An illustrated flora of the northern United States, Canada and the British possessions : from Newfoundland to the parallel of the southern boundary of Virginia, and from the Atlantic Ocean westward to the 102d meridian / by Nathaniel Lord Britton and Hon. Addison Brown.

3

An illustrated flora of the northern United States, Canada and the British possessions : from Newfoundland to the parallel of the southern boundary of Virginia, and from the Atlantic Ocean westward to the 102d meridian / by Nathaniel Lord Britton and Hon. Addison Brown.

2

An illustrated flora of the northern United States, Canada and the British possessions : from Newfoundland to the parallel of the southern boundary of Virginia, and from the Atlantic Ocean westward to the 102d meridian / by Nathaniel Lord Britton and Hon. Addison Brown.

1

Flora of West Virginia, by Charles Frederick Millspaugh and Lawrence William Nuttall.

v.1:no.2(1896)

An illustrated flora of the northern United States, Canada and the British possessions, from Newfoundland to the parallel of the southern boundary of Virginia, and from the Atlantic Ocean westward to the 102d meridian, by Nathaniel Lord Britton and Addison Brown. The descriptive text chiefly prepared by Britton, with the assistance of specialists in several groups; the figures also drawn under his supervision.

2

An illustrated flora of the northern United States, Canada and the British possessions, from Newfoundland to the parallel of the southern boundary of Virginia, and from the Atlantic Ocean westward to the 102d meridian, by Nathaniel Lord Britton and Addison Brown. The descriptive text chiefly prepared by Britton, with the assistance of specialists in several groups; the figures also drawn under his supervision.

3

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Les Constitutions vaudoises (1803-2003). Miroir des idées politiques

L'année 2003 est l'année du Bicentenaire, mais aussi celle de l'entrée en vigueur d'une nouvelle Constitution vaudoise. Après quatre ans de travaux, l'Assemblée constituante a accouché d'une charte appelée à régir la vie politique du canton pendant plusieurs décennies. Les débats ont cependant fait peu de place à l'histoire des idées politiques, qui ont modelé l'action des gouvernants, et à l'histoire constitutionnelle, dans laquelle ont été façonnées à un degré ou à un autre les grandes questions du temps présent. Il existe certes un grand nombre d'études qui abordent ces thématiques. Une foule de questions n'ont cependant pas encore été explorées et, surtout, les tentatives de montrer les liens presque organiques entre l'histoire des constitutions et l'histoire des idées sont rares. Il était donc intéressant de regrouper sous un toit commun des études abordant ces deux aspects de notre histoire. Aucun examen exhaustif n'était bien sûr possible. Il s'agit d'éclairages qui montreront combien certains débats constitutionnels ont baigné dans des ambiances intellectuelles particulières, arrimées à des événements ou à des courants de pensée qui ne pouvaient laisser les Vaudois indifférents. L'ouvrage est subdivisé en trois parties : - droits politiques et institutions ; - justice et finances publiques ; - histoire des idées politiques. L'histoire du canton de Vaud issu de l'Acte de Médiation est riche de débats politiques d'une haute tenue, où se croisent les influences les plus variées. C'est à une découverte de certaines d'entre elles qu'invite le présent ouvrage ; une manière d'entrer dans les soubassements historiques de la nouvelle Constitution vaudoise. L'ouvrage rassemble dix-neuf contributions, qui mettent toutes en évidence le profond enracinement intellectuel des débats ayant entouré la naissance des diverses constitutions vaudoises. Les auteurs de ces textes sont juristes, politologues ou historiens, au seuil de leur carrière ou dotés d'une riche expérience professionnelle, rattachés aux différents camps qui segmentent la vie politique. Le livre se nourrit de ces multiples vocations, de ces multiples sensibilités, et montre que l'histoire ne peut être soumise à un angle de vue unique. Il est agrémenté de vingt-cinq illustrations environ, dont plusieurs sont tirées de journaux satiriques vaudois du XIXe et du XXe siècle.

Endogenous constitutions

We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a relatively small government and low level of taxation. A consensual democracy redistributes resources toward a broader spectrum of social groups but also has a larger government and a higher level of taxation. We show that a consensual system turns out to be preferred by society when ex ante income inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when income inequality is relatively high. We also obtain that consensual democracies should be expected to be ruled more often by center-left coalitions while the right should have an advantage in majoritarian constitutions. The implications for the relationship between inequality and redistribution are discussed. Historical evidence and a cross-sectional analysis support our results.