Price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopoly

In this article we examine the eects of third degree price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopolies. We show that the average price is not affected by the extent of price discrimination. We nd that the asymmetry between firms is reflected only by the output produced for the lowest-valuation consumers and firms produce equal quantities to the other consumer groups.

Price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopoly

In this article we examine the eects of third degree price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopolies. We show that the average price is not affected by the extent of price discrimination. We nd that the asymmetry between firms is reflected only by the output produced for the lowest-valuation consumers and firms produce equal quantities to the other consumer groups.

A kompetitív piac közelítése sokszereplős Cournot-oligopóliumokkal

Mikroökonómia tankönyvekből és példatárakból ismert, hogy egy homogén termékű Cournot-oligopol piacon a termelők számának növelésével közelíthető a kompetitív piac. Az iskolapéldában lineáris keresleti görbét és állandó egységköltséget tételeznek fel. Az irodalomban több munka is foglalkozik az említett feltételek enyhítésével. Jelen dolgozatban egy új, egyszerű approximációs tételt igazolunk. Az első szakaszban áttekintjük a Cournot-oligopol játék egyensúlyának egzisztenciájára és a kompetitív piac Cournot-oligopóliumokkal történő approximálhatóságára vonatkozó eredményeket. Az egyensúly létezésével kapcsolatos eredményeket felhasználjuk a második szakaszban található approximációs tételünkhöz, amit aztán összevetünk az irodalomban található approximációs tételekkel.

The Impact of Emissions Trading on the Price of Electricity in Nord Pool : Market Power and Price Determination in the Nordic Electricity Market

The objective of this thesis is to find out how dominant firms in a liberalised electricity market will react when they face an increase in the level of costs due to emissions trading, and how this will effect the price of electricity. The Nordic electricity market is chosen as the setting in which to examine the question, since recent studies on the subject suggest that interaction between electricity markets and emissions trading is very much dependent on conditions specific to each market area. There is reason to believe that imperfect competition prevails in the Nordic market, thus the issue is approached through the theory of oligopolistic competition. The generation capacity available at the market, marginal cost of electricity production and seasonal levels of demand form the data based on which the dominant firms are modelled using the Cournot model of competition. The calculations are made for two levels of demand, high and low, and with several values of demand elasticity. The producers are first modelled under no carbon costs and then by adding the cost of carbon dioxide at 20€/t to those technologies subject to carbon regulation. In all cases the situation under perfect competition is determined as a comparison point for the results of the Cournot game. The results imply that the potential for market power does exist on the Nordic market, but the possibility for exercising market power depends on the demand level. In season of high demand the dominant firms may raise the price significantly above competitive levels, and the situation is aggravated when the cost of carbon dioixide is accounted for. Under low demand leves there is no difference between perfect and imperfect competition. The results are highly dependent on the price elasticity of demand.

Cost-Saving production technologies and strategic delegation

This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms that produce a differentiated good can choose between two production technologies: a low marginal cost technology and a high marginal cost technology. For the former to be adopted more investment is needed than for the latter. By giving managers of firms an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, we find that Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology than the strict profit maximization case. However, the results may be reversed under Cournot competition. We show that if the degree of product substitutability is sufficiently low (high), the incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology is larger under strict profit maximization (strategic delegation).

Royalty Licensing

Published as an article in: Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 2, pages 284-287.

Going Multinational under Exchange Rate Uncertainty

Published as an article in: Journal of International Money and Finance, 2010, vol. 29, issue 6, pages 1171-1191.

Strategic Behavior and Collusion: An Application to the Spanish Electricity Market

The paper has two major contributions to the theory of repeated games. First, we build a supergame oligopoly model where firms compete in supply functions, we show how collusion sustainability is affected by the presence of a convex cost function, the magnitude of both the slope of demand market, and the number of rivals. Then, we compare the results with those of the traditional Cournot reversion under the same structural characteristics. We find how depending on the number of firms and the slope of the linear demand, collusion sustainability is easier under supply function than under Cournot competition. The conclusions of the models are simulated with data from the Spanish wholesale electricity market to predict lower bounds of the discount factors.

Endogenous Formation of Competing Partnership with Moral Hazard

Published as an article in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, vol. 44, issue 1, pages 183-194.

