A characterization of a new value and an existing value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

En aquest treball presentem dues caracteritzacions de dos valors diferents en el marc dels jocs coalicionals amb cooperació restringida. Les restriccions són introduïdes com una seqüència finita de particions del conjunt del jugadors, de manera que cada una d'elles eés més grollera que l'anterior, formant així una estructura amb diferents nivells d'unions a priori.

Selection methods regulate evolution of cooperation in digital evolution.

A key, yet often neglected, component of digital evolution and evolutionary models is the 'selection method' which assigns fitness (number of offspring) to individuals based on their performance scores (efficiency in performing tasks). Here, we study with formal analysis and numerical experiments the evolution of cooperation under the five most common selection methods (proportionate, rank, truncation-proportionate, truncation-uniform and tournament). We consider related individuals engaging in a Prisoner's Dilemma game where individuals can either cooperate or defect. A cooperator pays a cost, whereas its partner receives a benefit, which affect their performance scores. These performance scores are translated into fitness by one of the five selection methods. We show that cooperation is positively associated with the relatedness between individuals under all selection methods. By contrast, the change in the performance benefit of cooperation affects the populations' average level of cooperation only under the proportionate methods. We also demonstrate that the truncation and tournament methods may introduce negative frequency-dependence and lead to the evolution of polymorphic populations. Using the example of the evolution of cooperation, we show that the choice of selection method, though it is often marginalized, can considerably affect the evolutionary dynamics.

A characterization of a new value and an existing value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

En aquest treball presentem dues caracteritzacions de dos valors diferents en el marc dels jocs coalicionals amb cooperació restringida. Les restriccions són introduïdes com una seqüència finita de particions del conjunt del jugadors, de manera que cada una d'elles eés més grollera que l'anterior, formant així una estructura amb diferents nivells d'unions a priori.

The rewards of cooperation: The effects of membership in European regulatory networks

Networks famously epitomize the shift from 'government' to 'governance' as governing structures for exercising control and coordination besides hierarchies and markets. Their distinctive features are their horizontality, the interdependence among member actors and an interactive decision-making style. Networks are expected to increase the problem-solving capacity of political systems in a context of growing social complexity, where political authority is increasingly fragmented across territorial and functional levels. However, very little attention has been given so far to another crucial implication of network governance - that is, the effects of networks on their members. To explore this important question, this article examines the effects of membership in European regulatory networks on two crucial attributes of member agencies, which are in charge of regulating finance, energy, telecommunications and competition: organisational growth and their regulatory powers. Panel analysis applied to data on 118 agencies during a ten-year period and semi-structured interviews provide mixed support regarding the expectation of organisational growth while strongly confirming the positive effect of networks on the increase of the regulatory powers attributed to member agencies.

The Impact of Cooperation on R&D, Innovation andProductivity: an Analysis of Spanish Manufacturing and Services Firms

This paper investigates relationships between cooperation, R&D, innovation and productivity in Spanish firms. It uses a large sample of firm-level micro-data and applies an extended structural model that aims to explain the effects of cooperation on R&D investment, of R&D investment on output innovation, and of innovation on firms’ productivity levels. It also analyses the determinants of R&D cooperation. Firms’ technology level is taken into account in order to analyse the differences between high-tech and low-tech firms, both in the industrial and service sectors. The database used was the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) for the period 2004-2010. Empirical results show that firms which cooperate in innovative activities are more likely to invest in R&D in subsequent years. As expected, R&D investment has a positive impact on the probability of generating an innovation, in terms of both product and process, for manufacturing firms. Finally, innovation output has a positive impact on firms’ productivity, being greater in process innovations.

The Impact of Cooperation on R&D, Innovation and Productivity: an Analysis of Spanish Manufacturing and Services Firms

This paper investigates relationships between cooperation, R&D, innovation and productivity in Spanish firms. It uses a large sample of firm-level micro-data and applies an extended structural model that aims to explain the effects of cooperation on R&D investment, of R&D investment on output innovation, and of innovation on firms’ productivity levels. It also analyses the determinants of R&D cooperation. Firms’ technology level is taken into account in order to analyse the differences between high-tech and low-tech firms, both in the industrial and service sectors. The database used was the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) for the period 2004-2010. Empirical results show that firms which cooperate in innovative activities are more likely to invest in R&D in subsequent years. As expected, R&D investment has a positive impact on the probability of generating an innovation, in terms of both product and process, for manufacturing firms. Finally, innovation output has a positive impact on firms’ productivity, being greater in process innovations. Keywords: innovation sources; productivity; R&D Cooperation

Conformity, upstream reciprocity and social diversity: secondary mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation

Cooperation is ubiquitous in nature: genes cooperate in genomes, cells in muti- cellular organims, and individuals in societies. In humans, division of labor and trade are key elements of most known societies, where social life is regulated by- moral systems specifying rights and duties often enforced by third party punish¬ment. Over the last decades, several primary mechanisms, such as kin selection, direct and indirect reciprocity, have been advanced to explain the evolution of cooperation from a naturalistic approach. In this thesis, I focus on the study of three secondary mechanisms which, although insufficient to allow for the evo¬lution of cooperation, have been hypothesized to further promote it when they are linked to proper primary mechanisms: conformity (the tendency to imitate common behaviors), upstream reciprocity (the tendency to help somebody once help has been received from somebody else) and social diversity (heterogeneous social contexts). I make use of mathematical and computational models in the formal framework of evolutionary game theory in order to investigate the theoret¬ical conditions under which conformity, upstream reciprocity and social diversity are able to raise the levels of cooperation attained in evolving populations. - La coopération est ubiquitaire dans la nature: les gènes coopèrent dans les génomes, les cellules dans les organismes muticellulaires, et les organismes dans les sociétés. Chez les humains, la division du travail et le commerce sont des éléments centraux de la plupart des sociétés connues, où la vie sociale est régie par des systèmes moraux établissant des droits et des devoirs, souvent renforcés par la punition. Au cours des dernières décennies, plusieurs mécanismes pri¬maires, tels que la sélection de parentèle et les réciprocités directe et indirecte, ont été avancés pour expliquer l'évolution de la coopération d'un point de vue nat¬uraliste. Dans cette thèse, nous nous concentrons sur l'étude de trois mécanismes secondaires qui, bien qu'insuffisants pour permettre l'évolution de la coopération, sont capables de la promouvoir davantage s'ils sont liés aux mécanismes primaires appropriés: la conformité (tendance à imiter des comportements en commun), la 'réciprocité en amont' (tendance à aider quelqu'un après avoir reçu l'aide de quelqu'un d'autre) et la diversité sociale (contextes sociaux hétérogènes). Nous faisons usage de modèles mathématiques et informatiques dans le cadre formel de la théorie des jeux évolutionnaires afin d'examiner les conditions théoriques dans lesquelles la conformité, la 'réciprocité en amont' et la diversité sociale sont capables d'élever le niveau de coopération des populations en évolution.

Co-opetition: Coexistence of cooperation and competition in public sector – A case study in one city’s public companies

Business actions do not take place in isolation. Complementary competencies and capabilities are the most important resources in the exponential knowledge growth. These resources are partially accessed via business partners. A company needs partners and the capability to cooperate, but also the awareness of the competitive tension, when operating in the market with multiple actors. The co-opetition research studies the occurrence and the forms of simultaneous cooperation and competition between companies or their units. Public sector’s governmental and municipal organs have been transformed into companies over the past years. Despite of their non-profit nature, public sector and public companies are adopting business doctrines from private sector towards efficient business operations. This case study aims to show, how co-opetition concept can be observed within public sector companies and in their operations with others, how public companies cooperate but also compete with others and why this happens. This thesis also explicates advantages and disadvantages of the co-opetition phenomenon.

Parallel characterizations of a generalized shapley value and a generalized banzhaf value for cooperative games with level structure of cooperation

We present parallel characterizations of two different values in the framework of restricted cooperation games. The restrictions are introduced as a finite sequence of partitions defined on the player set, each of them being coarser than the previous one, hence forming a structure of different levels of a priori unions. On the one hand, we consider a value first introduced in Ref. [18], which extends the Shapley value to games with different levels of a priori unions. On the other hand, we introduce another solution for the same type of games, which extends the Banzhaf value in the same manner. We characterize these two values using logically comparable properties.

The effect of synchronized group activities on pain threshold as a predictor of cooperation

Recent research suggests that participating in vigorous synchronized physical activity may result in elevated levels of endorphins, which may in turn affect social bonding (Cohen et. al., 2009). The present research aimed to examine whether or not the change in pain tolerance would be able to predict participants’ willingness to cooperate after statistically controlling for the groups’ condition. Participants were asked to run on a treadmill for 30 minutes under one of two conditions (control vs. synchronized). Prior to and after the run participants underwent a pain tolerance test. Once completed, a second activity was introduced to the participants; a cooperative game. A public goods game was used to measure an individual’s willingness to cooperate. The results showed the synchronized condition was able to predict that participants cooperated more during the public goods game (p = .009), however the change in pain threshold was unable to significantly predict cooperation (p = .32).

Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.