A közgazdaságtan és a szociológia határán - az identitás-gazdaságtan által felvetett elméleti kérdések (On the borders of economics and sociology. Theoretical questions raised by identity economics)

A tanulmány az identitás-gazdaságtan megközelítését és az általa felvetett elméleti kérdéseket kívánja bemutatni. E tan kiinduló tétele George A. Akerlof és Rachel E. Kranton szerint az, hogy a közgazdaságtanban használt hasznosságfüggvénybe be kell emelni az emberek énképének és az ezzel kapcsolatos egyéni mérlegelésnek a szempontjait. Ezt az indokolja, hogy az emberek társadalmi csoportokhoz/kategóriákhoz tartoznak, amelyekhez normarendszer társul, azaz ha viselkedésükkel megsértik a normákat, akkor önképük sérül, és ezáltal csökken a hasznosságuk is. A tanulmányban bemutatjuk, hogy ez a szemlélet az embereket "túlszocializált" társadalmi szereplőkként mutatja be, akik kevéssé reflektálnak a helyzetükre. További kérdéseket vetnek fel az elmúlt években végzett szociálpszichológiai és viselkedés- gazdaságtani kísérletek, amelyek rámutatnak, hogy az identitás- gazdaságtani elmélet egyik alapját jelentő normák erősen függnek szituációs tényezőktől. _____ The paper introduces the approach of identity economics and the theoretical questions raised by its arguments. According to Akerlof and Kranton, individual identity and personal calculations in relation to this identity should be incorporated into the utility function applied in economics, so that people are placed in social categories that involve normative systems. In line with this, if their actions breach the social norms, this affects negatively their self-image, so in turn decreasing their utility. The paper argues that this approach presents humans as "overly socialized" social actors who do not reflect on their situation. Further questions could be raised by experiments in social psychology and behavioral economics conducted in recent years. The results highlight the fact that the norms which serve as the basis for the theory of identity economics depend strongly on the context and given situation.

The Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change in Coasts and Oceans: Literature Review, Policy Implications and Research Agenda

Sea level rise and other effects of climate change on oceans and coasts around the world are major reasons to halt the emissions of greenhouse gases to the maximum extent. But historical emissions and sea level rise have already begun so steps to adapt to a world where shorelines, coastal populations, and economies could be dramatically altered are now essential. This presents significant economic challenges in four areas. (1) Large expenditures for adaptation steps may be required but the extent of sea level rise and thus the expenditures are unknowable at this point. Traditional methods for comparing benefits and costs are severely limited, but decisions must still be made. (2) It is not clear where the funding for adaptation will come from, which is a barrier to even starting planning. (3) The extent of economic vulnerability has been illustrated with assessments of risks to current properties, but these likely significantly understate the risks that lie in the future. (4) Market-based solutions to reducing climate change are now generally accepted, but their role in adaptation is less clear. Reviewing the literature addressing each of these points, this paper suggests specific strategies for dealing with uncertainty in assessing the economics of adaptation options, reviews the wide range of options for funding coastal adaption, identifies a number of serious deficiencies in current economic vulnerability studies, and suggests how market based approaches might be used in shaping adaptation strategies. The paper concludes by identifying a research agenda for the economics of coastal adaptation that, if completed, could significantly increase the likelihood of economically efficient coastal adaptation.

Variation in risk seeking behavior in a natural experiment following a large negative wealth shock induced by a natural disaster

An ongoing challenge in behavioral economics is to understand the variations observed in risk attitudes as a function of their environmental context. Of particular interest is the effect of wealth on risk attitudes. The research in this area has however faced two constraints: the difficulty to study the causal effects of large changes in wealth, and the causal effects of losses on risk behavior. The present paper address this double limitation by providing evidence of the variation of risk attitude after large losses using a natural disaster (Brisbane floods) as the setting for a natural experiment.

