Picking the Right Budget Constraint for Scotland

This position paper considers the devolution of further fiscal powers to the Scottish Parliament in the context of the objectives and remit of the Smith Commission. The argument builds on our discussion of fiscal decentralization made in our previous published work on this topic. We ask what sort of budget constraint the Scottish Parliament should operate with. A soft budget constraint (SBC) allows the Scottish Parliament to spend without having to consider all of the tax and, therefore, political consequences, of that spending, which is effectively the position at the moment. The incentives to promote economic growth through fiscal policy – on both the tax and spending sides are weak to non-existent. This is what the Scotland Act, 1998, and the continuing use of the Barnett block grant, gave Scotland. Now other budget constraints are being discussed – those of the Calman Commission (2009) and the Scotland Act (2012), as well as the ones offered in 2014 by the various political parties – Scottish Conservatives, Scottish Greens, Scottish Labour, the Scottish Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Government. There is also the budget constraint designed by the Holtham Commission (2010) for Wales that could just as well be used in Scotland. We examine to what extent these offer the hard budget constraint (HBC) that would bring tax policy firmly into the realm of Scottish politics, asking the Scottish electorate and Parliament to consider the costs to them of increasing spending in terms of higher taxes; or the benefits to them of using public spending to grow the tax base and own-sourced taxes? The hardest budget constraint of all is offered by independence but, as is now known, a clear majority of those who voted in the referendum did not vote for this form of budget constraint. Rather they voted for a significant further devolution of fiscal powers while remaining within a political and monetary union with the rest of the UK, with the risk pooling and revenue sharing that this implies. It is not surprising therefore that none of the budget constraints on offer, apart from the SNP’s, come close to the HBC of independence. However, the almost 25% fall in the price of oil since the referendum, a resource stream so central to the SNP’s economic policy making, underscores why there is a need for a trade off between a HBC and risk pooling and revenue sharing. Ranked according to the desirable characteristic of offering something approaching a HBC the least desirable are those of the Calman Commission, the Scotland Act, 2012, and Scottish Labour. In all of these the ‘elasticity’ of the block grant in the face of failure to grow the Scottish tax base is either not defined or is very elastic – meaning that the risk of failure is shuffled off to taxpayers outside of Scotland. The degree of HBC in the Scottish Conservative, Scottish Greens and Scottish Liberal Democrats proposals are much more desirable from an economic growth point of view, the latter even embracing the HBC proposed by the Holtham Commission that combines serious tax policy with welfare support in the long-run. We judge that the budget constraint in the SNP’s proposals is too hard as it does not allow for continuation of the ‘welfare union’ in the UK. We also consider that in the case of a generalized UK economic slow requiring a fiscal stimulus that the Scottish Parliament be allowed increased borrowing to be repaid in the next economic upturn.

Budget constrained expenditure multipliers

We show that standard expenditure multipliers capture economy-wide effects of new government projects only when financing constraints are not binding. In actual policy making, however, new projects usually need financing. Under liquidity constraints, new projects are subject to two opposite effects: an income effect and a set of spending substitution effects. The former is the traditional, unrestricted, multiplier effect; the latter is the result of expenditure reallocation to upheld effective financing constraints. Unrestricted multipliers will therefore be, as a general rule, upward biased and policy designs based upon them should be reassessed in the light of the countervailing substitution effects.

Comrades or Culprits? Donor Engagement and Budget Transparency in Aid Dependent Countries

Budget transparency has come to be considered a key aspect of governance. Over the past decade, donors have invested increasing resources in strengthening processes through which budget transparency in developing countries can be enhanced. According to the 2008 Open Budget Index (OBI) Report, however, aid dependency and budget transparency appear to be inversely correlated. This article looks at the role of donor agencies in promoting or preventing budget transparency in aid dependent countries. It analyzes data for a sample of 16 aid-dependent countries included in the OBI, to test some preliminary hypotheses and select six countries for which more detailed findings are then presented. All of these countries have implemented reforms aimed at enhancing budget transparency, with substantial donor support. These, however, often had only limited success, partly because they were not well adapted to the local context, and partly because donors put limited emphasis on improving public access to budget information. Donor efforts were also often offset by other characteristics of donor interventions, namely their fragmentation, lack of transparency, and limited use of program aid modalities such as budget support and pooled sector funding.

NI Draft Priorities and Budget Consultation 2006-2008 - Institute response

The Institute of Public Health in Ireland works to combat health inequalities and influence public policies in favour of health in Ireland, North and South. The Institute applies a holistic model of health which emphasises a wide range of determinants, including economic, educational, environmental, social and biological factors, as well as public services. The Institute’s work is based on the premise that improving health and reducing health inequalities in a sustainable way can only be achieved through addressing these broader determinants of health. We believe that the strategic direction of public spending in Northern Ireland has enormous potential to impact on people’s health, well being and prosperity.  We welcome the opportunity to comment on the draft priorities and the associated budget for 2006-2008 as set out in the consultation document.

Program, Highlights & Budget Summaries, 2004

Budget in Brief from the Governor's Office

Budget Report Fiscal Year 2005

Budget from the Governor's Office

Annual Report and Budget Summary, 2003-2004

Annual report for the Department of Public Health

Annual Report and Budget Summary, 2004

Annual report for the Department of Public Health

Iowa Budget Report Associated Financial Documents, January 2005

This report is of the financial documents, statements of federal funding.

Iowa Budget Report, January 2005

The FY 2006 budget we present to you today was built from the ground up and is the result of a budget process that focuses on priorities and results. Faced with difficult choices, we are heartened by the progress we have achieved with your cooperation and collaboration. Fulfilling our responsibility to Iowa children, together we have focused resources on cing class sizes and reversed an eight-year decline in test scores. As a result, Iowa students have reachieved four straight years of improved test scores, ranking among America’s best.

Iowa Budget Report Agency Budgets, January 2005

This is the detailed budget report of all state agencies for the FY2006. Page 604 long.

Iowa Budget Report Capital Projects, January 2005

This report is of the projects for the capital.