744 resultados para Corporate governance, agency costs, directors
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The Price of Honour is a case study, supported with teaching notes, which describes the events and circumstances surrounding the implosion of one of Portugal’s most systemically important banks - Banco Espírito Santo (BES). The case focuses on BES’s corporate governance and how the Espírito Santo family’s tight control of the bank led to its exploitation. Although the situation caught the attention of the bank’s supervisors, their untimely actions could not prevent BES’s financial health from crumbling only two months after a rights issue. With little leeway, the supervisors put forward a resolution which dramatically ended the bank’s centennial legacy.
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1 Summary This dissertation deals with two major aspects of corporate governance that grew in importance during the last years: the internal audit function and financial accounting education. In three essays, I contribute to research on these topics which are embedded in the broader corporate governance literature. The first two essays consist of experimental investigations of internal auditors' judgments. They deal with two research issues for which accounting research lacks evidence: The effectiveness of internal controls and the potentially conflicting role of the internal audit function between management and the audit committee. The findings of the first two essays contribute to the literature on internal auditors' judgment and the role of the internal audit function as a major cornerstone of corporate governance. The third essay theoretically examines a broader issue but also relates to the overall research question of this dissertation: What contributes to effective corporate governance? This last essay takes the perspective that the root for quality corporate governance is appropriate financial accounting education. r develop a public interest approach to accounting education that contributes to the literature on adequate accounting education with respect to corporate governance and accounting harmonization. The increasing importance of both the internal audit function and accounting education for corporate governance can be explained by the same recent fundamental changes that still affect accounting research and practice. First, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX, 2002) and the 8th EU Directive (EU, 2006) have led to a bigger role for the internal audit function in corporate governance. Their implications regarding the implementation of audit committees and their oversight over internal controls are extensive. As a consequence, the internal audit function has become increasingly important for corporate governance and serves a new master (i.e. the audit committee) within the company in addition to management. Second, the SOX (2002) and the 8th EU Directive introduced additional internal control mechanisms that are expected to contribute to the reliability of financial information. As a consequence, the internal audit function is expected to contribute to a greater extent to the reliability of financial statements. Therefore, effective internal control mechanisms that strengthen objective judgments and independence become important. This is especially true when external- auditors rely on the work of internal auditors in the context of the International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 610 and the equivalent US Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 65 (see IFAC, 2009 and AICPA, 1990). Third, the harmonization of international reporting standards is increasingly promoted by means of a principles-based approach. It is the leading approach since a study of the SEC (2003) that was required by the SOX (2002) in section 108(d) was in favor of this approach. As a result, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) commit themselves to the development of compatible accounting standards based on a principles-based approach. Moreover, since the Norwalk Agreement of 2002, the two standard setters have developed exposure drafts for a common conceptual framework that will be the basis for accounting harmonization. The new .framework will be in favor of fair value measurement and accounting for real-world economic phenomena. These changes in terms of standard setting lead to a trend towards more professional judgment in the accounting process. They affect internal and external auditors, accountants, and managers in general. As a consequence, a new competency set for preparers and users of financial statements is required. The basil for this new competency set is adequate accounting education (Schipper, 2003). These three issues which affect corporate governance are the initial point of this dissertation and constitute its motivation. Two broad questions motivated a scientific examination in three essays: 1) What are major aspects to be examined regarding the new role of the internal audit function? 