Free-riding, cooperation, and 'peaceful revolutions' in copyright

Modern copyright law is based on the inescapable assumption that users, given the choice, will free-ride rather than pay for access. In fact, many consumers of cultural works – music, books, films, games, and other works – fundamentally want to support their production. It turns out that humans are motivated to support cultural production not only by extrinsic incentives, but also by social norms of fairness and reciprocity. This article explains how producers across the creative industries have used this insight to develop increasingly sophisticated business models that rely on voluntary payments (including pay-what-you-want schemes) to fund their costs of production. The recognition that users are not always free-riders suggests that current policy approaches to copyright are fundamentally flawed. Because social norms are so important in consumer motivations, the perceived unfairness of the current copyright system undermines the willingness of people to pay for access to cultural goods. While recent copyright reform debate has focused on creating stronger deterrence through enforcement, increasing the perceived fairness and legitimacy of copyright law is likely to be much more effective. The fact that users will sometimes willingly support cultural production also challenges the economic raison d'être of copyright law. This article demonstrates how 'peaceful revolutions' are flipping conventional copyright models and encouraging free-riding through combining incentives and prosocial norms. Because they provide a means to support production without limiting the dissemination of knowledge and culture, there is good reason to believe that these commons-based systems of cultural production can be more efficient, more fair, and more conducive to human flourishing than conventional copyright systems. This article explains what we know about free-riding so far and what work remains to be done to understand the viability and importance of cooperative systems in funding cultural production.

Time discounting (delta) and pain anticipation: Experimental evidence

To be published in: Revista Internacional de Sociología (2011), Special Issue on Experimental and Behavioral Economics.

A legitimação jurídico-moral da regulação estatal à luz da premissa liberal republicana: autonomia privada, igualdade e autonomia pública. Estudo de caso sobre as regulações paternalistas

A presente tese tem por objetivo principal estudar a legitimação jurídico-moral da regulação estatal. Trata-se de tema de grande relevância e extrema atualidade em decorrência de dois fatores. Por um lado, desde o fenômeno da virada kantiana e da retomada da preocupação com o estabelecimento de uma teoria da justiça, tornou-se necessária a análise de justificação jurídico-moral de toda e qualquer instituição político-jurídica positivada. Por outro lado, entre as inúmeras instituições político-jurídicas positivadas, cresce cada vez mais a utilização das medidas jurídicas regulatórias, através das quais o Poder Público direciona ou controla a conduta dos agentes com o intuito de atingir determinada finalidade. Instituto econômico que é, ao interferir na alocação de riquezas, bens e serviços no mercado, a regulação estatal há tempos já vem sendo objeto de análise em uma perspectiva de legitimação econômica. Tradicionalmente, ainda dentro do paradigma da racionalidade, os economistas sempre apontaram as falhas de mercado como as razões a justificar as regulações estatais em um viés econômico. Mais recentemente, por sua vez, os adeptos da economia comportamental, rompendo ou relativizando as lições da Rational Choice Theory, têm apontado também as ações irracionais em heurística como razões a justificar as regulações estatais em um viés econômico. Ocorre, entretanto, que a regulação estatal é um instituto interdisciplinar. Ao direcionar ou controlar a conduta dos indivíduos, limitando ou implementando direitos e liberdades, a regulação constitui instituto simultaneamente jurídico e moral. A presente tese, portanto, buscará apresentar as razões a servir de justificação para a regulação estatal em uma perspectiva jurídico-moral. Neste ponto, adotar-se-á como paradigma de aferição de legitimação jurídico-moral das instituições político-jurídicas positivadas (entre as quais as regulações estatais) um liberalismo-republicano, consistente na compatibilização do liberalismo-igualitário com um republicanismo moderado. Desta forma, o estudo buscará defender a possibilidade de a legitimação jurídico-moral das diversas regulações estatais encontrar fundamento em um ou alguns de três valores jurídico-morais: a autonomia individual privada, as condições igualitárias e a autonomia pública. No que diz respeito à implementação da autonomia individual privada e das condições igualitárias, primeiramente, a tese defenderá a possibilidade de ser realizada uma nova leitura jurídico-moral dos institutos econômicos das falhas de mercado e das ações irracionais em heurística. Neste sentido, o conceito de falhas de mercado e o conceito de ações irracionais em heurística, em uma leitura jurídico-moral como razões a justificar a legitimação das regulações estatais, devem ser entendidos como situações em que o atuar livre dos agentes no mercado viole ou deixe de implementar os valores jurídico-morais fundamentais da autonomia individual privada e das condições igualitárias. Ainda no que diz respeito às influências liberal-igualitárias, a tese sustentará que, mesmo na inexistência de falhas de mercado ou de ações irracionais em heurística, será possível o estabelecimento de regulações estatais que encontrem justificação no valor jurídico-moral fundamental da igualdade, desde que tais regulações estejam destinadas a implementar as condições igualitárias mínimas necessárias à manutenção da própria autonomia individual privada e da dignidade humana. Por outro lado, no que diz respeito às influências republicanas, será exposto que as regulações estatais podem encontrar legitimação jurídico-moral também no valor jurídico-moral fundamental da autonomia pública. A saber, as regulações podem se encontrar legitimadas jurídico-moralmente quando da implementação dos projetos e políticas deliberados pelos cidadãos e pela sociedade no exercício da soberania popular, desde que tais projetos coletivos não violem os requisitos mínimos de dignidade humana dos indivíduos. A tese defenderá que os princípios da proporcionalidade e da igualdade podem exercer um papel de destaque na análise de legitimação jurídico-moral das regulações estatais. O princípio da proporcionalidade, neste ponto, será útil instrumental metodológico na aferição de legitimação jurídico-moral de uma medida regulatória em uma perspectiva interna, quando da aferição da relação estabelecida entre os meios e os fins da regulação. O princípio da igualdade, por sua vez, será útil instrumental metodológico na aferição de legitimação jurídico-moral de uma medida regulatória em uma perspectiva comparativa entre as diversas medidas regulatórias existentes. Por fim, uma vez enfrentados os pontos mais sensíveis pertinentes à justificação de toda e qualquer medida regulatória bem como estabelecida uma teoria geral acerca da legitimação jurídico-moral da regulação estatal, a presente tese realizará um estudo de caso acerca da legitimação jurídico-moral especificamente das regulações que utilizam argumentos de natureza paternalista. Trata-se de regulações que, ao direcionar a conduta de agentes com o intuito de zelar por bens, direitos e interesses destes próprios indivíduos cuja liberdade é restringida, apresentam-se extremamente controversas. Será exposto que, desde a clássica obra On Liberty de JONH STUART MILL, o paternalismo jurídico vem sendo tradicionalmente associado a uma conotação pejorativa de violação aos valores jurídico-morais fundamentais. A tese, porém, adotará posição segundo a qual as regulações paternalistas podem eventualmente encontrar legitimação jurídico-moral na promoção ou proteção dos valores jurídico-morais fundamentais da autonomia individual privada e da igualdade. Além disto, defenderá o estudo que os institutos econômicos das falhas de mercado da assimetria de informações e dos problemas de coordenação bem como os institutos econômicos das ações irracionais em heurística, adotados na nova leitura jurídico-moral proposta, servirão de instrumental útil na identificação das situações em que tais regulações paternalistas se encontram legitimadas jurídico-moralmente diante da premissa liberal-republicana.

