Institutional sustainability: at what price? UNDP and the new cost-sharing model in Brazil

By the turn of the twenty-first century, UNDP had embraced a new form of funding based on ‘cost-sharing’, with this source accounting for 51 per cent of the organisation’s total expenditure worldwide in 2000. Unlike the traditional donor - recipient relationship so common with development projects, the new cost-sharing modality has created a situation whereby UNDP local offices become ‘subcontractors’ and agencies of the recipient countries become ‘clients’. This paper explores this transition in the context of Brazil, focusing on how the new modality may have compromised UNDP’s ability to promote Sustainable Human Development, as established in its mandate. The great enthusiasm for this modality within the UN system and its potential application to other developing countries increase the importance of a systematic assessment of its impact and developmental consequences.

Cost-sharing of agricultural technology transfer in Nigeria: perceptions of farmers and extension professionals

Cost-sharing, which involves government-farmer partnership in the funding of agricultural extension service, is one of the reforms aimed at achieving sustainable funding for extension systems. This study examined the perceptions of farmers and extension professionals on this reform agenda in Nigeria. The study was carried out in six geopolitical zones of Nigeria. A multi-stage random sampling technique was applied in the selection of respondents. A sample size of 268 farmers and 272 Agricultural Development Programme (ADP) extension professionals participated in the study. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used in analysing the data generated from this research. The results show that majority of farmers (80.6%) and extension professionals (85.7%) had favourable perceptions towards cost-sharing. Furthermore, the overall difference in their perceptions was not significant (t =0.03). The study concludes that the strong favourable perception held by the respondents is a pointer towards acceptance of the reform. It therefore recommends that government, extension administrators and policymakers should design and formulate effective strategies and regulations for the introduction and use of cost-sharing as an alternative approach to financing agricultural technology transfer in Nigeria.

Cost Sharing under Uncertainty: An Algorithmic Approach to Cooperative Interval-Valued Games

Recently, Branzei, Dimitrov, and Tijs (2003) introduced cooperative interval-valued games. Among other insights, the notion of an interval core has been coined and proposed as a solution concept for interval-valued games. In this paper we will present a general mathematical programming algorithm which can be applied to find an element in the interval core. As an example, we discuss lot sizing with uncertain demand to provide an application for interval-valued games and to demonstrate how interval core elements can be computed. Also, we reveal that pitfalls exist if interval core elements are computed in a straightforward manner by considering the interval borders separately.

THE EFFECTS OF COST-SHARING ON USE OF SERVICES AND CONSUMER CHARACTERISTICS IN A STATE'S CRIPPLED CHILDREN'S DIVISION

The present study analyzed some of the effects of imposing a cost-sharing requirement on users of a state's health service program. The study population consisted of people who were in diagnosed medical need and included, but was not limited to, people in financial need.^ The purpose of the study was to determine if the cost-sharing requirement had any detrimental effects on the service population. Changes in the characteristics of service consumers and in utilization patterns were analyzed using time-series techniques and pre-post policy comparisons.^ The study hypotheses stated that the distribution of service provided, diagnoses serviced, and consumer income levels would change following the cost-sharing policy.^ Analysis of data revealed that neither the characteristics of service users (income, race, sex, etc.) nor services provided by the program changed significantly following the policy. The results were explainable in part by the fact that all of the program participants were in diagnosed medical need. Therefore, their use of "discretionary" or "less necessary" services was limited.^ The study's findings supported the work of Joseph Newhouse, Charles Phelps, and others who have contended that necessary service use would not be detrimentally affected by reasonable cost-sharing provisions. These contentions raise the prospect of incorporating cost-sharing into programs such as Medicaid, which, at this writing, do not demand any consumer payment for services.^ The study concluded with a discussion of the cost-containment problem in health services. The efficacy of cost-sharing was considered relative to other financing and reimbursement strategies such as HMO's, self-funding, and reimbursement for less costly services and places of service. ^

Heterogeneous firms and cost sharing in China's marketplaces

This study extends Melitz's model with heterogeneous firms by introducing shared fixed costs in a marketplace. It aims to explain heterogeneous firms' choice between traditional marketplaces and modern distribution channels on the basis of their productivities. The results reveal that the co-existence of a traditional marketplace and modern distribution channels improves social welfare. In addition, a deregulation policy for firm entry outside a marketplace and accumulation of human capital are factors that contribute to improve the social welfare.

Planning and cost sharing policy options for water and related land programs.

Some parts are composed chiefly of statistical tables.

International cost-sharing arrangements.

Mode of access: Internet.

Current cost-sharing and financing policies for federal and state water resources development.

Mode of access: Internet.

Federal support of project grants: indirect costs and cost sharing. Hearings, Ninety-first Congress, first session.

Hearings held Apr. 22 1969-

To establish a federal cost-sharing policy for the construction and maintenance of deep draft ports : hearing before the Subcommittee on Water Resources of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, first session, September 24, 1983--Portsmouth, N.H.

Mode of access: Internet.

Comparing cost-sharing practices for pharmaceuticals and health care services among four central European countries

The paper reviews the existing cost-sharing practices in four Central European countries namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia focusing on patient co-payments for pharmaceuticals and services covered by the social health insurance. The aim is to examine the role of cost-sharing arrangements and to evaluate them in terms of efficiency, equity and public acceptance to support policy making on patient payments in Central Europe. Our results suggest that the share of out-of-pocket payments in total health care expenditure is relatively high (24–27%) in the countries examined. The main driver of these payments is the expenditure on pharmaceuticals and medical devices, which share exceeds 70% of the household expenditure on health care. The four countries use similar cost-sharing techniques for pharmaceuticals, however there are differences concerning the measure of exemption mechanisms for vulnerable social groups. Patient payment policies for health care services covered by the social health insurance are also converging. All the four countries apply co-payments for dental care, some hotel services or in the case of free choice of physician. Also the countries (except for Poland) tried to extend co-payments for physician services and hospital care. However, their introduction met strong political opposition and unpopularity among public.

Impact of cost sharing on utilization of primary health care Services: providers versus household perspectives

This study is set to match and compare results of the analysis of impacts of cost sharing on households with those on health-care providers in two selected districts in Tanzania. The setting is intended to establish and compare concurrently the impact of cost sharing on health-care utilization as viewed from both the providers and beneficiary households. The findings of the study indicate that quality of primary health care has improved as a result of the introduction of cost sharing. Attendance and hence utilization in health facilities has also increased. Mortality rate, at least for one district has not worsened. By implication then, cost sharing appears to have a positive impact on the provision of primary health care, except for a few cases that fail to consult because of the fees. An appropriately managed exemption facility is likely to eliminate the negative impact.

Cost sharing solutions defined by non-negative eigenvectors

The problem of sharing a cost M among n individuals, identified by some characteristic ci∈R+,ci∈R+, appears in many real situations. Two important proposals on how to share the cost are the egalitarian and the proportional solutions. In different situations a combination of both distributions provides an interesting approach to the cost sharing problem. In this paper we obtain a family of (compromise) solutions associated to the Perron’s eigenvectors of Levinger’s transformations of a characteristics matrix A. This family includes both the egalitarian and proportional solutions, as well as a set of suitable intermediate proposals, which we analyze in some specific contexts, as claims problems and inventory cost games.

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach

We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population monotonicity says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone. Demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good (in the sense of a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences) should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged. Under suitable domain restrictions, there exists a unique incentive-constrained efficient and demand-monotonic allocation rule: the so-called serial rule. In the binary public good case, the serial rule is also the only incentive-constrained efficient and population-monotonic rule.