A firm's capability to calibrate supply chain knowledge-antecedents and consequences

This paper proposes a conceptual model for a firm's capability to calibrate supply chain knowledge (CCK). Knowledge calibration is achieved when there is a match between managers' ex ante confidence in the accuracy of held knowledge and the ex post accuracy of that knowledge. Knowledge calibration is closely related to knowledge utility or willingness to use the available ex ante knowledge: a manager uses the ex ante knowledge if he/she is confident in the accuracy of that knowledge, and does not use it or uses it with reservation, when the confidence is low. Thus, knowledge calibration attained through the firm's CCK enables managers to deal with incomplete and uncertain information and enhances quality of decisions. In the supply chain context, although demand- and supply-related knowledge is available, supply chain inefficiencies, such as the bullwhip effect, remain. These issues may be caused not by a lack of knowledge but by a firm's lack of capability to sense potential disagreement between knowledge accuracy and confidence. Therefore, this paper contributes to the understanding of supply chain knowledge utilization by defining CCK and identifying a set of antecedents and consequences of CCK in the supply chain context.

Holonic supply chain:a study from family-based manufacturing perspective

In the contemporary business environment, to adhere to the need of the customers, caused the shift from mass production to mass-customization. This necessitates the supply chain (SC) to be effective flexible. The purpose of this paper is to seek flexibility through adoption of family-based dispatching rules under the influence of inventory system implemented at downstream echelons of an industrial supply chain network. We compared the family-based dispatching rules in existing literature under the purview of inventory system and information sharing within a supply chain network. The dispatching rules are compared for Average Flow Time performance, which is averaged over the three product families. The performance is measured using extensive discrete event simulation process. Given the various inventory related operational factors at downstream echelons, the present paper highlights the importance of strategically adopting appropriate family-based dispatching rule at the manufacturing end. In the environment of mass customization, it becomes imperative to adopt the family-based dispatching rule from the system wide SC perspective. This warrants the application of intra as well as inter-echelon information coordination. The holonic paradigm emerges in this research stream, amidst the holistic approach and the vital systemic approach. The present research shows its novelty in triplet. Firstly, it provides leverage to manager to strategically adopting a dispatching rule from the inventory system perspective. Secondly, the findings provide direction for the attenuation of adverse impact accruing from demand amplification (bullwhip effect) in the form of inventory levels by appropriately adopting family-based dispatching rule. Thirdly, the information environment is conceptualized under the paradigm of Koestler's holonic theory.

Cooperation in supply chains: A cooperative game theoretic analysis = Együttműködés ellátási láncokban: Egy kooperatív játékelméleti elemzés

A cikkben a kooperatív játékelmélet fogalmait alkalmazzuk egy ellátási lánc esetében. Az ostorcsapás-hatás elemeit egy beszállító-termelő ellátási láncban ragadjuk meg egy Arrow-Karlin típusú modellben lineáris készletezési és konvex termelési költség mellett. Feltételezzük, hogy mindkét vállalat minimalizálja a fontosabb költségeit. Két működési rendszert hasonlítunk össze: egy hierarchikus döntéshozatali rendszert, amikor először a termelő, majd a beszállító optimalizálja helyzetét, majd egy centralizált (kooperatív) modellt, amikor a vállalatok az együttes költségüket minimalizálják. A kérdés úgy merül fel, hogy a csökkentett ostorcsapás-hatás esetén hogyan osszák meg a részvevők ebben a transzferálható hasznosságú kooperatív játékban. = In this paper we apply cooperative game theory concepts to analyze supply chains. The bullwhip effect in a two-stage supply chain (supplier-manufacturer) in the framework of the Arrow-Karlin model with linear-convex cost functions is considered. It is assumed that both firms minimize their relevant costs, and two cases are examined: the supplier and the manufacturer minimize their relevant costs in a decentralized and in a centralized (cooperative) way. The question of how to share the savings of the decreased bullwhip effect in the centralized (cooperative) model is answered by transferable utility cooperative game theory tools.

Cooperation in an HMMS-type supply chain: A management application of cooperative game theory = Kooperáció egy HMMS-típusú ellátási láncban: A kooperatív játékelmélet egy menedzsment alkalmazása

We apply cooperative game theory concepts to analyze a Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon (HMMS) supply chain. The bullwhip effect in a two-stage supply chain (supplier-manufacturer) in the framework of the HMMS-model with quadratic cost functions is considered. It is assumed that both firms minimize their relevant costs, and two cases are examined: the supplier and the manufacturer minimize their relevant costs in a decentralized and in a centralized (cooperative) way. The question of how to share the savings of the decreased bullwhip effect in the centralized (cooperative) model is answered by the weighted Shapley value, by a transferable utility cooperative game theory tool, where the weights are for the exogenously given “bargaining powers” of the participants of the supply chain. = A cikkben a kooperatív játékelmélet fogalmait alkalmazzuk egy Holt-Mogigliani-Muth-Simon-típusú ellátási lánc esetében. Az ostorcsapás-hatás elemeit egy beszállító-termelő ellátási láncban ragadjuk meg egy kvadratikus készletezési és termelési költség mellett. Feltételezzük, hogy mindkét vállalat minimalizálja a releváns költségeit. Két működési rendszert hasonlítunk össze: egy hierarchikus döntéshozatali rendszert, amikor először a termelő, majd a beszállító optimalizálja helyzetét, majd egy centralizált (kooperatív) modellt, amikor a vállalatok az együttes költségüket minimalizálják. A kérdés úgy merül fel, hogy a csökkentett ostorcsapás-hatás esetén hogyan osszák meg a részvevők ebben a transzferálható hasznosságú kooperatív játékban a költség megtakarítást, exogén módon adott tárgyalási pozíció mellett.