Analisis de la politica exterior de Francia y Alemania frente a la Constitucion Europea de 2004, Bajo la Logica de la Nueva Razon de Estado

El Tratado que establece una Constitución para Europa (CNE) de 2004 fue el resultado de una serie de debates que iniciaron en el seno del eje franco-alemán, y se fueron expandiendo a los otros Estados miembro y Estados candidatos de Europa Central y Oriental (PECO¿s) de la UE. A través de la Convención Europea (CVE) se creó un borrador del tratado constitucional y posteriormente, en la CIG se negoció y firmó por los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de dichos Estados. La presente monografía pretende explicar y analizar las diferentes posturas que tuvieron Francia y Alemania, respecto al debate, la negociación, y la ratificación de la CNE.

Die Europäische Union auf dem Weg zur Verfassungsrechtsgemeinschaft

Obwohl der Ursprung der europäischen Einigungsgeschichte im wirtschaftlichen Bereich lag, hatte die Integration von Beginn an auch politischen Charakter. Schon die römischen Verträge enthielten Ansätze einer Konstitutionalisierung und auch die Bezeichnung der Verträge als Verfassung wurde seit den 60er-Jahren unter Rechtswissenschaftlern immer gebräuchlicher, auch wenn dies stets umstritten war. Unabhängig vom Streit über den Verfassungsbegriff hat die von den Verträgen gebildete Rechtsordnung jedenfalls inhaltlich Verfassungscharakter. Sie enthält Regelungen, die man gemeinhin mit einer Staatsverfassung verbindet. Die europäische Integration war stets von verfassungsrechtlichen Idealen getragen, weshalb man die Mitgliedstaaten auch als eine Verfassungsrechtsgemeinschaft bezeichnen kann. Bedeutende Weiterentwicklungen erfuhr der Konstitutionalisierungsprozess mit der Konventsmethode und der Erarbeitung der Grundrechte-Charta. Fortgesetzt wurde dieser Prozess mit dem Entwurf über den Verfassungsvertrag für Europa. Da in ihm typische Gehalte einer Verfassung verkörpert sind, verdient er durchaus auch diese Bezeichnung. Auf seiner Basis sollte ein schlanker, übersichtlicher und verständlicher Verfassungstext geschaffen werden, der die Reform und Integration Europas weiter führt und ein Instrument der Identitätsstiftung sein kann.

Testing for Subsidiarity. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 13/2006

In the EU circuit (especially the European Parliament, the Council and Coreper) as well as in national parliaments of the EU Member States, one observes a powerful tendency to regard 'subsidiarity' as a 'political' issue. Moreover, subsidiarity is frequently seen as a one-way street : powers going 'back to' Member States. Both interpretations are at least partly flawed and less than helpful when looking for practical ways to deal with subsidiarity at both EU and Member states' levels. The present paper shows that subsidiarity as a principle is profoundly 'functional' in nature and, hence, is and must be a two-way principle. A functional subsidiarity test is developed and its application is illustrated for a range of policy issues in the internal market in its widest sense, for equity and for macro-economic stabilisation questions in European integration. Misapplications of 'subsidiarity' are also demonstrated. For a good understanding, subsidiarity being a functional, two-way principle neither means that elected politicians should not have the final (political!) say (for which they are accountable), nor that subsidiarity tests, even if properly conducted, cannot and will not be politicised once the results enter the policy debate. Such politicisation forms a natural run-up to the decision-making by those elected for it. But the quality and reasoning of the test as well as structuring the information in a logical sequence ( in accordance with the current protocol and with the one in the constitutional treaty) is likely to be directly helpful for decisionmakers, confronted with complicated and often specialised proposals. EU debates and decision-making is therefore best served by separating the functional subsidiarity test (prepared by independent professionals) from the final political decision itself. If the test were accepted Union-wide, it would also assist national parliaments in conducting comparable tests in a relatively short period, as the basis for possible joint action (as suggested by the constitutional treaty). The core of the paper explains how the test is formulated and applied. A functional approach to subsidiarity in the framework of European representative democracy seeks to find the optimal assignment of regulatory or policy competences to the various tiers of government. In the final analysis, this is about structures facilitating the highest possible welfare in the Union, in the fundamental sense that preferences and needs are best satisfied. What is required for such an analysis is no less than a systematic cost/benefit framework to assess the (de)merits of (de)centralisation in the EU.

