A Model for Creating Strategic Alliances. A Study of Inter-firm Cooperation in the North European ICT Sector

In this study, it is argued that the view on alliance creation presented in the current academic literature is limited, and that using a learning approach helps to explain the dynamic nature of alliance creation. The cases in this study suggest that a wealth of inefficiency elements can be found in alliance creation. These elements can further be divided into categories, which help explain the dynamics of alliance creation. The categories –combined with two models brought forward by the study– suggest that inefficiency can be avoided through learning during the creation process. Some elements are especially central to this argumentation. First, the elements related to the clarity and acceptance of the strategy of the company, the potential lack of an alliance strategy and the elements related to changes in the strategic context. Second, the elements related to the length of the alliance creation processes and the problems a long process entails. It is further suggested that the different inefficiency elements may create a situation, where the alliance creation process is –sequentially and successfully– followed to the end, but where the different inefficiencies create a situation where the results are not aligned with the strategic intent. The proposed solution is to monitor and assess the risk for inefficiency elements during the alliance creation process. The learning, which occurs during the alliance creation process as a result of the monitoring, can then lead to realignments in the process. This study proposes a model to mitigate the risk related to the inefficiencies. The model emphasizes creating an understanding of the other alliance partner’s business, creating a shared vision, using pilot cooperation and building trust within the process. An analytical approach to assessing the benefits of trust is also central in this view. The alliance creation approach suggested by this study, which emphasizes trust and pilot cooperation, is further critically reviewed against contracting as a way to create alliances.

Implications of the half-duplex constraint on relay-aided cooperation using rateless codes

The half-duplex constraint, which mandates that a cooperative relay cannot transmit and receive simultaneously, considerably simplifies the demands made on the hardware and signal processing capabilities of a relay. However, the very inability of a relay to transmit and receive simultaneously leads to a potential under-utilization of time and bandwidth resources available to the system. We analyze the impact of the half-duplex constraint on the throughput of a cooperative relay system that uses rateless codes to harness spatial diversity and efficiently transmit information from a source to a destination. We derive closed-form expressions for the throughput of the system, and show that as the number of relays increases, the throughput approaches that of a system that uses more sophisticated full-duplex nodes. Thus, half-duplex nodes are well suited for cooperation using rateless codes despite the simplicity of both the cooperation protocol and the relays.

Secrecy in the 2-User Symmetric Deterministic Interference Channel with Transmitter Cooperation

This work presents novel achievable schemes for the 2-user symmetric linear deterministic interference channel with limited-rate transmitter cooperation and perfect secrecy constraints at the receivers. The proposed achievable scheme consists of a combination of interference cancelation, relaying of the other user's data bits, time sharing, and transmission of random bits, depending on the rate of the cooperative link and the relative strengths of the signal and the interference. The results show, for example, that the proposed scheme achieves the same rate as the capacity without the secrecy constraints, in the initial part of the weak interference regime. Also, sharing random bits through the cooperative link can achieve a higher secrecy rate compared to sharing data bits, in the very high interference regime. The results highlight the importance of limited transmitter cooperation in facilitating secure communications over 2-user interference channels.

Outer Bounds on the Secrecy Rate of the 2-User Symmetric Deterministic Interference Channel with Transmitter Cooperation

This paper derives outer bounds for the 2-user symmetric linear deterministic interference channel (SLDIC) with limited-rate transmitter cooperation and perfect secrecy constraints at the receivers. Five outer bounds are derived, under different assumptions of providing side information to receivers and partitioning the encoded message/output depending on the relative strength of the signal and the interference. The usefulness of these outer bounds is shown by comparing the bounds with the inner bound on the achievable secrecy rate derived by the authors in a previous work. Also, the outer bounds help to establish that sharing random bits through the cooperative link can achieve the optimal rate in the very high interference regime.

Calling in the gap: competition or cooperation in littermates' begging behaviour?

Abstract: Offspring are frequently raised alongside their siblings and are provisioned early in life by adults. Adult provisioning is stimulated by offspring begging, but it is unclear how each offspring should beg, given the begging behaviour of their siblings. It has previously been suggested that siblings may compete directly through begging for a fixed level of provisioning, or that siblings may cooperate in their begging in order to jointly elevate the level of provisioning by adults. We studied the begging behaviour of meerkat Suricata suricatta pups, explored how it changed as the begging behaviour of their littermates altered, and asked how the adults responded to group-level changes in begging. We found conflicting evidence for classic models of competitive and cooperative begging. Pups reared in larger litters begged at higher rates, yet experimentally increasing begging levels within groups caused individual begging rates to decrease. Pups decreased begging rates when close to other begging pups, and pups spaced further apart were fed more. Adults increased their overall level of provisioning as group levels of begging increased, but per capita provisioning decreased. Adults preferred to provision speakers playing back recordings of two pups begging alternately to recordings of the same two pups begging simultaneously. Therefore, we suggest that meerkat pups avoid some of the costs of direct competition imposed by an escalation of begging as other pups beg, by begging in gaps between the bouts of others or avoiding littermates. Such behaviour is also preferred by provisioning adults, thus providing additional benefits to the pups.

