Feedback and Assessment for FEE

This is a collection of resources used at the Feedback and Assessment away half day for the Faculty of Engineering and the Environment

FEE Engineering Workshop Practice Training - illustrated

Engineering Workshop Practice Training is provided in the Faculty of Engineering and the Environment at the University of Southampton for engineering programme undergraduate students, typically at the end of year 1

Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.

The quality and outcomes framework reduces disparities in health outcomes for cardiovascular disease

Jamie Robinson, the Berkeley health economist, famously remarked in 2001 that ‘the three worst ways to pay doctors are salary, capitation and fee-for-service.’ Different financial incentives produce different clinical and service outcomes, sometimes perversely.1 In 2004, the UK government introduced pay for performance (P4P) for general practitioners, the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). Its introduction was associated with the general trend in the National Health Service away from placing implicit trust in doctors and more active monitoring of their performance. One-quarter of GP pay can be earned from achieving scores on 147 indicators.2 These indicators were acceptable to doctors because the majority are evidence-based clinical outcome measures for 10 chronic diseases. Others relate to patient access and satisfaction, and practice organisation.

Another explanation of the mutual fund fee puzzle

This paper demonstrates that investor sentiment explains the recent puzzle of the negative relation between fees and before-fee performance of equity mutual funds. Using a composite proxy for investor sentiment, the puzzle can be explained stronger by investor sentiment, compared to the strategic fee-setting explanation discussed in the literature. More-sentiment driven investors would like to select more skilled fund managers, leading to a better future performance in short run. Additionally, when sentiment is high (low), it results in lower (higher) fees. Our results highlight the use of investor sentiment approach in determining mutual fund fees and performance.

Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.

Fee - fishing operation evaluation at Nothwest São Paulo State, Brazil

Os lagos de pesca recreativa, pesque-pague, surgiram no Brasil em um cenário agrícola denominado como novo rural brasileiro. Este estudo conduzido no noroeste paulista teve como foco o desempenho produtivo dos lagos de pesca recreativa. Foram feitas visitas mensais a nove empreendimentos de pesca recreativa durante seis meses. A cada visita foi aplicado um questionário contendo 13 indicadores de desempenho. Os dados levantados foram submetidos à análise multivariada (MANOVA), análise de componente principal (ACP) e análise de agrupamento. A MANOVA indicou diferenças significativas entre os lagos de pesca recreativa. A ACP revelou, a partir do coeficiente dos autovalores, três atributos: sistema produtivo, gerenciamento pesqueiro e administração operacional. A análise de agrupamento classificou os lagos de pesca recreativa em quatro grupos. Freqüência de pescadores (FP), densidade de estocagem (DE), biomassa de estocagem (BE), captura total (CT) e captura lago dia (CLD), os quais fazem parte do atributo sistema produtivo, mostrando-se os indicadores mais importantes para a avaliação de desempenho dos lagos de pesca recreativa neste estudo.

Chile: is the fee for non-use of water rights effective?

Includes bibliography

Biotic and abiotic parameters at a subtropical fee-fishing farm

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)