Multimodal semantic-associative collateral labelling and indexing of still images

A novel framework for multimodal semantic-associative collateral image labelling, aiming at associating image regions with textual keywords, is described. Both the primary image and collateral textual modalities are exploited in a cooperative and complementary fashion. The collateral content and context based knowledge is used to bias the mapping from the low-level region-based visual primitives to the high-level visual concepts defined in a visual vocabulary. We introduce the notion of collateral context, which is represented as a co-occurrence matrix, of the visual keywords, A collaborative mapping scheme is devised using statistical methods like Gaussian distribution or Euclidean distance together with collateral content and context-driven inference mechanism. Finally, we use Self Organising Maps to examine the classification and retrieval effectiveness of the proposed high-level image feature vector model which is constructed based on the image labelling results.

Semi-automatic knowledge extraction, representation and context-sensitive intelligent retrieval of video content using collateral context modelling with scalable ontological networks

Automatic indexing and retrieval of digital data poses major challenges. The main problem arises from the ever increasing mass of digital media and the lack of efficient methods for indexing and retrieval of such data based on the semantic content rather than keywords. To enable intelligent web interactions, or even web filtering, we need to be capable of interpreting the information base in an intelligent manner. For a number of years research has been ongoing in the field of ontological engineering with the aim of using ontologies to add such (meta) knowledge to information. In this paper, we describe the architecture of a system (Dynamic REtrieval Analysis and semantic metadata Management (DREAM)) designed to automatically and intelligently index huge repositories of special effects video clips, based on their semantic content, using a network of scalable ontologies to enable intelligent retrieval. The DREAM Demonstrator has been evaluated as deployed in the film post-production phase to support the process of storage, indexing and retrieval of large data sets of special effects video clips as an exemplar application domain. This paper provides its performance and usability results and highlights the scope for future enhancements of the DREAM architecture which has proven successful in its first and possibly most challenging proving ground, namely film production, where it is already in routine use within our test bed Partners' creative processes. (C) 2009 Published by Elsevier B.V.

The Role of Collateral in Entrepreneurial Finance

Previous research has suggested collateral has the role of sorting entrepreneurs either by observed risk or by private information. In order to test these roles, this paper develops a model which incorporates a signalling process (sorting by observed risk) into the design of an incentivecompatible menu of loan contracts which works as a self-selection mechanism (sorting by private information). It then tests this Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection Model, using the 1998 US Survey of Small Business Finances. It reports for the first time that: high type entrepreneurs are more likely to pledge collateral and pay a lower interest rate; and entrepreneurs who transfer good signals enjoy better contracts than those transferring bad signals. These findings suggest that the Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection Model sheds more light on entrepreneurial debt finance than either the sorting-by-observed-risk or the sorting-by-private information paradigms on their own.

Collateral, default penalties and almost finite-time solvency

We argue that it is possible to adapt the approach of imposing restrictions on available plans through finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996), to encompass models with default and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) the concept of almost finite-time solvency. We show that the conditions imposed in these two papers to rule out Ponzi schemes implicitly restrict actions to be almost finite-time solvent. We define the notion of equilibrium with almost finite-time solvency and look on sufficient conditions for its existence. Assuming a mild assumption on default penalties, namely that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties, we prove that existence is guaranteed (and Ponzi schemes are ruled out) when actions are restricted to be almost finite-time solvent. The proof is very simple and intuitive. In particular, the main existence results in Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) are simple corollaries of our existence result.

Bubbles, collateral and monetary equilibrium

Consider an economy where infinite-lived agents trade assets collateralized by durable goods. We obtain results that rule out bubbles when the additional endowments of durable goods are uniformly bounded away from zero, regardless of whether the asset’s net supply is positive or zero. However, bubbles may occur, even for state-price processes that generate finite present value of aggregate wealth. First, under complete markets, if the net supply is being endogenously reduced to zero as a result of collateral repossession. Secondly, under incomplete markets, for a persistent positive net supply, under the general conditions guaranteeing existence of equilibrium. Examples of monetary equilibria are provided.

Endogenous collateral

We study an economy where there are two types of assets. Consumers’ promises are the primitive defaultable assets secured by collateral chosen by the consumers themselves. The purchase of these personalized assets by financial intermediaries is financed by selling back derivatives to consumers. We show that nonarbitrage prices of primitive assets are strict submartingales, whereas nonarbitrage prices of derivatives are supermartingales. Next we establish existence of equilibrium, without imposing bounds on short sales. The nonconvexity of the budget set is overcome by considering a continuum of agents.

