Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate

This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance \delta. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fails to exist in this model, except under special conditions about \delta and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium, show that candidate A adopts more moderate policies than candidate D, and obtain some comparative statics results about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates' policies.

Inter-firm labor mobility and knowledge diffusion: a theoretical approach

[cat] Analitzem una economia amb dues característiques principals: la mobilitat dels treballadors implica transferència de coneixement i la productivitat de l’empresa augmenta amb l’intercanvi de coneixement. Cada empresa desenvolupa un tipus de coneixement que serà trasmès a la resta de la indústria mitjançant la mobilitat de treballadors. Estudiem dues estructures de mercat laboral i utilitzant un anàlisi comparatiu derivem les implicacions del model. Els resultats revelen com la mobilitat de treballadors depèn en la varietat i nivell del coneixement, la presència de costos de mobilitat, les institucions, la capacitat d’absorvir coneixement per part de les empreses i la mida de la indústria. Els resultats no depenen de l’estructura del mercat laboral.

Inter-firm labor mobility and knowledge diffusion: a theoretical approach

[cat] Analitzem una economia amb dues característiques principals: la mobilitat dels treballadors implica transferència de coneixement i la productivitat de l’empresa augmenta amb l’intercanvi de coneixement. Cada empresa desenvolupa un tipus de coneixement que serà trasmès a la resta de la indústria mitjançant la mobilitat de treballadors. Estudiem dues estructures de mercat laboral i utilitzant un anàlisi comparatiu derivem les implicacions del model. Els resultats revelen com la mobilitat de treballadors depèn en la varietat i nivell del coneixement, la presència de costos de mobilitat, les institucions, la capacitat d’absorvir coneixement per part de les empreses i la mida de la indústria. Els resultats no depenen de l’estructura del mercat laboral.

Agreements with overlapping coalitions

Dans certaines circonstances, des actions de groupes sont plus performantes que des actions individuelles. Dans ces situations, il est préférable de former des coalitions. Ces coalitions peuvent être disjointes ou imbriquées. La littérature économique met un fort accent sur la modélisation des accords où les coalitions d’agents économiques sont des ensembles disjoints. Cependant on observe dans la vie de tous les jours que les coalitions politiques, environnementales, de libre-échange et d’assurance informelles sont la plupart du temps imbriquées. Aussi, devient-il impératif de comprendre le fonctionnement économique des coalitions imbriquées. Ma thèse développe un cadre d’analyse qui permet de comprendre la formation et la performance des coalitions même si elles sont imbriquées. Dans le premier chapitre je développe un jeu de négociation qui permet la formation de coalitions imbriquées. Je montre que ce jeu admet un équilibre et je développe un algorithme pour calculer les allocations d’équilibre pour les jeux symétriques. Je montre que toute structure de réseau peut se décomposer de manière unique en une structure de coalitions imbriquées. Sous certaines conditions, je montre que cette structure correspond à une structure d’équilibre d’un jeu sous-jacent. Dans le deuxième chapitre j’introduis une nouvelle notion de noyau dans le cas où les coalitions imbriquées sont permises. Je montre que cette notion de noyau est une généralisation naturelle de la notion de noyau de structure de coalitions. Je vais plus loin en introduisant des agents plus raffinés. J’obtiens alors le noyau de structure de coalitions imbriquées que je montre être un affinement de la première notion. Dans la suite de la thèse, j’applique les théories développées dans les deux premiers chapitres à des cas concrets. Le troisième chapitre est une application de la relation biunivoque établie dans le premier chapitre entre la formation des coalitions et la formation de réseaux. Je propose une modélisation réaliste et effective des assurances informelles. J’introduis ainsi dans la littérature économique sur les assurances informelles, quatre innovations majeures : une fusion entre l’approche par les groupes et l’approche par les réseaux sociaux, la possibilité d’avoir des organisations imbriquées d’assurance informelle, un schéma de punition endogène et enfin les externalités. Je caractérise les accords d’assurances informelles stables et j’isole les conditions qui poussent les agents à dévier. Il est admis dans la littérature que seuls les individus ayant un revenu élevé peuvent se permettre de violer les accords d’assurances informelles. Je donne ici les conditions dans lesquelles cette hypothèse tient. Cependant, je montre aussi qu’il est possible de violer cette hypothèse sous d’autres conditions réalistes. Finalement je dérive des résultats de statiques comparées sous deux normes de partage différents. Dans le quatrième et dernier chapitre, je propose un modèle d’assurance informelle où les groupes homogènes sont construits sur la base de relations de confiance préexistantes. Ces groupes sont imbriqués et représentent des ensembles de partage de risque. Cette approche est plus générale que les approches traditionnelles de groupe ou de réseau. Je caractérise les accords stables sans faire d’hypothèses sur le taux d’escompte. J’identifie les caractéristiques des réseaux stables qui correspondent aux taux d’escomptes les plus faibles. Bien que l’objectif des assurances informelles soit de lisser la consommation, je montre que des effets externes liés notamment à la valorisation des liens interpersonnels renforcent la stabilité. Je développe un algorithme à pas finis qui égalise la consommation pour tous les individus liés. Le fait que le nombre de pas soit fini (contrairement aux algorithmes à pas infinis existants) fait que mon algorithme peut inspirer de manière réaliste des politiques économiques. Enfin, je donne des résultats de statique comparée pour certaines valeurs exogènes du modèle.