Anchors, scales and the relative coding of value in the brain.

People are alarmingly susceptible to manipulations that change both their expectations and experience of the value of goods. Recent studies in behavioral economics suggest such variability reflects more than mere caprice. People commonly judge options and prices in relative terms, rather than absolutely, and display strong sensitivity to exemplar and price anchors. We propose that these findings elucidate important principles about reward processing in the brain. In particular, relative valuation may be a natural consequence of adaptive coding of neuronal firing to optimise sensitivity across large ranges of value. Furthermore, the initial apparent arbitrariness of value may reflect the brains' attempts to optimally integrate diverse sources of value-relevant information in the face of perceived uncertainty. Recent findings in neuroscience support both accounts, and implicate regions in the orbitofrontal cortex, striatum, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex in the construction of value.

Integrating simultaneous prosocial and antisocial behavior into theories of collective action.

Trust and cooperation constitute cornerstones of common-pool resource theory, showing that "prosocial" strategies among resource users can overcome collective action problems and lead to sustainable resource governance. Yet, antisocial behavior and especially the coexistence of prosocial and antisocial behaviors have received less attention. We broaden the analysis to include the effects of both "prosocial" and "antisocial" interactions. We do so in the context of marine protected areas (MPAs), the most prominent form of biodiversity conservation intervention worldwide. Our multimethod approach relied on lab-in-the-field economic experiments (n = 127) in two MPA and two non-MPA communities in Baja California, Mexico. In addition, we deployed a standardized fishers' survey (n = 544) to verify the external validity of our findings and expert informant interviews (n = 77) to develop potential explanatory mechanisms. In MPA sites, prosocial and antisocial behavior is significantly higher, and the presence of antisocial behavior does not seem to have a negative effect on prosocial behavior. We suggest that market integration, economic diversification, and strengthened group identity in MPAs are the main potential mechanisms for the simultaneity of prosocial and antisocial behavior we observed. This study constitutes a first step in better understanding the interaction between prosociality and antisociality as related to natural resources governance and conservation science, integrating literatures from social psychology, evolutionary anthropology, behavioral economics, and ecology.

