Dgenco market balancing - cost repartition under light regulation markets

In this paper we present a new methodology, based in game theory, to obtain the market balancing between Distribution Generation Companies (DGENCO), in liberalized electricity markets. The new contribution of this methodology is the verification of the participation rate of each agent based in Nucléolo Balancing and in Shapley Value. To validate the results we use the Zaragoza Distribution Network with 42 Bus and 5 DGENCO.

Efficient bidding with externalities

We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals.

Forming efficient networks

In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.

A Comparison of the poverty impact of transfers, taxes and market income across five OECD Countries

This paper compares the poverty reduction impact of income sources, taxes and transfers across five OECD countries. Since the estimation of that impact can depend on the order in which the various income sources are introduced into the analysis, it is done by using the Shapley value. Estimates of the poverty reduction impact are presented in a normalized and un-normalized fashion, in order to take into into account the total as well as the per dollar impacts. The methodology is applied to data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database.

Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

Some game-theoretic grounds for meeting people half-way

It is well known that, in distributions problems, fairness rarely leads to a single viewpoint (see, for instance, Young (1994)). In this context, this paper provides interesting bases that support the simple and commonly observed behavior of reaching intermediate agreements when two prominent distribution proposals highlight a discrepancy in sharing resources. Specifi cally, we formalize such a conflicting situation by associating it with a `natural' cooperative game, called bifocal distribution game, to show that both the Nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) and the Shapley value (Shapley (1953a)) agree on recommending the average of the two focal proposals. Furthermore, we analyze the interpretation of the previous result by means of axiomatic arguments. Keywords: Distribution problems, Cooperative games, Axiomatic analysis, Nucleolus, Shapley value. JEL Classi fication Numbers: C71, D63, D71.

Three essays in incomplete contracts

General Introduction These three chapters, while fairly independent from each other, study economic situations in incomplete contract settings. They are the product of both the academic freedom my advisors granted me, and in this sense reflect my personal interests, and of their interested feedback. The content of each chapter can be summarized as follows: Chapter 1: Inefficient durable-goods monopolies In this chapter we study the efficiency of an infinite-horizon durable-goods monopoly model with a fmite number of buyers. We find that, while all pure-strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) are efficient, there also exist previously unstudied inefficient MPE where high valuation buyers randomize their purchase decision while trying to benefit from low prices which are offered once a critical mass has purchased. Real time delay, an unusual monopoly distortion, is the result of this attrition behavior. We conclude that neither technological constraints nor concern for reputation are necessary to explain inefficiency in monopolized durable-goods markets. Chapter 2: Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice? In this chapter we study the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find anon-monotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low, and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. We explain this result by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in hold-up and a change in bargaining erosion. Chapter 3: Contract bargaining with multiple agents In this chapter we study a bargaining game between a principal and N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal. We show, using the Potential, that equilibria payoffs coincide with the Shapley value of the underlying coalitional game with an appropriately defined characteristic function, which under common assumptions coincides with the principal's equilibrium profit in the offer game. Since the problem accounts for differences in information and agents' conjectures, the outcome can be either efficient (e.g. public contracting) or inefficient (e.g. passive beliefs).

Enjoying cooperative games: The R package GameTheory

This paper focuses on cooperative games with transferable utility. We propose the computation of two solutions, the Shapley value for n agents and the nucleolus with a maximum of four agents. The current approach is also focused on conflicting claims problems, a particular case of coalitional games. We provide the computation of the most well-known and used claims solutions: the proportional, the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, the Talmud and the random arrival rules. Keywords: Cooperative game, Shapley value, nucleolus, claims problem, claims rule, bankruptcy.

An Axiomatization of the Serial Cost-Sharing Method

We o¤er an axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method of Friedman and Moulin (1999). The key property in our axiom system is Group Demand Monotonicity, asking that when a group of agents raise their demands, not all of them should pay less.