2) How should major changes in standard setting affect financial accounting education? The first question became apparent due to two published literature reviews by Gramling et al. (2004) and Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright (2004). These studies raise various questions for future research that are still relevant and which motivate the first two essays of my dissertation. In the first essay, I focus on the role of the internal audit function as one cornerstone of corporate governance and its potentially conflicting role of serving both management and the audit committee (IIA, 2003). In an experimental study, I provide evidence on the challenges for internal auditors in their role as servant for two masters -the audit committee and management -and how this influences internal auditors' judgment (Gramling et al. 2004; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2004). I ask if there is an expectation gap between what internal auditors should provide for corporate governance in theory compared to what internal auditors are able to provide in practice. In particular, I focus on the effect of serving two masters on the internal auditor's independence. I argue that independence is hardly achievable if the internal audit function serves two masters with conflicting priorities. The second essay provides evidence on the effectiveness of accountability as an internal control mechanism. In general, internal control mechanisms based on accountability were enforced by the SOX (2002) and the 8th EU Directive. Subsequently, many companies introduced sub-certification processes that should contribute to an objective judgment process. Thus, these mechanisms are important to strengthen the reliability of financial statements. Based on a need for evidence on the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms (Brennan & Solomon, 2008; Gramling et al. 2004; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2004; Solomon & Trotman, 2003), I designed an experiment to examine the joint effect of accountability and obedience pressure in an internal audit setting. I argue that obedience pressure potentially can lead to a negative influence on accountants' objectivity (e.g. DeZoort & Lord, 1997) whereas accountability can mitigate this negative effect. My second main research question - How should major changes in standard setting affect financial accounting education? - is investigated in the third essay. It is motivated by the observation during my PhD that many conferences deal with the topic of accounting education but very little is published about what needs to be done. Moreover, the Endings in the first two essays of this thesis and their literature review suggest that financial accounting education can contribute significantly to quality corporate governance as argued elsewhere (Schipper, 2003; Boyce, 2004; Ghoshal, 2005). In the third essay of this thesis, I therefore focus on approaches to financial accounting education that account for the changes in standard setting and also contribute to corporate governance and accounting harmonization. I argue that the competency set that is required in practice changes due to major changes in standard setting. As the major contribution of the third article, I develop a public interest approach for financial accounting education. The major findings of this dissertation can be summarized as follows. The first essay provides evidence to an important research question raised by Gramling et al. (2004, p. 240): "If the audit committee and management have different visions for the corporate governance role of the IAF, which vision will dominate?" According to the results of the first essay, internal auditors do follow the priorities of either management or the audit committee based on the guidance provided by the Chief Audit executive. The study's results question whether the independence of the internal audit function is actually achievable. My findings contribute to research on internal auditors' judgment and the internal audit function's independence in the broader frame of corporate governance. The results are also important for practice because independence is a major justification for a positive contribution of the internal audit function to corporate governance. The major findings of the second essay indicate that the duty to sign work results - a means of holding people accountable -mitigates the negative effect of obedience pressure on reliability. Hence, I found evidence that control .mechanisms relying on certifications may enhance the reliability of financial information. These findings contribute to the literature on the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms. They are also important in the light of sub-certification processes that resulted from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 8th EU Directive. The third essay contributes to the literature by developing a measurement framework that accounts for the consequences of major trends in standard setting. Moreovér, it shows how these trends affect the required .competency set of people dealing with accounting issues. Based on this work, my main contribution is the development of a public interest approach for the design of adequate financial accounting curricula. 2 Serving two masters: Experimental evidence on the independence of internal auditors Abstract Twenty nine internal auditors participated in a study that examines the independence of internal auditors in their potentially competing roles of serving two masters: the audit committee and management. Our main hypothesis suggests that internal auditors' independence is not achievable in an institutional setting in which internal auditors are accountable to two different parties with potentially differing priorities. We test our hypothesis in an experiment in which the treatment consisted of two different instructions of the Chief audit executive; one stressing the priority of management (cost reduction) and one stressing the priority of the audit committee (effectiveness). Internal auditors had to evaluate internal controls and their inherent costs of different processes which varied in their degree of task complexity. Our main results indicate that internal auditors' evaluation of the processes is significantly different when task complexity is high. Our findings suggest that internal auditors do follow the priorities of either management or the audit committee depending on the instructions of a superior internal auditor. The study's results question whether the independence of the internal audit function is actually achievable. With our findings, we contribute to research on internal auditors' judgment and the internal audit function's independence in the frame of corporate governance.
