Exposición del Sr. Enrique V. Iglesias, Secretario Ejecutivo de la Comisión Económica para América Latina en la VIII Reunión Ordinaria del Consejo Latinoamericano del Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (SELA) = Statement by the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America, Mr. Enrique V. Iglesias, at the Eighth Regular Session of the Latin American Council of the Latin American Economic System (SELA)

En su exposición el Sr. Iglesias se refiere a la gran crisis de los años ochenta y reflexiona sobre las políticas antirrecesivas: la colaboración internacional y la cooperación regional; y sobre el nuevo enfoque del desarrollo latinoamericano.

The social evil in Chicago: a study of existing conditions with recommendations by the Vice Commission of Chicago, a municipal body appointed by the Mayor and the City Council of the City of Chicago, and submitted as its report to the Mayor and City Council of Chicago

Preface -- Outline of study -- Resolution of appreciation -- Introduction and summary -- Proposed ordinance -- Recommendations -- Existing conditions in Chicago -- The social evil and the saloon -- The social evil and the police -- Sources of supply -- Child protection and education -- Rescue and reform -- The social evil and its medical aspects -- Appendices: Text of revised statutes of Illinois and ordinances of the City of Chicago ; Tables ; Exhibits.

Strategic planning tools for European negotiators to defend their national interests in the Council of the European Union. EIPA Working Paper 2013/W/02

Summary. Negotiating in the Council of the European Union poses some challenges that are common to most international negotiations but there are other dimensions that are a lot more specific. In order to understand better the specific nature of negotiations on a European level and to develop some practical guidelines for European negotiators, it is important to situate European negotiations in the more general context of the theory on international relations and to remember that European negotiations are governed by the general principles which characterise the negotiation theory. This working document has three objectives; after having reminded ourselves of the fundamental principles that govern European negotiations, it aims to provide a general foundation, which in turn will be useful for preparing most negotiations within the Council. A series of practical recommendations will then be made in order to contribute to the strategic thinking of the negotiator responsible for defending the interests of his or her Member State within the Council.

Outils de réflexion stratégique du négociateur européen pour la défense de ses intérêts nationaux au sein du Conseil de l’UE = Strategic planning tools for European negotiators to defend their national interests in the Council of the European Union. EIPA Working Paper 2013/W/01

No abstract.

Do Institutional Changes Make a Difference? A veto player analysis of how institutional changes in the Council of the EU influence legislative efficiency and outputs. Brugges Political Research Paper No. 31, October 2013

A driving argument behind recent EU treaty reforms was that more qualified majority voting (QMV) was required to reduce the potential dangers of legislative paralysis caused by enlargement. Whilst existing literature on enlargement mostly focuses on the question of what changed in the legislative process after the 2004 enlargement, the question of why these changes occurred has been given far less attention. Through the use of a single veto player theoretical model, this paper seeks to test and explain whether enlargement reduces the efficiency of the legislative process and alters the type of legislation produced, and whether QMV can compensate for these effects. In doing this, it offers a theoretical explanation as to why institutional changes that alter the level of cohesion between actors in the Council have an influence over both the legislative process and its outcomes.