Production externalities : cooperative and non-cooperative approaches

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Teoria dei giochi e Multi-criteria decision-making per reti mobili Ad-hoc: un protocollo di routing

Nell'elaborato si analizzano aspetti della teoria dei giochi e della multi-criteria decision-making. La riflessione serve a proporre le basi per un nuovo modello di protocollo di routing in ambito Mobile Ad-hoc Networks. Questo prototipo mira a generare una rete che riesca a gestirsi in maniera ottimale grazie ad un'acuta tecnica di clusterizzazione. Allo stesso tempo si propone come obiettivo il risparmio energetico e la partecipazione collaborativa di tutti i componenti.

Cooperation in an HMMS-type supply chain: A management application of cooperative game theory = Kooperáció egy HMMS-típusú ellátási láncban: A kooperatív játékelmélet egy menedzsment alkalmazása

We apply cooperative game theory concepts to analyze a Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon (HMMS) supply chain. The bullwhip effect in a two-stage supply chain (supplier-manufacturer) in the framework of the HMMS-model with quadratic cost functions is considered. It is assumed that both firms minimize their relevant costs, and two cases are examined: the supplier and the manufacturer minimize their relevant costs in a decentralized and in a centralized (cooperative) way. The question of how to share the savings of the decreased bullwhip effect in the centralized (cooperative) model is answered by the weighted Shapley value, by a transferable utility cooperative game theory tool, where the weights are for the exogenously given “bargaining powers” of the participants of the supply chain. = A cikkben a kooperatív játékelmélet fogalmait alkalmazzuk egy Holt-Mogigliani-Muth-Simon-típusú ellátási lánc esetében. Az ostorcsapás-hatás elemeit egy beszállító-termelő ellátási láncban ragadjuk meg egy kvadratikus készletezési és termelési költség mellett. Feltételezzük, hogy mindkét vállalat minimalizálja a releváns költségeit. Két működési rendszert hasonlítunk össze: egy hierarchikus döntéshozatali rendszert, amikor először a termelő, majd a beszállító optimalizálja helyzetét, majd egy centralizált (kooperatív) modellt, amikor a vállalatok az együttes költségüket minimalizálják. A kérdés úgy merül fel, hogy a csökkentett ostorcsapás-hatás esetén hogyan osszák meg a részvevők ebben a transzferálható hasznosságú kooperatív játékban a költség megtakarítást, exogén módon adott tárgyalási pozíció mellett.

On the impossibility of fair risk allocation

Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using a coherent measure of risk it is impossible to allocate risk satisfying the natural requirements of (Solution) Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. To obtain the result we characterize the Shapley value on the class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games.

Regression games

The solution of a TU cooperative game can be a distribution of the value of the grand coalition, i.e. it can be a distribution of the payo (utility) all the players together achieve. In a regression model, the evaluation of the explanatory variables can be a distribution of the overall t, i.e. the t of the model every regressor variable is involved. Furthermore, we can take regression models as TU cooperative games where the explanatory (regressor) variables are the players. In this paper we introduce the class of regression games, characterize it and apply the Shapley value to evaluating the explanatory variables in regression models. In order to support our approach we consider Young (1985)'s axiomatization of the Shapley value, and conclude that the Shapley value is a reasonable tool to evaluate the explanatory variables of regression models.

Stable sets in one-seller assignment games

We consider von Neumann -- Morgenstern stable sets in assignment games with one seller and many buyers. We prove that a set of imputations is a stable set if and only if it is the graph of a certain type of continuous and monotone function. This characterization enables us to interpret the standards of behavior encompassed by the various stable sets as possible outcomes of well-known auction procedures when groups of buyers may form bidder rings. We also show that the union of all stable sets can be described as the union of convex polytopes all of whose vertices are marginal contribution payoff vectors. Consequently, each stable set is contained in the Weber set. The Shapley value, however, typically falls outside the union of all stable sets.