Two-part tariff licensing mechanisms

Most of the patent licensing agreements that are observed include royalties, in particular per-unit or ad valorem royalties. This paper shows that in a differ entiated duopoly that competes á la Cournot the optimal contract for an internal patentee always includes a positive royalty. Moreover, we show that the patentee would prefer to use ad valorem royalties rather than per-unit royalties when goods are complements or when they are substitutes and the degree of differentiation is suffciently low. The reason is that by including an ad valorem royalty in the licensing contract the patentee can commit strategically to be more (less) aggressive when goods are complements (substitutes) since his licensing revenues become increasing with the price of output of his rival. As a result, licensing may hurt consumers although it always increases social welfare.

Simple Coalitional Strategy Profiles in Repeated Games

This paper is a version of the discussion paper titled "Simple coalitional strategy profiles"

Essays on cooperation and reciprocity

This dissertation comprises three essays that use theory-based experiments to gain understanding of how cooperation and efficiency is affected by certain variables and institutions in different types of strategic interactions prevalent in our society.

Chapter 2 analyzes indefinite horizon two-person dynamic favor exchange games with private information in the laboratory. Using a novel experimental design to implement a dynamic game with a stochastic jump signal process, this study provides insights into a relation where cooperation is without immediate reciprocity. The primary finding is that favor provision under these conditions is considerably less than under the most efficient equilibrium. Also, individuals do not engage in exact score-keeping of net favors, rather, the time since the last favor was provided affects decisions to stop or restart providing favors.

Evidence from experiments in Cournot duopolies is presented in Chapter 3 where players indulge in a form of pre-play communication, termed as revision phase, before playing the one-shot game. During this revision phase individuals announce their tentative quantities, which are publicly observed, and revisions are costless. The payoffs are determined only by the quantities selected at the end under real time revision, whereas in a Poisson revision game, opportunities to revise arrive according to a synchronous Poisson process and the tentative quantity corresponding to the last revision opportunity is implemented. Contrasting results emerge. While real time revision of quantities results in choices that are more competitive than the static Cournot-Nash, significantly lower quantities are implemented in the Poisson revision games. This shows that partial cooperation can be sustained even when individuals interact only once.

Chapter 4 investigates the effect of varying the message space in a public good game with pre-play communication where player endowments are private information. We find that neither binary communication nor a larger finite numerical message space results in any efficiency gain relative to the situation without any form of communication. Payoffs and public good provision are higher only when participants are provided with a discussion period through unrestricted text chat.

Análisis económico de la relocalización de empresas

En las últimas décadas se ha incrementado de forma notoria las inversiones que las empresas realizan en países extranjeros, que en muchos casos han venido acompañadas de deslocalizaciones de empresas. En este trabajo se analiza, desde un punto de vista económico, el porqué de las deslocalizaciones de empresas en los países desarrollados, así como su efecto sobre el mercado donde producen. Utilizamos para ello el ejemplo de la empresa Reckitt, que trasladó una fábrica de Güeñes a Polonia en 2007. Haciendo una simplificación de la realidad, suponemos un modelo con un producto homogéneo en el mercado único europeo, cuya producción se reparten entre Reckitt y otras tres fábricas. Las empresas tienen costes de transporte, de producción y de capacidad productiva, que difieren en función de donde están situadas. Comparando los resultados de dos casos diferenciados, se demuestra que tanto los beneficios de Reckitt como su cuota de mercado aumentan en caso de deslocalizarse. Para el resto de empresas con las que compite, en cambio, el efecto sobre sus cuotas de mercados y sus beneficios es el contrario. Finalmente, realizando un análisis del bienestar, se demuestra que la UE se beneficia de la deslocalización de Reckitt.

Análisis económico de la relocalización de empresas

En las últimas décadas se ha incrementado de forma notoria las inversiones que las empresas realizan en países extranjeros, que en muchos casos han venido acompañadas de deslocalizaciones de empresas. En este trabajo se analiza, desde un punto de vista económico, el porqué de las deslocalizaciones de empresas en los países desarrollados, así como su efecto sobre el mercado donde producen. Utilizamos para ello el ejemplo de la empresa Reckitt, que trasladó una fábrica de Güeñes a Polonia en 2007. Haciendo una simplificación de la realidad, suponemos un modelo con un producto homogéneo en el mercado único europeo, cuya producción se reparten entre Reckitt y otras tres fábricas. Las empresas tienen costes de transporte, de producción y de capacidad productiva, que difieren en función de donde están situadas. Comparando los resultados de dos casos diferenciados, se demuestra que tanto los beneficios de Reckitt como su cuota de mercado aumentan en caso de deslocalizarse. Para el resto de empresas con las que compite, en cambio, el efecto sobre sus cuotas de mercados y sus beneficios es el contrario. Finalmente, realizando un análisis del bienestar, se demuestra que la UE se beneficia de la deslocalización de Reckitt.