Individual Decision-Making and Inflation Persistence

The traditional task of a central bank is to preserve price stability and, in doing so, not to impair the real economy more than necessary. To meet this challenge, it is of great relevance whether inflation is only driven by inflation expectations and the current output gap or whether it is, in addition, influenced by past inflation. In the former case, as described by the New Keynesian Phillips curve, the central bank can immediately and simultaneously achieve price stability and equilibrium output, the so-called ‘divine coincidence’ (Blanchard and Galí 2007). In the latter case, the achievement of price stability is costly in terms of output and will be pursued over several periods. Similarly, it is important to distinguish this latter case, which describes ‘intrinsic’ inflation persistence, from that of ‘extrinsic’ inflation persistence, where the sluggishness of inflation is not a ‘structural’ feature of the economy but merely ‘inherited’ from the sluggishness of the other driving forces, inflation expectations and output. ‘Extrinsic’ inflation persistence is usually considered to be the less challenging case, as policy-makers are supposed to fight against the persistence in the driving forces, especially to reduce the stickiness of inflation expectations by a credible monetary policy, in order to reestablish the ‘divine coincidence’. The scope of this dissertation is to contribute to the vast literature and ongoing discussion on inflation persistence: Chapter 1 describes the policy consequences of inflation persistence and summarizes the empirical and theoretical literature. Chapter 2 compares two models of staggered price setting, one with a fixed two-period duration and the other with a stochastic duration of prices. I show that in an economy with a timeless optimizing central bank the model with the two-period alternating price-setting (for most parameter values) leads to more persistent inflation than the model with stochastic price duration. This result amends earlier work by Kiley (2002) who found that the model with stochastic price duration generates more persistent inflation in response to an exogenous monetary shock. Chapter 3 extends the two-period alternating price-setting model to the case of 3- and 4-period price durations. This results in a more complex Phillips curve with a negative impact of past inflation on current inflation. As simulations show, this multi-period Phillips curve generates a too low degree of autocorrelation and too early turnings points of inflation and is outperformed by a simple Hybrid Phillips curve. Chapter 4 starts from the critique of Driscoll and Holden (2003) on the relative real-wage model of Fuhrer and Moore (1995). While taking the critique seriously that Fuhrer and Moore’s model will collapse to a much simpler one without intrinsic inflation persistence if one takes their arguments literally, I extend the model by a term for inequality aversion. This model extension is not only in line with experimental evidence but results in a Hybrid Phillips curve with inflation persistence that is observably equivalent to that presented by Fuhrer and Moore (1995). In chapter 5, I present a model that especially allows to study the relationship between fairness attitudes and time preference (impatience). In the model, two individuals take decisions in two subsequent periods. In period 1, both individuals are endowed with resources and are able to donate a share of their resources to the other individual. In period 2, the two individuals might join in a common production after having bargained on the split of its output. The size of the production output depends on the relative share of resources at the end of period 1 as the human capital of the individuals, which is built by means of their resources, cannot fully be substituted one against each other. Therefore, it might be rational for a well-endowed individual in period 1 to act in a seemingly ‘fair’ manner and to donate own resources to its poorer counterpart. This decision also depends on the individuals’ impatience which is induced by the small but positive probability that production is not possible in period 2. As a general result, the individuals in the model economy are more likely to behave in a ‘fair’ manner, i.e., to donate resources to the other individual, the lower their own impatience and the higher the productivity of the other individual. As the (seemingly) ‘fair’ behavior is modelled as an endogenous outcome and as it is related to the aspect of time preference, the presented framework might help to further integrate behavioral economics and macroeconomics.