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Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on tutkia, kuinka Suomen vuonna 2004 voimaan tullut corporate governance -suositus tukee hallituksen riippumattomuutta. Tutkimuksessa määritellään hallituksen riippumattomuuden käsite. Tämän määritelmän avulla tarkastellaan, kuinka Suomen corporate governance -suosituksessa ohjataan hallituksen riippumattomuutta. Tutkimus on kvalitatiivinen tutkimus, joka on luonteeltaan osittain teoreettinen ja osittain normatiivinen. Tutkimusstrategiassayhdistyvät deskriptiivisyys ja komparatiivisuus. Tutkimuksessa Suomen corporategovernance -suosituksen hallituksen riippumattomuutta koskevia suosituksia verrataan toisaalta päämies-agenttiteorian pohjalta muodostettuun riippumattoman hallituksen määritelmään ja toisaalta keskeisimpiin ulkomaisiin corporate governance -säännöstöihin. Riippumattomaksi hallitukseksi määriteltiin hallitus, jonka toimintaa toimiva johto tai merkittävä osakkeenomistaja ei voi suoraan tai välillisesti dominoida. Suomen suosituksessa voidaan nähdä pyrkimys kohti riippumaton-ta hallitusta. Suomen suositus ei kuitenkaan tue hallituksen riippumattomuutta parhaalla mahdollisella tavalla. Sekä toimivalle johdolle että yhtiön merkittäville osakkeenomistajille jää valtaa vaikuttaa hallituksen toimintaan enemmän kuin osakkeenomistajien etujen kannalta olisi suositeltavaa.
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Tutkielman tavoitteena oli antaa yleiskuva corporate governance -aiheen ympärillä käydystä kansallisesta ja kansainvälisestä keskustelusta ja siitä syntyneistä normistoista. Tavoitteena oli myös esimerkkiyrityksen kautta tarkastella suomalaisen keskustelun perusteella syntyneen normiston kolmea suositusta (liittyen hallintoneuvoston, hallituksen ja toimitusjohtajan päätöksenteolliseen asemaan). Mainittujen aihepiirien suosituksia on tutkimuksessa selvitetty laajemmin ja mukaan tarkasteluun on otettu kansallisella tasolla asioihin merkittävästi vaikuttava lainsäädäntö. Tutkimuksen case osuudessa tarkasteltiin valtio-omistajan antamia corporate governance suosituksia ja niiden toteutumista esimerkkiyrityksessä, Finnvera Oyj:ssa. Tutkielman yhteenvetona voidaan todeta, että kansainvälinen keskustelu eroaa aihepiireiltään jonkin verran suomalaisen keskustelun mielenkiinnon kohteista, joskin yhtymäkohtiakin on. Eroavaisuuteen vaikuttaa ainakin historialliset, kulttuurilliset ja institutionaaliset erot eri maiden kesken. Suomessa olemassa oleva yhtiölainsäädäntö on huomattavan kattava ja se osaltaan hoitaa sääntelyä ja siten poistaa tarvetta erillisille suosituksille ja pelisäännöille. Tutkimuksen case-yrityksessä Finnvera Oyj:ssa omistajan antamat toimenpidesuositukset corporate governance kysymysten käsittelystä on hoidettu asianmukaisesti, ja sillä tavoin kuin ne sovellettavuutensa perusteella on ollut tarkoituksenmukaista hoitaa.
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Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on selvittää, millainen Corporate Governance -järjestelmä ja sääntely-ympäristö Suomessa on voimassa. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan lisäksi osakeyhtiön johdon fidusiaarisia velvollisuuksia ja johdon velvollisuuksien tehosteena olevaa vastuujärjestelmää. Corporate Governance -järjestelmää analysoidaan perinteisestä oikeustieteellisestä näkökulmasta poiketen oikeustaloustieteen metodein. Tutkimuksen teoriapohja perustuu koti- ja ulkomaiseen oikeustaloustieteelliseen kirjallisuuteen, muutoin tutkimuksessa tukeudutaan suurimmilta osin kotimaiseen oikeuskirjallisuuteen ja virallislähteisiin. Suomalainen Corporate Governance -järjestelmä minimioi tehokkaasti transaktiokustannuksia ja tarjoaa osakkeenomistajille tehokkaan, informaation epäsymmetriaa rajoittavan valvontamekanismin. Jos johto toimii velvollisuuksiensa vastaisesti, osakkeenomistajat erottavat johdon, joka ei nauti sen luottamusta tai johto joutuu vastaamaan toimistaan vahingonkorvausvastuun tai rikosoikeudellisen vastuun kautta.
