are a substitute source of means of forecasting future earnings, lower loss reliability increases the information content of dividend reductions. Therefore, given the presence of a loss, the longer the stream of prior earnings and dividend payments, (1) the lower the loss reliability and (2) the more reliably dividend cuts are perceived as an indication that earnings difficulties will persist in the future.