A preliminary taxonomic review of the South American bearded saki monkeys genus Chiropotes (Cebidae, Platyrrhini), with the description of a new supspecies / Philip Hershkovitz.

n.s. no.27(1985)

The South American gracile mouse opossums, genus Gracilinanus Gardner and Creighton, 1989 (Marmosidae, Marsupialia) : a taxonomic review with notes on general morphology and relationships / Philip Hershkovitz.

n.s. no.70(1992)

A contribution to the taxonomy of aquatic and humicolous beetles of the family Hydraenidae in southern Africa / Philip D. Perkins, J. Balfour-Browne.

n.s. no.77(1994)

A manual of marine zoology for the British Isles. By Philip Henry Gosse...

pt. 1

A manual of marine zoology for the British Isles. By Philip Henry Gosse...

pt. 2

Rather than words: Philip Larkin's 'High Windows'

Discussion of possible origins and analogues, including Milton, Herbert and Mallarmé, of the image in Larkin's famous poem.

The Sustainable Debts of Philip II: A Reconstruction of Spain's Fiscal Position, 1560-1598

The defaults of Philip II have attained mythical status as the origin of sovereign debt crises. Four times during his reign the king failed to honor his debts and had to renegotiate borrowing contracts. In this paper, we reassess the fiscal position of Habsburg Spain. New archival evidence allows us to derive comprehensive estimates of debt and revenue. These show that primary surpluses were sufficient to make the king's debt sustainable in most scenarios. Spain's debt burden was manageable up to the 1580s, and its fiscal position only deteriorated for good after the defeat of the "Invincible Armada." We also estimate fiscal policy reaction functions, and show that Spain under the Habsburgs was at least as "responsible" as the US in the 20th century or as Britain in the 18th century. Our results suggest that the outcome of uncertain events such as wars may influence on a history of default more than strict adherence to fiscal rules.

Risk sharing with the monarch: Excusable defaults and contingent debt in the age of Philip II, 1556-1598

Contingent sovereign debt can create important welfare gains. Nonetheless,there is almost no issuance today. Using hand-collected archival data, we examine thefirst known case of large-scale use of state-contingent sovereign debt in history. Philip IIof Spain entered into hundreds of contracts whose value and due date depended onverifiable, exogenous events such as the arrival of silver fleets. We show that this allowedfor effective risk-sharing between the king and his bankers. The data also stronglysuggest that the defaults that occurred were excusable they were simply contingenciesover which Crown and bankers had not contracted previously.

The sustainable debts of Philip II: A reconstruction of Castile's fiscal position, 1566-1596

The defaults of Philip II have attained mythical status as the origin of sovereigndebt crises. We reassess the fiscal position of Habsburg Castile, derivingcomprehensive estimates of revenue, debt, and expenditure from new archivaldata. The king s debts were sustainable. Primary surpluses were large and rising.Debt-to-revenue ratios remained broadly unchanged during Philip s reign.Castilian finances in the sixteenth century compare favorably with those of otherearly modern fiscal states at the height of their imperial ambitions, includingBritain. The defaults of Philip II therefore reflected short-term liquidity crises,and were not a sign of unsustainable debts.

Lending to the borrower from hell: Debt and default in the age of Philip II, 1556-1598

What sustained borrowing without third-party enforcement, in the early days of sovereignlending? Philip II of Spain accumulated towering debts while stopping all payments tohis lenders four times. How could the sovereign borrow much and default often? Weargue that bankers ability to cut off Philip II s access to smoothing services was key. Aform of syndicated lending created cohesion among his Genoese bankers. As a result,lending moratoria were sustained through a cheat the cheater mechanism (Kletzer andWright, 2000). Our paper thus lends empirical support to a recent literature emphasizingthe role of bankers incentives for continued sovereign borrowing.