Institutions, Behavior and Evolution

The three articles constituting this thesis are for reasons of content or method related to the following three fields in economics: Behavioral Economics, Evolutionary Game Theory and Formal Institutional Economics. A core element of these fields is the concept of individual preferences. Preferences are of central importance for the conceptional framework to analyze human behavior. They form the foundation for the theory of rational choice which is defined by the determination of the choice set and the selection of the most preferred alternative according to some consistency requirements. The theory of rational choice is based on a very simplified description of the problem of choice (object function and constraints). However, that choices depend on many more factors is for instance propagated by psychological theories and is supported by many empirical and experimental studies. This thesis adds to a better understanding of individual behavior to the extent that the evolution of certain characteristics of preferences and their consequences on human behavior forms the overarching theme of the dissertation. The long-term effect of evolutionary forces on a particular characteristic of importance in the theoretical, empirical and experimental economic literature, the concept of inequality aversion, is subject of the article “The evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life” (Chapter 4). The contribution of the article is the overcoming of a restriction of former approaches to analyze the evolution of preferences in very simple environments. By classifying human interaction into three central economic games, the article provides a first step towards a simplified and sufficiently complete description of the interaction environment. Within such an environment the article characterizes the evolutionary stable preference distribution. One result shows, that the interaction of the aforementioned three classes can stabilize a preference of inequality aversion in the subpopulation which is favored in the problem of redistribution. The two remaining articles are concerned with social norms, which dissemination is determined by medium-run forces of cultural evolution. The article “The impact of market innovations on the evolution of social norms: the sustainability case.“ (Chapter 2) studies the interrelation between product innovations which are relevant from a sustainability perspective and an according social norm in consumption. This relation is based on a conformity bias in consumption and the attempt to avoid cognitive dissonances resulting from non-compliant consumption. Among others, it is shown that a conformity bias on the consumption side can lead to multiple equilibria on the side of norm adoption. The article “Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas: signaling internalized norms.” (Chapter 3) studies the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas based on the signaling of social norms. The article provides a potential explanation of cooperative behavior, which does not rely on the assumption of structured populations or on the unmotivated ability of social norms to restrict individual actions or strategy spaces. A comprehensive result of the single articles is the explanation of the phenomenon of partial norm adaption or dissemination of preferences. The plurality of the applied approaches with respect to the proximity to the rational choice approach and regarding the underlying evolutionary mechanics is a particular strength of the thesis. It shows the equality of these approaches in their potential to explain the phenomenon of cooperation in environments that provide material incentives for defective behavior. This also points to the need of a unified framework considering the biological and cultural coevolution of preference patterns.

El sistema multifondos de pensiones colombiano bajo las nuevas teorías del comportamiento financiero

En Colombia, después de casi dos décadas de la creación del régimen de cuentas privadas, se implementó una reforma donde se pasa de un sistema con un unico fondo a uno multifondos. Este tipo de reformas se vienen implementando en diferentes paises europeos y de Latino America. A la luz de las teorías clásicas dicha reforma trae mejoras en el bienestar de los individuos; sin embargo, la literatura sobre las nuevas teorías del comportamiento sugiere que los individuos no siempre toman decisiones que están de acuerdo con los supuestos de las teorías clásicas. Este trabajo estudia esta reforma en Colombia bajo algunas de las teorías del comportamiento financiero. Se encuentra que aún cuando el afiliado se quede en la opción default , o actúe con aversión a la pérdida, va a obtener valores en sus cuentas privadas mayores a las que obtendría con un sistema de un único fondo.

El sistema multifondos de pensiones colombiano bajo las nuevas teorías del comportamiento financiero

En Colombia, después de casi dos décadas de la creación del régimen de cuentas privadas, se implementó una reforma donde se pasa de un sistema con un único fondo a uno multifondos. Este tipo de reformas se vienen implementando en diferentes países europeos y de Latino América. A la luz de las teorías clásicas dicha reforma trae mejoras en el bienestar de los individuos; sin embargo, la literatura sobre las nuevas teorías del comportamiento sugiere que los individuos no siempre toman decisiones que están de acuerdo con los supuestos de las teorías clásicas. Este trabajo estudia esta reforma en Colombia bajo algunas de las teorías del comportamiento financiero. Se encuentra que aún cuando el afiliado se quede en la opción default , o actúe con aversión a la pérdida, va a obtener valores en sus cuentas privadas mayores a las que obtendría con un sistema de un único fondo.

Internationalization motives: sell more, buy better, upgrade and escape

Purpose – The purpose of this the paper is to review the motives for internationalization to clarify previous arguments and provide a theory-driven classification. Design/methodology/approach – The authors build on behavioral economics and propose a classification of internationalization motives as the result of the interaction among two dimensions, an economics-driven exploitation of existing resources or exploration of new resources, and a psychology-driven search for better host country conditions or avoidance of poor home country conditions. Findings – These two dimensions result in four internationalization motives: sell more, in which the company exploits existing resources at home and obtains better host country conditions; buy better, in which the company exploits existing resources abroad and avoids poor home country conditions; upgrade, in which the company explores for new resources, and it obtains better host country conditions; and escape, in which the company explores for new resources and avoids poor home country conditions. Originality/value – This theory-driven classification provides predictive power for future analyses of internationalization motives.

Strategy Method (and payment cards)

Payment cards are a useful device to measure subjects’ preferences for a good and especially their willingness to pay for it. Together with some other similar elicitation methods, payment cards are especially appropriate for both hypothetical and incentive-compatible valuations of a good; a property which has prompted many researchers to use them in studies comparing stated and revealed valuations. The Strategy Method (hereafter SM) is a method based on a similar principle as that of payment cards, but is aimed at eliciting a subject’s full profile of responses to each of the strategies available to the rival(s).