France and the construction of Europe, 1944-2007:the geopolitical imperative

In the second half of the twentieth century France played the greatest role - even greater than Germany’s - in shaping what eventually became the European Union. By the early twenty-first century, however, in a hugely transformed Europe, this era had patently come to an end. This comprehensive history shows how France coupled the pursuit of power and the furtherance of European integration over a sixty-year period, from the close of the Second World War to the hesitation caused by the French electorate’s referendum rejection of the European Union’s constitutional treaty in 2005.

European Economic and Social Constitutionalism after the Treaty of Lisbon

European studies frequently regard the economic and social dimensions of EU integration as diametrically opposed, maintaining that this state of affairs is beyond change. This edited collection challenges this perceived wisdom, focusing on the post-Lisbon constitutional landscape. Taking the multi-layered polity that is Europe today as its central organising theme, it examines how the social and the economic might be reconciled under the Union's different forms of governance. The collection has a clear structure, opening with a theoretical appraisal of its theme, before considering three specific policy fields: migration policy and civic integration, company law and corporate social responsibility and the role of third sector providers in public healthcare. It concludes with three case studies in these fields, illustrating how the argument can be practically applied. Insightful and topical, with a unique interdisciplinary perspective, this is an important contribution to European Union law after the Lisbon Treaty

Canadian federalism and treaty powers: existential communities, functional regimes and the Canadian constitution

La Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 ne contient aucune disposition expresse concernant un quelconque pouvoir pour les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux de conclure des traités internationaux - ce pouvoir étant réservé, à l'époque de l'adoption de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867, au pouvoir impérial britannique. Aussi, une seule disposition prévoyait les modalités de mise en oeuvre des traités impériaux au sein de la fédération canadienne et cette disposition est aujourd'hui caduque. Puisque l'autonomie du Canada face à l'Empire britannique ne s'est pas accompagnée d'une refonte en profondeur du texte de la constitution canadienne, rien n'a été expressément prévu concernant le droit des traités au sein de la fédération canadienne. Le droit constitutionnel touchant les traités internationaux est donc Ie fruit de la tradition du «constitutionnalisme organique» canadien. Cette thèse examine donc ce type de constitutionnalisme à travers le cas particulier du droit constitutionnel canadien relatif aux traités internationaux. Elle examine ce sujet tout en approfondissant les conséquences juridiques du principe constitutionnel du fédéralisme reconnu par la Cour suprême du Canada dans le Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec, [1998] 2 R.C.S. 217. De manière plus spécifique, cette thèse analyse en détail l’affaire Canada (P.G.) c. Ontario (P. G.), [1937] A.C. 326 (arrêt des conventions de travail) ou le Conseil prive a conclu que si l'exécutif fédéral peut signer et ratifier des traités au nom de l'État canadien, la mise en oeuvre de ces traités devra se faire - lorsqu'une modification législative est nécessaire à cet effet - par le palier législatif compétent sur la matière visée par l'obligation internationale. Le Conseil Prive ne spécifia toutefois pas dans cet arrêt qui a compétence pour conclure des traités relatifs aux matières de compétence provinciale. Cette thèse s'attaque donc à cette question. Elle défend la position selon laquelle aucun principe ou règle de droit constitutionnel canadien ou de droit international n'exige que l'exécutif fédéral ait un pouvoir plénier et exclusif sur la conclusion des traités. Elle souligne de plus que de très importants motifs de politique publique fondes notamment sur les impératifs d'expertise, de fonctionnalité institutionnelle et de démocratie militent à l’encontre d'un tel pouvoir fédéral plénier et exclusif. L'agencement institutionnel des différentes communautés existentielles présentes au Canada exige une telle décentralisation. Cette thèse démontre de plus que les provinces canadiennes sont les seules à posséder un pouvoir constitutionnel de conclure des traités portant sur des domaines relevant de leurs champs de compétence - pouvoir dont elles peuvent cependant déléguer l'exercice au gouvernement fédéral. Enfin, cette thèse analyse de manière systématique et approfondie les arguments invoques au soutien d'un renversement des principes établis par l'arrêt des conventions de travail en ce qui concerne la mise en oeuvre législative des traités relatifs à des matières provinciales et elle démontre leur absence de fondement juridique. Elle démontre par ailleurs que, compte tenu de l'ensemble des règles et principes constitutionnels qui sous-tendent et complètent le sens de cette décision, renverser l’arrêt des conventions de travail aurait pour effet concret de transformer l'ensemble de la fédération canadienne en état quasi unitaire car le Parlement pourrait alors envahir de manière permanente et exclusive l'ensemble des champs de compétence provinciaux. Cette conséquence est assurément interdite par le principe du fédéralisme constitutionnellement enchâssé.