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Dado el interés que se presenta con los temas de gobierno corporativo, este trabajo busca describir si la divulgación on-line de los contenidos de los códigos de buen gobierno, es determinante en el posicionamiento que tienen las Instituciones de Educación Superior (IES) en el ranking QS. Partiendo de una muestra de 20 IES, se recolectaron un conjunto de datos dicotómicos para 30 variables independientes y se relacionaron con la variable dependiente denominada posicionamiento en el ranking. A partir de lo anterior, se elaboró un trabajo descriptivo y correlacional con el fin de probar las hipótesis de investigación. Este estudio reveló que la divulgación on-line de los contenidos de los códigos de buen gobierno en las IES, no es determinante para el posicionamiento en el ranking QS.
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Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas
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The recent promotion of best corporate governance standards by several different government institutions and non-for profit organizations resulted in the implementation of more sophisticated governance mechanisms. As consequence to the separation of ownership and control the concept of agency theory arose. Agency theory argues that without out proper control mechanism managers would behave exploit owners due to information asymmetry. Regulators have promoted corporate governance mechanisms in order to address this issue. This paper aims to contrast the implementation of best corporate governance practices in Germany and Brazil on the example of two practical examples. With this purpose in mind, this paper analyzed two companies listed in the main stock exchange in Germany and Brazil throughout a period of 5 years. In order to measure the degree of corporate governance practices implemented 3 different parameters have been chosen. In line with great part of the literature the parameters considered to be relevant are; composition, procedures and deviation from the local corporate governance code. The comparison of the data revealed that board composition in the two analyzed companies is similar regarding the proportion of independent representatives but does distinguish in size. While committees are related to the same topics it can be implied that Natura’s board is more involved in the actual management of the company. Lastly, Beiersdorf has been able to comply to a larger extend with the recommendations of the local German code than Natura to the recommendations published by Brazilian code of the IBGC.
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Large shareholders of firms with majority bIocks are often at the heIm of their companies and do not necessarily have the same interests as minority shareholders. We show that bargaining problems Ied by the presence of muItipIe controlling shareholders protect minority shareholders. The same bargaining problems, however, prevent efficient decisions. By solving this trade-off we find that i) muItipIe controlling shareholders should be present in firms with Iarge costs of diIuting minority shareholders and in firms with Iarge financing requirements, ii) an optimal ownership structure requires the presence of a dass of shareholders - the minority shareholders - with no control over corporate decisions. Evidence on the ownership structure of dose corporations in the V.S. is consistent with our model.
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Corporate governance has been in the spotlight for the past two decades, being subject of numerous researches all over the world. Governance is pictured as a broad and diverse theme, evolving through different routes to form distinct systems. This scenario together with 2 types of agency problems (investor vs. management and minorities vs. controlling shareholders) produce different definitions for governance. Usually, studies investigate whether corporate governance structures influence firm performance, and company valuation. This approach implies investors can identify those impacts and later take them into consideration when making investment decisions. However, behavioral finance theory shows that not always investors take rational decisions, and therefore the modus operandi of those professionals needs to be understood. So, this research aimed to investigate to what extent Brazilian corporate governance standards and practices influence the investment decision-making process of equity markets' professionals from the sell-side and buy-side. This exploratory study was carried out through qualitative and quantitative approaches. In the qualitative phase, 8 practitioners were interviewed and 3 dimensions emerged: understanding, pertinence and practice. Based on the interviews’ findings, a questionnaire was formulated and distributed to buy-siders and sell-siders that cover Brazilian stocks. 117 respondents from all over the world contributed to the study. The data obtained were analyzed through structural equation modeling and descriptive statistics. The 3 dimensions became 5 constructs: definition (institutionalized governance, informal governance), pertinence (relevance), practice (valuation process, structured governance assessment) The results of this thesis suggest there is no definitive answer, as the extent to which governance will influence an investment decision process will depend on a number of circumstances which compose the context. The only certainty is the need to present a “corporate governance behavior”, rather than simply establishing rules and regulations at firm and country level.