Labour market, international trade, and unemployment in a less developed country

This paper constructs a trade general equilibrium model for a less developed country with three sectors. One is the informal and un-tradable sector characterized by áexible wages, while the other two sectors are tradable, export and import sectors. The model imposes a binding minimum wage over the unskilled labour and e¢ cient wage distortions on the skilled labour. Comparative statics is driven to analyze the e§ects on the labour market as consequence of opening the economy, raising the minimum wage and the introduction of an augmenting productivity in the export sector.

On blame-freeness and reciprocity: an experimental study

The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward nice or kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question as to how to define kindness. In this paper we offer a new definition of kindness that we call “blame-freeness.” Put most simply, blame-freeness states that in judging whether player i has been kind or unkind to player j in a social situation, player j would have to put himself in the strategic position of player i, while retaining his preferences, and ask if he would have acted in a manner that was worse than i did under identical circumstances. If j would have acted in a more unkind manner than i acted, then we say that j does not blame i for his behavior. If, however, j would have been nicer than i was, then we say that “j blames i” for his actions (i’s actions were blameworthy). We consider this notion a natural, intuitive and empirically relevant way to explain the motives of people engaged in reciprocal behavior. After developing the conceptual framework, we then test this concept in a laboratory experiment involving tournaments and find significant support for the theory.

The Farm-Retail Price Spread in an Imperfectly Competitive Food Industry

Gardner's popular model of perfect competition in the marketing sector is extended to a conjectural-variations oligopoly with endogenous entry. Revising Gardner's comparative statics on the "farm-retail price ratio," tests of hypotheses about food industry conduct are derived. Using data from a recent article by Wohlgenant, which employs Gardner's framework, tests are made of the validity of his maintained hypothesis-that the food industries are perfectly competitive. No evidence is found of departures from competition in the output markets of the food industries of eight commodity groups: (a) beef and veal, (b) pork, (c) poultry, (d) eggs, (e) dairy, (f) processed fruits and vegetables, (g) fresh fruit, and (h) fresh vegetables.

Distribution of research gains in multistage production systems: further results

The "marketing" sector in Muth's single-stage model is disaggregated in to two sequential stages: "processing" and "distribution. "Comparative statics are used to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for farmers to gain from downstream research. The farm benefits are shown to depend crucially on the stage in "marketing" to which research is directed.

Chasing patents

We examine the problem faced by a company that wishes to purchase patents in the hands of two di¤erent patent owners. Complementarity of these patents in the production process of the company is a prime e¢ciency reason for them being owned (or licenced) by the company. We show that this very same complementarity can lead to patent owners behaving strategically in bargaining, and delaying their sale to the company. When the company is highly leveraged, such ine¢cient delay is limited. Comparative statics results are also obtained. Relevant applications include assembly of patents for drug treatments from the human genome, and land assembly.

