999 resultados para Constitutional review
Resumo:
Based on a case of a patient with angiosarcoma (AS) of the right atrium with superior vena cava syndrome associated with urticaria and polyarthralgias, who died soon after surgery, the authors present a brief review of the subject of cardiac AS, an extremely rare pathology, usually diagnosed late due to its non-specific symptomatology. Several topics are discussed, including mechanisms of clinical manifestations caused by blood flow obstruction and valve dysfunction, local invasion with arrhythmias and pericardial effusion, embolic phenomena and constitutional symptoms. Imaging and histopathologic methods of diagnosis are considered, as well as references to cytogenetic analysis. Surgery is the first treatment choice, but heart AS are frequently not completely resectable and concomitant metastases at the time of surgery are common, both usually leading to a dismal prognosis. Chemotherapy, radiotherapy and even heart transplantation do not substantially improve the survival of these patients. Urticaria is not generally assumed by most authors to be associated with malignancy, but there are rare reports of its association with some malignant tumors.
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Discussions at the inaugural meeting of a Trans-European Pedagogic Research Group for Anatomical Sciences highlighted the fact that there exist considerable variations in the legal and ethical frameworks throughout Europe concerning body bequests for anatomical examination. Such differences appear to reflect cultural and religious variations as well as different legal and constitutional frameworks. For example, there are different views concerning the "ownership" of cadavers and concerning the need (perceived by different societies and national politicians) for legislation specifically related to anatomical dissection. Furthermore, there are different views concerning the acceptability of using unclaimed bodies that have not given informed consent. Given that in Europe there have been a series of controversial anatomical exhibitions and also a public (televised) dissection/autopsy, and given that the commercial sale or transport of anatomical material across national boundaries is strongly debated, it would seem appropriate to "harmonise" the situation (at least in the European Union). This paper summarises the legal situation in a variety of European countries and suggests examples of good practice. In particular, it recommends that all countries should adopt clear legal frameworks to regulate the acceptance of donations for medical education and research. It stresses the need for informed consent, with donors being given clear information upon which to base their decision, intentions to bequest being made by the donor before death and encourages donors to discuss their wishes to bequeath with relatives prior to death. Departments are encouraged, where they feel it appropriate, to hold Services of Thanksgiving and Commemoration for those who have donated their bodies. Finally, there needs to be legislation to regulate transport of bodies or body parts across national borders and a discouragement of any moves towards commercialisation in relation to bequests.
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Since the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, Canadians courts have become bolder in the law-making entreprise, and have recently resorted to unwritten constitutional principles in an unprecedented fashion. In 1997, in Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, the Supreme Court of Canada found constitutional justification for the independence of provincially appointed judges in the underlying, unwritten principles of the Canadian Constitution. In 1998, in Reference re Secession of Quebec, the Court went even further in articulating those principles, and held that they have a substantive content which imposes significant limitations on government action. The author considers what the courts' recourse to unwritten principles means for the administrative process. More specifically, he looks at two important areas of uncertainty relating to those principles: their ambiguous normative force and their interrelatedness. He goes on to question the legitimacy of judicial review based on unwritten constitutional principles, and to critize the courts'recourse to such principles in decisions applying the principle of judicial independence to the issue of the remuneration of judges.
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This thesis entitled “Judicial review of academic decisions.Education in India is being increasingly controlled and guided by the courts.This study makes an attempt to assess the involvement of the court in regulating education and its role or interference in the conventional concepts of ‘academic freedom’ and ‘university autonomy.The study mostly concentrates on the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and its invocation in academic matters with particular reference to the decisions of the Kerala High Court.The concept of judicial review in the Constituent Assembly, initial approach of the Supreme Court of India towards the doctrine, gradual empowerment of Indian judiciary in this area and the resultant judicial activism.The study proceeds through the analysis of ‘academic freedom’ and ‘university autonomy’ in the 4"‘ chapter. This chapter attempts to probe academic freedom and university autonomy in India,England and United States and autonomy of Indian universities before and after independence.Basic principles and the jurisdictional parameters of judicial review in the area of academic decisions, as pronounced by the Apex Court, can be convincingly and consistently followed by the High Courts, which is possible only if special Academic Benches are constituted.