The Constitutional basis of aboriginal rights

Aboriginal rights are rights held by aboriginal peoples, not by virtue of Crown grant, legislation or treaty, but “by reason of the fact that aboriginal peoples were once independent, self-governing entities in possession of most of the lands now making up Canada.” It is, of course, the presence of aboriginal peoples in North America before the arrival of the Europeans that distinguishes them from other minority groups in Canada, and explains why their rights have special legal status. However, the extent to which those rights had survived European settlement was in considerable doubt until as late as 1973, which was when the Supreme Court of Canada decided the Calder case.2 In that case, six of the seven judges held that the Nishga people of British Columbia possessed aboriginal rights to their lands that had survived European settlement. The actual outcome of the case was inconclusive, because the six judges split evenly on the question whether the rights had been validly extinguished or not. However, the recognition of the rights was significant, and caught the attention of the Government of Canada, which began to negotiate treaties (now called land claims agreements) with First Nations in those parts of the country that were without treaties. That resumed a policy that had been abandoned in the 1920s, when the last numbered treaty was entered into.

Only if “je est un autre” Can I Recognise You: Reflections on Canada’s Process of Constitutional Recognition of the “Preexistence of Distinctive Aborignial Societies”

1er Prix du concours d'initiation à la recherche organisé par le Regroupement Droit et Changements. La Loi sur les Indiens institutionnalise toujours de nombreuses facettes de ce qu’est être « Indien » pour beaucoup d’individus au Canada et un changement de perspective doit être opéré. Cet essai puise dans la pensée du philosophe Theodor Adorno pour réfléchir aux tentatives de reconnaissance juridique par le Canada des individus et sociétés autochtones en vertu de l’article 35 de la Constitution. L’auteur présente la théorie de la dialectique négative d’Adorno de 1966 sur le rapport à l’altérité, à partir de l’analyse de la professeure Drucilla Cornell, afin d’identifier ce que sa pensée prescrit pour établir des rapports non-oppressants entre Autochtones et non-Autochtones et leurs gouvernements aujourd’hui. La dialectique négative est particulièrement appropriée à la tentative de reconnaissance juridique de l’existence des sociétés autochtones par le Canada, du fait de leur statut marginalisé et de leurs revendications à la spécificité. Après avoir établi un tel cadre, l’auteur souligne que des précédentes tentatives de reconnaissances se sont soldées par des échecs en raison des désaccords au niveau des valeurs impliquées et des concepts utilisés auxquels elles ont donné lieu. Le processus de signature des traités numérotés de 1871-1921 est employé comme illustration en raison de son résultat souvent décrit aujourd’hui comme coercitif et injuste en dépit du discours de négociation sur un pied d’égalité l’ayant accompagné. Les critiques contemporaines de la politique en vigueur de mise en œuvre de l’autonomie gouvernementale autochtone par des accords négociés sont également présentées, afin d’illustrer que des désaccords quant à la manière dont l’État canadien entend reconnaître les peuples autochtones persistent à ce jour. L’auteur ajoute que, du point de vue de la dialectique négative, de tels désaccords doivent nécessairement être résolus pour que des rapports moins oppressifs puissent être établis. L’auteur conclut que la dialectique négative impose à la fois de se considérer soi-même (« je est un autre ») et de considérer l’autre comme au-delà des limites de sa propre pensée. La Cour suprême a déjà reconnu que la seule perspective de la common law n’est pas suffisante pour parvenir à une réconciliation des souverainetés des Autochtones et de la Couronne en vertu de la Constitution. Le concept de common law de fiduciaire présente un véhicule juridique intéressant pour une reconfiguration plus profonde par le gouvernement canadien de son rapport avec les peuples autochtones, priorisant processus plutôt que résultats et relations plutôt que certitude. Il doit toutefois être gardé à l’esprit que la reconnaissance de ces peuples par l’État canadien par le prisme de la pensée d’Adorno présente non seulement le défi d’inclure de nouvelles perspectives, mais également de remettre en cause les prémisses fondamentales à partir desquelles on considère la communauté canadienne en général.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

The Swiss Public Initiative against Mass Immigration (‘Masseneinwanderungsinitiative’): Caught between Constitutional Sovereignty and Pacta Sunt Servanda

This article seeks to bring some clarity to the publicly held debate on the Swiss federal popular initiative to limit immigration as it was adopted on 9 February 2014 by the Swiss people. It considers the crux of the matter, which is the implementation of the new Swiss constitutional article in the context of public international law. The initiative is stuck in between Swiss constitutional sovereignty and Swiss treaty obligations flowing from the agreement on free movement of persons between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation. Specific attention is paid to the democratic element anchored in the Swiss Constitution which, in contrast to other systems where the judicial element prevails, is of high importance for whole the process of a bilateral contractual relationship between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation.

