Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.

The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment.

Brazilian policies and strategies for rural territorial development in Mozambique: South-South cooperation and the case of ProSAVANA and PAA

Pós-graduação em Geografia - FCT

A plan for regional cooperation: public information and education for highway safety including communication plans and strategies. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

Planning, Cooperation and Competition: A case study in industry and construction in a Portuguese Region

In the present paper we analyzed the behavior of firms in the construction and manufacturing sectors, located in the region of Vale do Sousa, in the north of Portugal. From the literature, even existing some disagreements, it is possible to conclude that planning is crucial for firms survival and growth. Cooperation is another aspect that the literature presents as an important factor for firms sustainability. It also plays a major role in competition, since firms are adopting coopetition strategies. By studying a sample of 251 firms, it was possible to realize, that the majority started their business without a formal planning, and they keep going without using it. In cooperation aspects, there is a lack of cooperation. It was possible to verify, that existing cooperation has some evidence but at a vertical level. These vertical relations were also identified in stakeholder’s involvement.

Spiteful Strategies. The ontogeny and the practice of spite in human interaction: an experimental game theory approach and empirical applications

As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

IPH response to Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government and the Department for Regional Development Spatial Strategies

The remit of the Institute of Public Health in Ireland (IPH) is to promote cooperation for public health between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in the areas of research and information, capacity building and policy advice. Our approach is to support Departments of Health and their agencies in both jurisdictions, and maximise the benefits of all-island cooperation to achieve practical benefits for people in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. As an all-island body, the Institute of Public Health in Ireland particularly welcomes that the Framework for Collaboration has been co-produced by the Department for Regional Development and the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government. In addition the Institute of Public Health welcomes a more holistic approach to spatial planning that takes into account the environment and sustainable economic development. A clean environment and a more equitable distribution of prosperity have associated health benefits, as outlined in the IPH’s Active travel – healthy lives (2011) and Health impacts of the built environment- a review (2006).

IPH response to the Joint Committee on Health and Children and members of the Northern Ireland Assembly on “Cross-border cooperation on healthcare”

The Institute of Public Health in Ireland were asked to submit a paper on 'Cross-border cooperation on healthcare' for a joint meeting between the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Health and Children and the Northern Ireland Assembly Health Committee which took place in Leinster House on 1 March 2012. Key points from the submission included: o    The Institute of Public Health in Ireland (IPH) is an all-island organisation which promotes cooperation between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland with the aim of improving population health on the island and tackling health inequalities. IPH work is focused on addressing the causes of ill health rather than the design and delivery of treatment services. o    North/South cooperation on health was mandated under the Belfast Agreement in 1998 in five domains, including health promotion. IPH has supported the North South Ministerial Council (NSMC) in respect of the health promotion strand since inception. o    The Department of Health and Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety North-South Feasibility Study (December 2011) states that mutual benefits are most evident from cooperation in the areas of (i) anticipating trends and illnesses in a collective manner (ii) public health issues (iii) specialised services where the population or activity required to sustain the service cannot be met by either jurisdiction alone and (iv) in relation to those areas adjacent to the border. o    The European Directive on Cross-Border Healthcare will be implemented in the next few years which will have implications in relation to patients travelling for healthcare across the Republic of Ireland/Northern Ireland border. o    IPH is supporting the development of new public health strategies in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland which are both due for publication this year. o    There are tangible benefits from cross-border cooperation in the health sector, both in public health and in health service planning and delivery and there are many examples of successful initiatives. However, developments are not occurring in the context of an agreed plan or overall strategic context and tend to be project-based and concentrated in border counties. o    Successful cross-border cooperation requires high level support and integration into departmental policy cycles. The provision of data on an all-island basis supports cross-border cooperation as does the operation of sustainable all-island organisations which can support research, evaluations and programmes. o    In the future, cross-border cooperation in health will be more effective if developed with a strategic planning process intrinsically linked to Departmental priorities. o    North-South cooperation in the areas of alcohol, obesity, tobacco health surveys and rare diseases will be particularly beneficial.

Alternation and Cooperation in a Two-party System: Implications for Resource-Based Developing Economies

This paper studies cooperation in a political system dominated by two opportunistic parties competing in a resource-based economy. Since a binding agreement as an external solution might be difficult to enforce due to the close association between the incumbent party and the government, the paper explores the extent to which co-operation between political parties that alternate in office can rely on self-enforcing strategies to provide an internal solution. We show that, for appropriate values of the probability of re-election and the discount factor cooperation in maintaining the value of a state variable is possible, but fragile. Another result is that, in such political framework, debt decisions contain an externality element linked to electoral incentives that creates a bias towards excessive borrowing.

