Assessment of irrigators’ preferences for different water supply risk management tools: option contract and insurance.

Irrigators face the risk of not having enough water to meet their crops’ demand. There are different mechanisms to cope with this risk, including water markets (option contracts) or insurance. A farmer will purchase them when the expected utility change derived from the tool is positive. This paper presents a theoretical assessment of the farmer’s expected utility under two different option contracts, a drought insurance and a combination of an option contract and the insurance. We analyze the conditions that determine farmer’s reference for one instrument or the other and perform a numerical application that is relevant for a Spanish region.

Proposed contract and specifications for the sinking of a shaft, etc.

Mode of access: Internet.

Final report specifications for grant, contract, and in-house projects.

Includes sample.

Notice of letting, Specifications, proposal, contract and bond for Susquehanna Water Supply Project, section no. 1, Montebello Raw Water Distribution Center.

"Addendum no. 1", 1958 (6 l.) inserted at end.

Peace-republicans' manual; or, The French constitution of 1793, and the Declaration of the rights of man and of citizens, according to the Moniteur of June 27th, 1793; in the original French, together with a translation in English. To which is added: debates on this constitution in the National convention ... translated extracts from pieces seized in Babœuf's rooms; extracts from a translation of Rousseau's work on the Social contract; and various other extracts ...

Preface signed : Maria Aletta Hulshoff.

Corporate boards and incentives: empirical evidence from the UK in 1935

We investigate boardroom governance using UK historical data for 1935. We demonstrate that there is a negative relationship between risk and incentives in this year. Prior research has produced anomalous results (Prendergast, 2002). Second, we show that average (median) board ownership of ordinary shares is about 7.95% (2.88%). Heuristically this figure is less than previously reported estimates for the US also using 1935 data. Finally, we show the phenomenon of multiple board membership. UK directors in 1935 hold many directorships – sometimes exceeding 10 concurrent memberships.

Person-organization fit and incentives:a causal test

We investigate the effects of organizational culture and personal values on performance under individual and team contest incentives. We develop a model of regard for others and in-group favoritism that predicts interaction effects between organizational values and personal values in contest games. These predictions are tested in a computerized lab experiment with exogenous control of both organizational values and incentives. In line with our theoretical model we find that prosocial (proself) orientated subjects exert more (less) effort in team contests in the primed prosocial organizational values condition, relative to the neutrally primed baseline condition. Further, when the prosocial organizational values are combined with individual contest incentives, prosocial subjects no longer outperform their proself counterparts. These findings provide a first, affirmative, causal test of person-organization fit theory. They also suggest the importance of a 'triple-fit' between personal preferences, organizational values and incentive mechanisms for prosocially orientated individuals.

Third-mission policy goals and incentives from performance-based funding: Are they aligned?

In competitive knowledge-based economies, policymakers recognize the importance of universities’ engagement in third mission activities. This article investigates how a specific policy approach to encourage third mission engagement—the use of performance-based funding to reward universities’ success in this domain—aligns with the broader goals of third mission policy. Considering the case of the UK, the first country to have implemented a system of this kind, we analyse how the system has come into being and how it has evolved, and we discuss whether its implementation is likely to encourage universities to behave in ways that are aligned with the goals of third mission policy, as outlined in government documents. We argue that the system encourages universities to focus on a narrow range of income-producing third mission activities, and this is not well aligned with the policy goal to support a complex innovation ecosystem comprising universities with different third mission objectives and strategies. The article concludes by proposing possible avenues for achieving greater alignment between incentives and policy goals.

Privity of Contract and Third Party Rights in European Construction Projects

Privity of contract has lately been criticized in several European jurisdictions, particu-larly due to the onerous consequences it gives rise to in arrangements typical for the modern exchange such as chains of contracts. Privity of contract is a classical premise of contract law, which prohibits a third party to acquire or enforce rights under a contract to which he is not a party. Such a premise is usually seen to be manifested in the doctrine of privity of contract developed under common law, however, the jurisdictions of continental Europe do recognize a corresponding starting point in contract law. One of the traditional industry sectors affected by this premise is the construction industry. A typical large construction project includes a contractual chain comprised of an employer, a main contractor and a subcontractor. The employer is usually dependent on the subcontractor's performance, however, no contractual nexus exists between the two. Accordingly, the employer might want to circumvent the privity of contract in order to reach the subcontractor and to mitigate any risks imposed by such a chain of contracts. From this starting point, the study endeavors to examine the concept of privity of con-tract in European jurisdictions and particularly the methods used to circumvent the rule in the construction industry practice. For this purpose, the study employs both a com-parative and a legal dogmatic method. The principal aim is to discover general principles not just from a theoretical perspective, but from a practical angle as well. Consequently, a considerable amount of legal praxis as well as international industry forms have been used as references. The most important include inter alia the model forms produced by FIDIC as well as Olli Norros' doctoral thesis "Vastuu sopimusketjussa". According to the conclusions of this study, the four principal ways to circumvent privity of contract in European construction projects include liability in a chain of contracts, collateral contracts, assignment of rights as well as security instruments. The contempo-rary European jurisdictions recognize these concepts and the references suggest that they are an integral part of the current market practice. Despite the fact that such means of circumventing privity of contract raise a number of legal questions and affect the risk position of particularly a subcontractor considerably, it seems that the impairment of the premise of privity of contract is an increasing trend in the construction industry.