The concept of 'economic activity' in the EU treaty: from ideological dead-ends to workable judicial concepts. Research Paper in Law 06/2011

[From the Introduction]. The economic rules, or put more ambitiously, the economic constitution of the Treaty,1 only apply to economic activities. This general principle remains valid, even if some authors strive to demonstrate that certain Treaty rules also apply in the absence of an economic activity,2 and despite the fact that non-economic (horizontal) Treaty provisions (e.g. principle of nondiscrimination, rules on citizenship) are also applicable in the absence of any economic activity.3 Indeed, the exercise of some economic activity transcends the concepts of ‘goods’ (having positive or negative market value),4 workers (even if admitted in an extensive manner),5 and services (offered for remuneration).6 It is also economic activity or ‘the activity of offering goods and services into the market’7 that characterises an ‘undertaking’ thus making the competition rules applicable. Further, it is for regulating economic activity that Article 115 TFEU, Article 106(3) TFEU and most other legal bases in the TFEU provide harmonisation powers in favour of the EU. Last but not least, Article 14 TFEU on the distinction between services of general economic interest (SGEIs) and non-economic services of general interest (NESGIs), as well as Protocol n. 26 on Services of General Interest (SGIs) confirm the constitutional significance of the distinction between economic and non-economic: a means of dividing competences between the EU and the member states. The distinction between economic and non-economic activities is fraught with legal and technical intricacies – the latter being generated by dynamic technological advances and regulatory experimentation. More importantly, however, the distinction is overcharged with political and ideological significations and misunderstandings and, even, terminological confusions.8

Talking with the “pouvoir constituant” in times of constitutional reform: The European Court of Justice on Private Applicants’ Access to Justice. Research Paper in Law 3/2003

[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”

The Lisbon Treaty and Spain: Background, Context and Impact. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Special Issue 1, August 2012

The year 2010 will be remembered in the European Union (EU) circles of governmental Spain as a crucial milestone regarding the role of the country in one of the most important alliances of world history. During the first semester, from January to June 2010, Spain had previously been scheduled to hold the rotating presidency as done since the times of the inception of the predecessor of the EU, the European Economic Community (EEC). Furthermore, on June 12, Spain would be ready to celebrate the 25th anniversary of its adhesion (along with Portugal) to the European integration experiment, by signing the treaty, effectively acceding to the European Community (EC) on January 1, 1986. While all of this was set to occur, the new Reform Treaty (“of Lisbon”) was set to be implemented as a substitute for the failed constitutional text floated during the first years of the new century. Moreover, these spectacular events unraveled in the middle of one of the worst economic crises of the world, with considerable impact on the evolution of the EU and, most especially, Spain. This paper will review the background, context and impact of particular novel aspects of the new treaty governing the EU and several milestones regarding the experience of Spain in the European process.

The Convention on the Future of Europe: Extended Working Group or Constitutional Assembly? Research Papers in Law, 4/2005

From the Introduction. “We are a Convention. We are not an Intergovernmental Conference because we have not been given a mandate by Governments to negotiate on their behalf the solutions which we propose. We are not a Parliament because we are not elected by citizens to draft legislative texts. […] We are a Convention. What does this mean? A Convention is a group of men and women meeting for the sole purpose of preparing a joint proposal. […] It is a task modest in form but immense in content, for if it succeeds in accordance with our mandate, it will light up the future of Europe”.1 In his speech inaugurating the Convention process on 26 February 2002 in Brussels, Convention President VALÉRY GISCARD D’ESTAING raises three issues: first, he refers to the Convention’s nature and method; second, he talks of the Convention’s aim and output; and, third, he evokes the Convention’s historic and symbolic significance. All three aspects have been amply discussed in the past two years by politicians and academics analysing whether the Convention’s purpose and instruments differ fundamentally from those of previous reform rounds; whether the input into and output of the Convention process qualitatively improves European Treaty revision; and whether the Convention as an institution lived up to its symbolic and normative load, reflected in comparisons with “Philadelphia” or references to a “constitutional moment”.2