Effect of European Sovereign debt crisis on banks’ stock market performances: application to Portuguese data

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Sovereign debt and CRAs: Where does the power lie?

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The tight grip of a debt based global economy: A study on banking regulation and the implementation of the Basel II Accord in Portugal

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Contingent convertible debt: The case study of Banco Comercial Português

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on the recovering from the financial crisis: Equity returns of the banking sector

This paper analyses, through a dynamic panel data model, the impact of the Financial and the European Debt crisis on the equity returns of the banking system. The model is also extended to specifically investigate the impact on countries who received rescue packages. The sample under analysis considers eleven countries from January 2006 to June 2013. The main conclusion is that there was in fact a structural change in banks’ excess returns due to the outbreak of the European Debt Crisis, when stock markets were still recovering from the Financial Crisis of 2008.

O contrato de Project Finance

Currently, Angola portrays a notorious economic growth and due to recent innovative legislations, it has become the major investment attracting pole, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, having, thus, an extraordinary potentiality for a rapid and sustainable development, likely to place her in outstanding positions in the world economic ranking. Yet, such economic growth entails demanding levels of intensive investment in infrastructure, what has been reported of the Angolan Government to be unable to respond to, save if recurring to very high index of external debt, poisoning, in this way, the future budgeting of the country. Due to these infrastructure investment shortages, the cost of production remains highly onerous and the cost of life extremely unaffordable. On this account, the current study disserts about the contract of Project Finance; an alternative finance resource given as a viable solution for the private financing of infrastructure, aiming to demonstrate that such contractual figure, likewise the experience of several emerging economies and others, is a contract bid framework to take into account in today’s world. It refers to a financing technique – through which the Government may satisfy a common need (for example, the construction of a public domain or public servicing), without having to pay neither offer any collateral – based on a complex legal-financial engineering, arranged throughout a coalition of typical and atypical agreements, whereby it is mandatory to look back at the basic concepts of corporate law. More than just a simple financial study, the dissertation at stake analyses the nature and legal framework of Project Finance, which is a legally atypical and innominate contract, concluding that there is a relevant need for regulating and devoting a special legal regime in the Angolan jurisdiction for this promising legal form in the contemporary corporate finance world.

Valuation of defaultable bonds and debt restructuring

In this paper we develop a contingent valuation model for zero-coupon bonds with default. In order to emphasize the role of maturity time and place of the lender’s claim in the hierarchy of debt of a firm, we consider a firm that issues two bonds with different maturities and different seniorage. The model allows us to analyze the implications of both debt renegotiation and capital structure of a firm on the prices of bonds. We obtain that renegotiation brings about a significant change in the bond prices and that the effect is dispersed through different channels: increasing the value of the firm, reallocating payments, and avoiding costly liquidation. Moreover, the presence of two creditors leads to qualitatively different implications for pricing, while emphasizing the importance of bond covenants and renegotiation of the entire debt.

Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets

We analyse the implications of optimal taxation for the stochastic behaviour of debt. We show that when a government pursues an optimal fiscal policy under complete markets, the value of debt has the same or less persistence than other variables in the economy and it declines in response to shocks that cause the deficit to increase. By contrast, under incomplete markets debt shows more persistence than other variables and it increases in response to shocks that cause a higher deficit. Data for US government debt reveals diametrically opposite results from those of complete markets and is much more supportive of bond market incompleteness.

Fiscal insurance and debt management in OECD economies

Assuming the role of debt management is to provide hedging against fiscal shocks we consider three questions: i) what indicators can be used to assess the performance of debt management? ii) how well have historical debt management policies performed? and iii) how is that performance affected by variations in debt issuance? We consider these questions using OECD data on the market value of government debt between 1970 and 2000. Motivated by both the optimal taxation literature and broad considerations of debt stability we propose a range of performance indicators for debt management. We evaluate these using Monte Carlo analysis and find that those based on the relative persistence of debt perform best. Calculating these measures for OECD data provides only limited evidence that debt management has helped insulate policy against unexpected fiscal shocks. We also find that the degree of fiscal insurance achieved is not well connected to cross country variations in debt issuance patterns. Given the limited volatility observed in the yield curve the relatively small dispersion of debt management practices across countries makes little difference to the realised degree of fiscal insurance.

In Search of a theory of debt management

A growing literature integrates theories of debt management into models of optimal fiscal policy. One promising theory argues that the composition of government debt should be chosen so that fluctuations in the market value of debt offset changes in expected future deficits. This complete market approach to debt management is valid even when the government only issues non-contingent bonds. A number of authors conclude from this approach that governments should issue long term debt and invest in short term assets. We argue that the conclusions of this approach are too fragile to serve as a basis for policy recommendations. This is because bonds at different maturities have highly correlated returns, causing the determination of the optimal portfolio to be ill-conditioned. To make this point concrete we examine the implications of this approach to debt management in various models, both analytically and using numerical methods calibrated to the US economy. We find the complete market approach recommends asset positions which are huge multiples of GDP. Introducing persistent shocks or capital accumulation only worsens this problem. Increasing the volatility of interest rates through habits partly reduces the size of these simulations we find no presumption that governments should issue long term debt ? policy recommendations can be easily reversed through small perturbations in the specification of shocks or small variations in the maturity of bonds issued. We further extend the literature by removing the assumption that governments every period costlessly repurchase all outstanding debt. This exacerbates the size of the required positions, worsens their volatility and in some cases produces instability in debt holdings. We conclude that it is very difficult to insulate fiscal policy from shocks by using the complete markets approach to debt management. Given the limited variability of the yield curve using maturities is a poor way to substitute for state contingent debt. The result is the positions recommended by this approach conflict with a number of features that we believe are important in making bond markets incomplete e.g allowing for transaction costs, liquidity effects, etc.. Until these features are all fully incorporated we remain in search of a theory of debt management capable of providing robust policy insights.

Discretionary Policy in a Monetary Union with Sovereign Debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policy- makers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fi scal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with signifi cant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.

The EMU sovereign-debt crisis: Fundamentals, expectations and contagion

We offer a detailed empirical investigation of the European sovereign debt crisis based on the theoretical model by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010). We find evidence of a marked shift in market pricing behaviour from a ‘convergence-trade’ model before August 2007 to one driven by macro-fundamentals and international risk thereafter. The majority of EMU countries have experienced contagion from Greece. There is no evidence of significant speculation effects originating from CDS markets. Finally, the escalation of the Greek debt crisis since November 2009 is confirmed as the result of an unfavourable shift in countryspecific market expectations. Our findings highlight the necessity of structural, competitiveness-inducing reforms in periphery EMU countries and institutional reforms at the EMU level enhancing intra-EMU economic monitoring and policy co-ordination.

Delay and Haircuts in Sovereign Debt: Recovery and Sustainability

One of the striking aspects of recent sovereign debt restructurings is, conditional on default, delay length is positively correlated with the size of haircut. In this paper, we develop an incomplete information model of debt restructuring where the prospect of uncertain economic recovery and the signalling about sustainability concerns together generate multi-period delay. The results from our analysis show that there is a correlation between delay length and size of haircut. Such results are supported by evidence. We show that Pareto ranking of equilibria, conditional on default, can be altered once we take into account the ex ante incentive of sovereign debtor. We use our results to evaluate proposals advocated to ensure orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises.

The EMU sovereign-debt crisis: fundamentals, expectations and contagion

In a research project conducted while visiting the DG-ECFIN in June 2010, we provided a detailed empirical investigation of the EMU sovereign-debt crisis up to February 2010.