Treatment and outcomes of acute basilar artery occlusion in the Basilar Artery International Cooperation Study (BASICS): a prospective registry study.

BACKGROUND: Treatment strategies for acute basilar artery occlusion (BAO) are based on case series and data that have been extrapolated from stroke intervention trials in other cerebrovascular territories, and information on the efficacy of different treatments in unselected patients with BAO is scarce. We therefore assessed outcomes and differences in treatment response after BAO. METHODS: The Basilar Artery International Cooperation Study (BASICS) is a prospective, observational registry of consecutive patients who presented with an acute symptomatic and radiologically confirmed BAO between November 1, 2002, and October 1, 2007. Stroke severity at time of treatment was dichotomised as severe (coma, locked-in state, or tetraplegia) or mild to moderate (any deficit that was less than severe). Outcome was assessed at 1 month. Poor outcome was defined as a modified Rankin scale score of 4 or 5, or death. Patients were divided into three groups according to the treatment they received: antithrombotic treatment only (AT), which comprised antiplatelet drugs or systemic anticoagulation; primary intravenous thrombolysis (IVT), including subsequent intra-arterial thrombolysis; or intra-arterial therapy (IAT), which comprised thrombolysis, mechanical thrombectomy, stenting, or a combination of these approaches. Risk ratios (RR) for treatment effects were adjusted for age, the severity of neurological deficits at the time of treatment, time to treatment, prodromal minor stroke, location of the occlusion, and diabetes. FINDINGS: 619 patients were entered in the registry. 27 patients were excluded from the analyses because they did not receive AT, IVT, or IAT, and all had a poor outcome. Of the 592 patients who were analysed, 183 were treated with only AT, 121 with IVT, and 288 with IAT. Overall, 402 (68%) of the analysed patients had a poor outcome. No statistically significant superiority was found for any treatment strategy. Compared with outcome after AT, patients with a mild-to-moderate deficit (n=245) had about the same risk of poor outcome after IVT (adjusted RR 0.94, 95% CI 0.60-1.45) or after IAT (adjusted RR 1.29, 0.97-1.72) but had a worse outcome after IAT compared with IVT (adjusted RR 1.49, 1.00-2.23). Compared with AT, patients with a severe deficit (n=347) had a lower risk of poor outcome after IVT (adjusted RR 0.88, 0.76-1.01) or IAT (adjusted RR 0.94, 0.86-1.02), whereas outcomes were similar after treatment with IAT or IVT (adjusted RR 1.06, 0.91-1.22). INTERPRETATION: Most patients in the BASICS registry received IAT. Our results do not support unequivocal superiority of IAT over IVT, and the efficacy of IAT versus IVT in patients with an acute BAO needs to be assessed in a randomised controlled trial. FUNDING: Department of Neurology, University Medical Center Utrecht.

STRATEGIES TO SURPASS THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SMALL ISLAND STATES WITH FEW RESOURCES: THE CASE OF CAPE VERDE

