A study of behavioral finance: background, theories and application

Behavioral finance, or behavioral economics, consists of a theoretical field of research stating that consequent psychological and behavioral variables are involved in financial activities such as corporate finance and investment decisions (i.e. asset allocation, portfolio management and so on). This field has known an increasing interest from scholar and financial professionals since episodes of multiple speculative bubbles and financial crises. Indeed, practical incoherencies between economic events and traditional neoclassical financial theories had pushed more and more researchers to look for new and broader models and theories. The purpose of this work is to present the field of research, still ill-known by a vast majority. This work is thus a survey that introduces its origins and its main theories, while contrasting them with traditional finance theories still predominant nowadays. The main question guiding this work would be to see if this area of inquiry is able to provide better explanations for real life market phenomenon. For that purpose, the study will present some market anomalies unsolved by traditional theories, which have been recently addressed by behavioral finance researchers. In addition, it presents a practical application of portfolio management, comparing asset allocation under the traditional Markowitz’s approach to the Black-Litterman model, which incorporates some features of behavioral finance.

A közgazdaságtan és a szociológia határán - az identitás-gazdaságtan által felvetett elméleti kérdések (On the borders of economics and sociology. Theoretical questions raised by identity economics)

A tanulmány az identitás-gazdaságtan megközelítését és az általa felvetett elméleti kérdéseket kívánja bemutatni. E tan kiinduló tétele George A. Akerlof és Rachel E. Kranton szerint az, hogy a közgazdaságtanban használt hasznosságfüggvénybe be kell emelni az emberek énképének és az ezzel kapcsolatos egyéni mérlegelésnek a szempontjait. Ezt az indokolja, hogy az emberek társadalmi csoportokhoz/kategóriákhoz tartoznak, amelyekhez normarendszer társul, azaz ha viselkedésükkel megsértik a normákat, akkor önképük sérül, és ezáltal csökken a hasznosságuk is. A tanulmányban bemutatjuk, hogy ez a szemlélet az embereket "túlszocializált" társadalmi szereplőkként mutatja be, akik kevéssé reflektálnak a helyzetükre. További kérdéseket vetnek fel az elmúlt években végzett szociálpszichológiai és viselkedés- gazdaságtani kísérletek, amelyek rámutatnak, hogy az identitás- gazdaságtani elmélet egyik alapját jelentő normák erősen függnek szituációs tényezőktől. _____ The paper introduces the approach of identity economics and the theoretical questions raised by its arguments. According to Akerlof and Kranton, individual identity and personal calculations in relation to this identity should be incorporated into the utility function applied in economics, so that people are placed in social categories that involve normative systems. In line with this, if their actions breach the social norms, this affects negatively their self-image, so in turn decreasing their utility. The paper argues that this approach presents humans as "overly socialized" social actors who do not reflect on their situation. Further questions could be raised by experiments in social psychology and behavioral economics conducted in recent years. The results highlight the fact that the norms which serve as the basis for the theory of identity economics depend strongly on the context and given situation.

The Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change in Coasts and Oceans: Literature Review, Policy Implications and Research Agenda

Sea level rise and other effects of climate change on oceans and coasts around the world are major reasons to halt the emissions of greenhouse gases to the maximum extent. But historical emissions and sea level rise have already begun so steps to adapt to a world where shorelines, coastal populations, and economies could be dramatically altered are now essential. This presents significant economic challenges in four areas. (1) Large expenditures for adaptation steps may be required but the extent of sea level rise and thus the expenditures are unknowable at this point. Traditional methods for comparing benefits and costs are severely limited, but decisions must still be made. (2) It is not clear where the funding for adaptation will come from, which is a barrier to even starting planning. (3) The extent of economic vulnerability has been illustrated with assessments of risks to current properties, but these likely significantly understate the risks that lie in the future. (4) Market-based solutions to reducing climate change are now generally accepted, but their role in adaptation is less clear. Reviewing the literature addressing each of these points, this paper suggests specific strategies for dealing with uncertainty in assessing the economics of adaptation options, reviews the wide range of options for funding coastal adaption, identifies a number of serious deficiencies in current economic vulnerability studies, and suggests how market based approaches might be used in shaping adaptation strategies. The paper concludes by identifying a research agenda for the economics of coastal adaptation that, if completed, could significantly increase the likelihood of economically efficient coastal adaptation.

Marketing : a (ir)racionalidade dos consumidores, numa perspetiva empreendedora

Mestrado em Gestão e Empreendedorismo

Positive self-image and incentives in organizations

This paper investigates the implications of individuals’ mistaken beliefs of their abilities on incentives in organizations using the principal-agent model of moral hazard. The paper shows that if effort is observable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability are always favorable to the principal. However, if effort is unobservable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability can be either favorable or unfavorable to the principal. The paper provides conditions under which an agent’s over estimation about own ability is favorable to the principal when effort is unobservable. Finally, the paper shows that workers’ mistaken beliefs about their coworkers’ abilities make interdependent incentive schemes more attractive to firms than individualistic incentive schemes.

Positive self-image in tournaments

This paper analyzes the implications of worker overestimation of productivity for firms in which incentives take the form of tournaments. Each worker overestimates his productivity but is aware of the bias in his opponent’s self-assessment. The manager of the firm, on the other hand, correctly assesses workers’ productivities and self-beliefs when setting tournament prizes. The paper shows that, under a variety of circumstances, firms make higher profits when workers have positive self-image than if workers do not. By contrast, workers’ welfare declines due to their own misguided choices.

Payoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt: an experimental study

Game theorists typically assume that changing a game’s payoff levels—by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs—should not affect behavior. While this invariance is an implication of the theory when payoffs mirror expected utilities, it is an empirical question when the “payoffs” are actually money amounts. In particular, if individuals treat monetary gains and losses differently, then payoff–level changes may matter when they result in positive payoffs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the results of a human–subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find differences in behavior across the three versions of Stag Hunt; these differences are hard to detect in the first round of play, but grow over time. When significant, the differences we find are in the direction predicted by certain– and possible–loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for games with multiple equilibria, and for theories that attempt to select among equilibria in such games.

Effects of stress on economic decision-making: Evidence from laboratory experiments

The ways in which preferences respond to the varying stress of economic environments is a key question for behavioral economics and public policy. We conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate the effects of stress on financial decision making among individuals aged 50 and older. Using the cold pressor task as a physiological stressor, and a series of intelligence tests as cognitive stressors, we find that stress increases subjective discounting rates, has no effect on the degree of risk-aversion, and substantially lowers the effort individuals make to learn about financial decisions.

What is the Causal Effect of Information and Learning about a Public Good on Willingness to Pay?

In this study we elicit agents’ prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior information sets. The design of this field experiment allows us to perform theoretically motivated hypothesis testing between different updating rules: non-informative updating, Bayesian updating, and incomplete updating. We find causal evidence that agents imperfectly update their information sets. We also field causal evidence that the amount of additional information provided to subjects relative to their pre-existing information levels can affect stated WTP in ways consistent overload from too much learning. This result raises important (though familiar) issues for the use of stated preference methods in policy analysis.

Autonomy-enhancing paternalism

We present a form of soft paternalism called "autonomy-enhancing paternalism" that seeks to in-crease individual well-being by facilitating the individual ability to make critically reflected, autonomous decisions. The focus of autonomy-enhancing paternalism is on helping individuals to become better decision-makers, rather than on helping them by making better decisions for them. Autonomy-enhancing paternalism acknowledges that behavioral interventions can change the strength of decision-making anomalies over time, and favors those interventions that improve, rather than reduce, individuals ability to make good and unbiased decisions. By this it prevents manipulation of the individual by the soft paternalist, accounts for the heterogeneity of individuals, and counteracts slippery slope arguments by decreasing the probability of future paternalistic interventions. Moreover, autonomy-enhancing paternalism can be defended based on both liberal values and welfare considerations.

Interpreting social enterprises

Institutional and organizational variety is increasingly characterizing advanced economic systems. While traditional economic theories have focused almost exclusively on profit-maximizing (i.e., for-profit) enterprises and on publicly-owned organizations, the increasing relevance of non-profit organizations, and especially of social enterprises, requires scientists to reflect on a new comprehensive economic approach for explaining this organizational variety. This paper examines the main limitations of the orthodox and institutional theories and asserts the need for creating and testing a new theoretical framework, which considers the way in which diverse enterprises pursue their goals, the diverse motivations driving actors and organizations, and the different learning patterns and routines within organizations. The new analytical framework proposed in the paper draws upon recent developments in the theories of the firm, mainly of an evolutionary and behavioral kind. The firm is interpreted as a coordination mechanism of economic activity, and one whose objectives need not coincide with profit maximization. On the other hand, economic agents driven by motivational complexity and intrinsic, non-monetary motivation play a crucial role in forming firm activity over and above purely monetary and financial objectives. The new framework is thought to be particularly suitable to correctly interpret the emergence and role of nontraditional organizational and ownership forms that are not driven by the profit motive (non-profit organizations), mainly recognized in the legal forms of cooperative firms, non-profit organizations and social enterprises. A continuum of organizational forms ranging from profit making activities to public benefit activities, and encompassing mutual benefit organizations as its core constituent, is envisaged and discussed.

Choice by sequential procedures

We propose a rule of decision-making, the sequential procedure guided byroutes, and show that three influential boundedly rational choice models can be equivalentlyunderstood as special cases of this rule. In addition, the sequential procedure guidedby routes is instrumental in showing that the three models are intimately related. We showthat choice with a status-quo bias is a refinement of rationalizability by game trees, which, inturn, is also a refinement of sequential rationalizability. Thus, we provide a sharp taxonomyof these choice models, and show that they all can be understood as choice by sequentialprocedures.

A characterization of sequential rationalizability

A choice function is sequentially rationalizable if there is an ordered collection of asymmetric binary relations that identifies the selected alternative in every choice problem. We propose a property, F-consistency, and show that it characterizes the notion of sequential rationalizability. F-consistency is a testable property that highlights the behavioral aspects implicit in sequentially rationalizable choice. Further, our characterization result provides a novel tool with which to study how other behavioral concepts are related to sequential rationalizability, and establish a priori unexpected implications. In particular, we show that the concept of rationalizability by game trees, which, in principle, had little to do with sequential rationalizability, is a refinement of the latter. Every choice function that is rationalizable by a game tree is also sequentially rationalizable. Finally, we show that some prominent voting mechanisms are also sequentially rationalizable.