Collateral avoids Ponzi schemes in incomplete markets

Without introducing neither debt constraints nor transversality conditions to avoid the possibility of Ponzi schemes, we show existence of equilibrium in an incomplete markets economy with a collateral structure.

Endogenous collateral: arbitrage and equilibrium without bounded short sales

We study the implications of the absence of arbitrage in an two period economy where default is allowed and assets are secured by collateral choosen by the borrowers. We show that non arbitrage sale prices of assets are submartingales, whereas non arbitrage purchase prices of the derivatives (secured by the pool of collaterals) are supermartingales. We use these non arbitrage conditions to establish existence of equilibrium, without imposing bounds on short sales. The nonconvexity of the budget set is overcome by considering a continuum of agents. Our results are particularly relevant for the collateralized mortgage obligations(CMO) markets.

The Eaton-Gersovitz-Arellano environment with collateral

Neste artigo eu introduzo colateralização no ambiente de dívida soberana de Eaton-Gersovitz-Arellano. Esta colateralização pode ser vista como Investimento Estrangeiro Direto. A entrada de recursos colateralizados serve como uma estratégia de comprometimento dos países. Ao abrir a economia para este tipo de aporte de recursos, meu modelo prescreve maior tomada de dívida em equilíbrio pelos países e menos uso de default como instrumento de suavização da trajetória de consumo. Além destas características, eu mostro que limitação de colateral pode gerar mais default em equilíbrio do que um modelo sem Investimento Estrangeiro Direto ou colateral.

Collateral, Intermediated Lending, and Aggregate Productivity

Neste trabalho busca-se compreender como que restrições a diferentes tipos de crédito - doméstico e internacional - afetam a dinâmica de uma economia, especialmente com relação a sua Produtividade Total dos Fatores (PTF). Para ajudar no entendimento dessa questão e assuntos relacionados, propomos um simples modelo de economia aberta. Nesse contexto, empreendedores domésticos possuem produtividades heterogêneas, o que implica que a distribuição de riqueza entre indivíduos é essencial para a determinação da produtividade agregada da economia. Além disso, o ambiente de comprometimento limitado obriga os tomadores de empréstimo a dispor de colateral para contrair dívidas. Por hipótese, dívida doméstica e externa requerem diferentes quantidades de colateral. O modelo gera uma dinâmica macroeconômica rica após mudanças na taxa de juros internacional e restrições a crédito. Mais especificamente, um alívio na restrição doméstica causa um aumento da PTF, enquanto a mesma variação na restrição internacional tem o efeito contrário.

Collateral or utility penalties ?

In a two-period economy with incomplete markets and possibility of default we consider the two classical ways to enforce the honor of financial commitments: by using utility penalties and by using collateral requirements that borrowers have to fulfill. Firstly, we prove that any equilibrium in an economy with collateral requirements is also equilibrium in a non-collateralized economy where each agent is penalized (rewarded) in his utility if his delivery rate is lower (greater) than the payment rate of the financial market. Secondly, we prove the converse: any equilibrium in an economy with utility penalties is also equilibrium in a collateralized economy. For this to be true the payoff function and initial endowments of the agents must be modified in a quite natural way. Finally, we prove that the equilibrium in the economy with collateral requirements attains the same welfare as in the new economy with utility penalties.

Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts

This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.

Role of the oblique ligament in the integrity of the medial collateral ligament of the canine elbow joint

Foram estudados o arranjo e o diâmetro médio das fibrilas colágenas do ligamento colateral medial da articulação do cotovelo do cão, isolado ou associado ao ligamento oblíquo e tracionado até a ruptura. Dezoito articulações foram divididas em três grupos. O primeiro grupo teve o ligamento colateral medial coletado, mas não tracionado; o segundo grupo teve o ligamento colateral medial tracionado isoladamente; o terceiro grupo teve os ligamentos colateral medial e oblíquo tracionados associadamente. O ligamento colateral medial não submetido ao ensaio de tração apresentou um padrão ondulado das fibras colágenas, o qual não foi totalmente destruído quando foi tracionado, associado ao ligamento oblíquo, e perdeu totalmente o padrão reticular das fibras colágenas quando testado isoladamente. Quando o ligamento colateral medial foi submetido à tensão isoladamente, o diâmetro médio das fibrilas colágenas aumentou em relação ao grupo não submetido à tensão. Associado ao ligamento oblíquo, o diâmetro médio das fibrilas colágenas foi o maior na região de inserção e o menor na região média, em relação aos outros grupos. Concluiu-se que o ligamento oblíquo pode favorecer a integridade da região de inserção do ligamento colateral medial, aumentando a eficácia de sua reconstrução após a lesão.