The problem of small Island Developing States (SIDS) is quite recent, end of the 80s and 90s, still looking for a theoretical consolidation. SIDS, as small states in development, formed by one or several islands geographically dispersed, present reduced population, market, territory, natural resources, including drinkable water, and, in great number of the cases, low level of economic activity, factors that together, hinder the gathering of scale economies. To these diseconomies they come to join the more elevated costs in transports and communications which, allies to lower productivities, to a smaller quality and diversification of its productions, which difficult its integration in the world economy. In some SIDS these factors are not dissociating of the few investments in infrastructures, in the formation of human resources and in productive investments, just as it happens in most of the developing countries. In ecological terms, many of them with shortage of natural resources, but integrating important ecosystems in national and world terms, but with great fragility relatively to the pollution action, of excessive fishing, of uncontrolled development of tourism, factors that, conjugated and associated to the stove effect, condition the climate and the slope of the medium level of the sea water and therefore could put in cause the own survival of some of them. The drive to the awareness of the international community towards its problems summed up with the accomplishment by the United Nations in the Barbados’s Conference, 1994 where the right to the development was emphasized, through the going up the appropriate strategies and the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of the SIDS. The orientation of the regional and international cooperation in that sense, sharing technology (namely clean technology and control and administration environmental technology), information and creation of capacity-building, supplying means, including financial resources, creating non discriminatory and just trade rules, it would drive to the establishment of a world system economically more equal, in which the production, the consumption, the pollution levels, the demographic politics were guided towards the sustainability. It constituted an important step for the recognition for the international community on the specificities of those states and it allowed the definition of a group of norms and politics to implement at the national, regional and international level and it was important that they continued in the sense of the sustainable development. But this Conference had in its origin previous summits: the Summit of Rio de Janeiro about Environment and Development, accomplished in 1992, which left an important document - the Agenda 21, in the Conference of Stockholm at 1972 and even in the Conference of Ramsar, 1971 about “Wetlands.” CENTRO DE ESTUDOS AFRICANOS Occasional Papers © CEA - Centro de Estudos Africanos 4 Later, the Valletta Declaration, Malta, 1998, the Forum of Small States, 2002, get the international community's attention for the problems of SIDS again, in the sense that they act to increase its resilience. If the definition of “vulnerability” was the inability of the countries to resist economical, ecological and socially to the external shocks and “resilience” as the potential for them to absorb and minimize the impact of those shocks, presenting a structure that allows them to be little affected by them, a part of the available studies, dated of the 90s, indicate that the SIDS are more vulnerable than the other developing countries. The vulnerability of SIDS results from the fact the they present an assemblage of characteristics that turns them less capable of resisting or they advance strategies that allow a larger resilience to the external shocks, either anthropogenic (economical, financial, environmental) or even natural, connected with the vicissitudes of the nature. If these vulnerability factors were grouped with the expansion of the economic capitalist system at world level, the economic and financial globalisation, the incessant search of growing profits on the part of the multinational enterprises, the technological accelerated evolution drives to a situation of disfavour of the more poor. The creation of the resilience to the external shocks, to the process of globalisation, demands from SIDS and of many other developing countries the endogen definition of strategies and solid but flexible programs of integrated development. These must be assumed by the instituted power, but also by the other stakeholders, including companies and organizations of the civil society and for the population in general. But that demands strong investment in the formation of human resources, in infrastructures, in investigation centres; it demands the creation capacity not only to produce, but also to produce differently and do international marketing. It demands institutional capacity. Cape Verde is on its way to this stage.

Emergence of Cooperation on Static and Dynamic Networks

Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics used to analyze situation where two or more agents are interacting. Originally it was developed as a model for conflicts and collaborations between rational and intelligent individuals. Now it finds applications in social sciences, eco- nomics, biology (particularly evolutionary biology and ecology), engineering, political science, international relations, computer science, and philosophy. Networks are an abstract representation of interactions, dependencies or relationships. Net- works are extensively used in all the fields mentioned above and in many more. Many useful informations about a system can be discovered by analyzing the current state of a network representation of such system. In this work we will apply some of the methods of game theory to populations of agents that are interconnected. A population is in fact represented by a network of players where one can only interact with another if there is a connection between them. In the first part of this work we will show that the structure of the underlying network has a strong influence on the strategies that the players will decide to adopt to maximize their utility. We will then introduce a supplementary degree of freedom by allowing the structure of the population to be modified along the simulations. This modification allows the players to modify the structure of their environment to optimize the utility that they can obtain.

Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions

Human cooperation is often based on reputation gained from previous interactions with third parties. Such reputation can be built on generous or punitive actions, and both, one's own reputation and the reputation of others have been shown to influence decision making in experimental games that control for confounding variables. Here we test how reputation-based cooperation and punishment react to disruption of the cognitive processing in different kinds of helping games with observers. Saying a few superfluous words before each interaction was used to possibly interfere with working memory. In a first set of experiments, where reputation could only be based on generosity, the disruption reduced the frequency of cooperation and lowered mean final payoffs. In a second set of experiments where reputation could only be based on punishment, the disruption increased the frequency of antisocial punishment (i.e. of punishing those who helped) and reduced the frequency of punishing defectors. Our findings suggest that working memory can easily be constraining in reputation-based interactions within experimental games, even if these games are based on a few simple rules with a visual display that provides all the information the subjects need to play the strategies predicted from current theory. Our findings also highlight a weakness of experimental games, namely that they can be very sensitive to environmental variation and that quantitative conclusions about antisocial punishment or other behavioral strategies can easily be misleading.

Cooperation and game theory, free software or the #15m movement: Two examples for universities

Closing talk of the Open Access Week 2011 at the UOC, by Josep Jover. Why do altruistic strategies beat selfish ones in the spheres of both free software and the #15m movement? The #15m movement, like software but unlike tangible goods, cannot be owned. It can be used (by joining it) by an indeterminate number of people without depriving anyone else of the chance to do the same. And that turns everything on its head: how universities manage information and what their mission is in this new society. In the immediate future, universities will be valued not for the information they harbour, which will always be richer and more extensive beyond their walls, but rather for their capacity to create critical masses, whether of knowledge research, skill-building, or networks of peers... universities must implement the new model or risk becoming obsolete.