Resumo:
The focus of study in this thesis is on the necessity and extent of judicial creativity in interpreting provisions in certain crucial areas in the Constitution of India. Judicial innovation was essential to adapt the constitutional provisions to modern changed context. Creativity of the Court has been mainly in the creation and introduction of certain new concepts not found in any specific provision of the Constitution which, but were essential for its meaningful interpretation.Independence of the judiciary, basic structure and certain elements of social justice cherished as ideal by the makers of the Constitution are some such concepts infused into the Constitution by the judiciary. The second aspect of creativity lies in the attempt of the Court to construe provisions in the Constitution with a view to upholding and maintaining the concepts so infused into the Constitution. Introduction of those concepts into the Constitution was necessary and is justified. all important features of the Constitution like democratic form of government, federal structure, judicial review, independence of judiciary and rule of law were thus included in the doctrine to prevent their alteration by amendments.As a result of such a construction, the nature of those directive principles itself has changed. They ceased to be mere directives for state action but became mandate for it. If left to legislative or executive will for their implementation, the directives would have remained enforceable as ordinary right.To conclude, notwithstanding the errors committed by the Supreme Court in construing the provisions in the above areas, they stand testimony to its creative and innovative response in interpreting the Constitution. If this trend is continued, it will be possible to achieve through the judicial process, maintenance of independence of the judiciary, avoidance of destruction of the Constitution through the process of amendment and realisation of social justice envisaged in the directive principles. It can be hoped that the Court would maintain its energetic and vibrant mind and rise up to the occasions and extend the same to other areas in future.
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My aim in this paper is to propose a reflection on the position and the importance that the constitutional judge has in the legal systems of contemporary constitutionalism. The figure of the judge responsible of protecting the Constitution is a key institution, without which we cannot understand the laws of constitutional democracies, their current lines of development, and the guarantee of rights and freedoms that constitute the normative core of these systems. Moreover, the reflection on the exercise of the powers of the judge, its scope and its justification is an important part of contemporary legal discussion, still relevant, albeit not exclusively - in the field of legal philosophy. The object of attention of my reflection is the judge who has the power of judicial review, in a scheme of defense of the Constitution, regardless the specific ways of this defense.
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In The Global Model of Constitutional Rights Kai Möller claims that the proportionality test is underlain by an expansive moral right to autonomy. This putative right protects everything that advances one’s self-conception. It may of course be limited when balanced against other considerations such as the rights of others. But it always creates a duty on the state to justify the limitation. Möller further contends that the practice of proportionality can best be understood as protecting the right to autonomy. This review article summarizes the main tenets of Möller’s theory and criticizes them on two counts. First, it disputes the existence of a general right to autonomy; such a right places an unacceptably heavy burden on others. Second, it argues that we do not need to invoke a right to autonomy to explain and justify the main features of the practice of proportionality. Like other constitutional doctrines, proportionality is defensible, if it is grounded in pragmatic –mainly epistemic and institutional- considerations about how to increase overall rights compliance. These considerations are independent of any substantive theory of rights.
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This article investigates the effects of the investments made by the Northeast Financing Constitutional Fund (FNE) on the economic growth of that region's municipalities in the decade of 2000. To that end, it uses an empirical framework based on growth models that make it possible to form convergence clubs according to the municipalities' initial development level. The results corroborate the empirical strategy and reveal the existence of four groups of municipalities, in which investment flows through the FNE have different effects on growth. In general, the FNE produces positive and significant effects in most municipalities of the Northeast, except for those whose gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was either very low or very high at the start of the decade, in which case its effects are not significant.
Resumo:
Development then and now: Idea and utopia / Rolando Cordera Campos .-- Latin America’s competitive position in knowledge-intensive services trade / Andrés López, Andrés Niembro and Daniela Ramos .-- Wage share and economic growth in Latin America, 1950-2011 / Germán Alarco Tosoni .-- Patterns of technical progress in the Brazilian economy, 1952-2008 / Adalmir Marquetti and Melody de Campos Soares Porsse .-- Mexico: Combining monthly inflation predictions from surveys / Pilar Poncela, Víctor M. Guerrero, Alejandro Islas, Julio Rodríguez and Rocío Sánchez-Mangas .-- Expectations and industrial output in Uruguay: Sectoral interdependence and common trends / Bibiana Lanzilotta .-- Argentina: Impacts of the child allowance programme on the labour-market behaviour of adults / Roxana Maurizio and Gustavo Vázquez .-- Occupational mobility and income differentials: The experience of Brazil between 2002 and 2010 / Sandro Eduardo Monsueto, Julimar da Silva Bichara and André Moreira Cunha .-- What does the National High School Exam (enem) tell Brazilian society? / Rodrigo Travitzki, Jorge Calero and Carlota Boto .-- Brazil’s Northeast Financing Constitutional Fund: Differentiated effects on municipal economic growth / Fabrício Carneiro Linhares, Ricardo Brito Soares, Marcos Falcão Gonçalves and Luiz Fernando Gonçalves Viana.
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This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.