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Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.
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This study is an examination of the timeliness of corporate internet reporting by U.K. companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The research examines the significance of several corporate governance and firm-specific characteristics as potential determinants of the timeliness of corporate internet reporting. Our primary analysis provides evidence of a significant association between timely corporate internet reporting and the corporate governance characteristics of board experience and board independence. Our findings provide evidence that boards with less cross directorships, more experience in terms of the average age of directors, and lower length in service for executive directors provide more timely corporate internet reporting.We find that board independence is negatively associated with timely corporate internet reporting. Follow-up analysis provides additional evidence of a significant association between the timeliness of corporate internet reporting and board experience. The evidence indicates that role duality and block ownership are associated with less timely corporate internet reporting. Our findings also reveal strengths and weaknesses in the Internet reporting of U.K. listed companies. Companies need to voluntarily focus on improving the timeliness dimension of their corporate internet reporting so that the EU and U.K. accounting regulators do not replace recommendations with regulations.
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Corporate Governance - which is concerned with the management and direction of organizations at the very highest level - has grown in importance in the private sector, from where the concept largely derives, as a result mainly of malpractice. As a consequence, interest in the topic has grown steadily, largely on the part of Governments, regulators and academics. Managerial reforms of the NHS introduced refashioned District Health Authorities (DHAs) which mimic the role and structure of the Company board. The research reported in this thesis is an assessment of corporate governance in post reform English DHAs. The research examines the characteristics of directors, the extent to which corporate governance can be empirically demonstrated, the extent to which it is consistent with the Working for Patients reforms, and, the consequences of such changes for the development of directors and of DHAs. The research also considers the relevance of the findings to other parts of the NHS and public sector. The work draws upon the conceptual framework established by Tricker (1984; also Hilmer & Tricker 1991) with detailed survey and case study findings concerned with issues of direction, executive management, supervision and accountability. The findings from this new research make an important contribution to the policy debate and to the literature(s) concerned.
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Using data on 157 large companies in Poland and Hungary, this paper employs Bayesian structural equation modeling to examine the relations among corporate governance, managers' independence from owners in terms of strategic decision making, exporting, and performance. Managers' independence is positively associated with firms' financial performance and exporting. In turn, the extent of managers' independence is negatively associated with ownership concentration, but positively associated with the percentage of foreign directors on the firm's board. We interpret these results as indicating that concentrated owners tend to constrain managerial autonomy at the cost of the firm's internationalization and performance, but board participation of foreign stakeholders enhances the firm's export orientation and performance by encouraging executives' decision-making autonomy.
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Using data on 157 large companies in Poland and Hungary this paper employs Bayesian structural equation modeling to examine interrelationships between corporate governance, managers' independence from owners in terms of strategic decision-making, exporting and performance. It is found that managers' independence is positively associated with firms' financial performance and exporting. In turn, the extent of managers' independence is contingent on the firm's corporate governance parameters: it is negatively associated with ownership concentration, but positively associated with the percentage of foreign directors on the firm's board. We interpret these results as an indication that (i) risk averse, concentrated owners tend to constrain managerial autonomy at the cost of the firm's internationalization and performance, (ii) board participation of foreign stakeholders, on the other hand, enhances the firm's export orientation and performance by encouraging executives' decision-making autonomy.