Strategic behavior under partial cooperation

We investigate how a group of players might cooperate with each other within the setting of a non-cooperative game. We pursue two notions of partial cooperative equilibria that follow a modification of Nash's best response rationality rather than a core-like approach. Partial cooperative Nash equilibrium treats non-cooperative players and the coalition of cooperators symmetrically, while the notion of partial cooperative leadership equilibrium assumes that the group of cooperators has a first-mover advantage. We prove existence theorems for both types of equilibria. We look at three well-known applications under partial cooperation. In a game of voluntary provision of a public good we show that our two new equilibrium notions of partial cooperation coincide. In a modified Cournot oligopoly, we identify multiple equilibria of each type and show that a non-cooperator may have a higher payoff than a cooperator. In contrast, under partial cooperation in a symmetric Salop City game, a cooperator enjoys a higher return.

Do mirrors reflect reality in agonistic encounters? A test of mutual cooperation in displays

Animals frequently engage in mutual displays that may allow or at least help decisions about the outcome of agonistic encounters with mutual benefit to the opponents. In fish these often involve lateral displays, with previous studies finding evidence of population-level lateralization with a marked preference for showing the right side and using the right eye. Because both opponents tend to show this preference a head to tail configuration is formed and is used extensively during the display phase. Here we tested the significance of these lateral displays by comparing displays to a mirror with those to a real opponent behind a transparent barrier. The frequency of displays was lower to a mirror but the individual displays were of greater duration indicating a slower pace of the interaction with a mirror. This suggests that fish respond to initiatives of real opponents but as mirror images do not initiate moves the focal fish only moves when it is ready to change position. However, lateralization was still found with mirrors, indicating that the right-side bias is a feature of the individual and not of the interaction between opponents. We discuss implications for ideas about the evolution of mutual cooperation and information exchange in contests, as well as the utility of the use of mirrors in the study of aggression in fish.

Partial Cooperation in Strategic Decision Situations

We consider a normal form game in which there is a single exogenously given coalition of cooperating players that can write a binding agreement on pre-selected actions. These collective actions typically represent a certain number of dimensions in the players’ strategy space. The actions represented by the other dimensions of the strategy space remain under the complete, individual control of the players.r/>We consider a standard extension of the Nash equilibrium concept denoted as a partial cooperative equilibrium as well as an equilibrium concept in which the coalition of cooperators has a leadership position. Existence results are developed for these new equilibrium concepts. We identify conditions on these partial cooperative games under which the various equilibrium concepts are equivalent.r/>We apply this game theoretic framework to existing models of multi-market oligopolies and international pollution abatement. In a multi-market oligopoly typically a merger paradox emerges in the partial cooperative equilibrium, which vanishes if the cartel of collaborators exploits its leadership position. Our application to international pollution abatement treaties shows that cooperation by a sufficiently large group of countries results in a Pareto improvement over the standard tragedy of the commons outcome described by the Nash equilibrium.r/>

The Evolution of Extreme Cooperation via Shared Dysphoric Experiences

Willingness to lay down one’s life for a group of non-kin, well documented in ther/>historical and ethnographic records, represents an evolutionary puzzle. Here wer/>present a novel explanation for the willingness to fight and die for a group, combining evolutionary theorizing with empirical evidence from real-world human groups. Building on research in social psychology, we develop a mathematical model showing how conditioning cooperation on previous shared experience can allow extreme (i.e., life-threatening) pro-social behavior to evolve. The model generates a series of predictions that we then test empirically in a range of special sample populations (including military veterans, college fraternity/sorority members, football fans, martial arts practitioners, and twins). Our results show that sharing painful experiences produces “identity fusion” – a visceral sense of oneness – more so even than bonds of kinship, in turn motivating extreme pro-group behavior, including willingness to fight and die for the group. These findings have theoretical and practical relevance. Theoretically, our results speak to the origins of human cooperation, as we offer an explanation of extremely costly actions left unexplained by existing models.r/>Practically, our account of how shared dysphoric experiences produce identity fusion, which produces a willingness to fight and die for a non-kin group, helps us better understand such pressing social issues as suicide terrorism, holy wars, sectarian violence, gang-related violence, and other forms of intergroup conflict.r/>r/>

Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.

Análisis de los elementos de Soft Power presentes en la política exterior alemana de cooperación para el desarrollo (2002-2009)R ALEMANA DE COOPERACIÓN PARA EL DESARROLLO (2002-2009)

A lo largo de la historia el Sistema Internacional se ha configurado a partir de los diferentes polos de poder y de diversas formas de interacción entre actores. Una de estas formas es la cooperación internacional, la cual abre el espacio a nuevos asuntos dentro de la agenda internacional y permite profundizar la colaboración en determinados temas de interés de los actores. Esta forma de relacionamiento puede ser entendida como una herramienta de Soft Power definiéndose éste como un elemento que permite a los Estados influenciar dentro del sistema internacional por medio de acciones no bélicas y que facilita el acercamiento de los países desarrollados con los países en vías de desarrollo para moldear el sistema internacional. Siguiendo esta idea, el Estado Alemán ha implementado el uso del Soft Power dentro de su política exterior buscando generar beneficios tanto a Alemania como para los Estados receptores de cooperación. Alemania ha redefinido sus prioridades: ajustar y reorganizar sus estrategias de cooperación para optimizar recursos, teniendo en cuenta la historia alemana y los cambios estructurales que las dos guerras mundiales generaron en la perspectiva de su política exterior. La fuerte y firme estructura política, económica y social ha permitido que este sea el único país de la Unión Europea que no ha sufrido directamente la crisis económica y por lo tanto ha logrado seguir aportando parte de su PIB a la cooperación internacional. Esto ha generado un diálogo político entre diferentes países, el cual permite el acercamiento con los gobiernos de turno en cada Estado para la creación de políticas encaminadas al desarrollo y al mejoramiento de la calidad de vida de los ciudadanos.