Unitização de jazidas de petróleo: uma aplicação do modelo de Green e Porter

Neste trabalho abordamos a unitização como uma reinterpretação de cartel, partindo do modelo clássico de Green e Porter. A incerteza geológica é representada por um componente estocástico no custo marginal. Caracterizamos o contrato ótimo e, a partir da estática comparativa, avaliamos a eficiência e a viabilidade da cooperação. O preço e o grau da externalidade afetam positivamente o nível de eficiência do contrato ótimo. Mas enquanto preços elevados viabilizam os acordos, o grau de externalidade elevado pode conduzir a equilíbrios ineficientes ou mesmo inviabilizar a produção. O mesmo resultado ocorre com os custos fixos. Adicionalmente, quanto maior for o número de firmas envolvidas no acordo, menor será a chance de existir um contrato mais eficiente que a regra da captura.

Inferring conduct under the threat of entry : the case of Brazilian cement industry

This paper demonstrates that when an industry faces potential entry and this threat of entry constrains pre-entry prices, cost and conduct are not identified from the comparative statics of equilibrium. In such a setting, the identifying assumption behind the well-established technique of relying on exogenous demand perturbations to empirically distinguish between alternative hypotheses of conduct is shown to fail. The Brazilian cement industry, where the threat of imports restrains market outcomes, provides an empirical illustration. In particular, pricecost margins estimated using this established technique are considerably biased downward, underestimating the degree of market power. A test of conduct is proposed, adapted to this constrained setting, which suggests that outcomes in the industry are collusive and characterised by market division.

Workplace diversity and incentive contracts : theory and evidence

This paper presents a simple theory of the provision of incentives in firms in which the principal optimally chooses both compensation contracts and the composition of the work force. Assuming that individuals display group loyalty, a less diverse (more homogeneous) work force will be more cooperative. Simple comparative statics provide some testable implications relating risk, diversity and incentive pay. I also analyze the case in which workers’ characteristics cannot be readily observed ex ante. The theory then predicts that firms are more likely to prevent workers from interacting with each other when workers are expected to have similar characteristics. This shows a surprising effect of diversity in the workplace: more diverse firms will promote more interactions between workers of different types, i.e. they will be less segregated. I test the main predictions of the model using a cross-sectional sample of corporate boards. I use the proportion of women on boards as a measure of diversity. There are three main empirical findings: (1) a significant negative correlation between firm risk and diversity, (2) a significant positive relationship between performance-based compensation and diversity and (3) a significant positive correlation between the number of board meetings (a measure of interactions among directors) and diversity. The evidence is broadly consistent with the implications of the theory.

Do insurance defrauders want to be punished?

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit confirms a false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We characterize the efRcient contracts when this punishment is bounded from above by a legal restriction. Then, we do some comparative statics on the efRcient contracts and on the agent's utility. The most important result of this paper concerns the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment. We prove that there exists a uni que value of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high risk type. Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment, the insurer will effectively audit a low risk reporto We also show that this particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk policyholder. Therefore, when this probability is sufRciently high, the nullity of the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder, the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA and in some European countries.

Bias from ignoring price dispersion in demand estimation

Consumers often pay different prices for the same product bought in the same store at the same time. However, the demand estimation literature has ignored that fact using, instead, aggregate measures such as the “list” or average price. In this paper we show that this will lead to biased price coefficients. Furthermore, we perform simple comparative statics simulation exercises for the logit and random coefficient models. In the “list” price case we find that the bias is larger when discounts are higher, proportion of consumers facing discount prices is higher and when consumers are more unwilling to buy the product so that they almost only do it when facing discount. In the average price case we find that the bias is larger when discounts are higher, proportion of consumers that have access to discount are similar to the ones that do not have access and when consumers willingness to buy is very dependent on idiosyncratic shocks. Also bias is less problematic in the average price case in markets with a lot of bargain deals, so that prices are as good as individual. We conclude by proposing ways that the econometrician can reduce this bias using different information that he may have available.

The United States-Central American Free Trade Agreement: fiscal implications for the Central American countries

Includes bibliography