Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Two main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the literature: Boston and deferred acceptance (DA). The question arises on the ex-ante welfareimplications when the game is played by participants that vary in terms of their strategicsophistication. Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2011) have shown that the chances ofnaive participants getting into a good school are higher under the Boston mechanism thanunder DA, and some naive participants are actually better off. In this note we show thatthese results can be extended to show that, under the veil of ignorance, i.e. students not yetknowing their utility values, all naive students may prefer to adopt the Boston mechanism.

One person in the battlefield is not a warrior: Self-construal, perceived ability to make a difference, and socially responsible behavior

We suggest that cultivating an individual's connectedness to others promotes sociallyresponsible behavior both directly and indirectly through increased perceived abilityto make a difference. Individuals whose interdependent self is more prominent feel theyhave more of an impact on larger scale societal outcomes and, therefore, engage more insocially responsible behaviors than do individuals whose independent self is moreprominent. We test these hypotheses in two experiments in which participants makefinancial contributions or exert an effort for a social cause. In a survey, we find thatperceived effectiveness mediates the effect of self-construal on socially responsibleconsumption.

Predestination and the Protestant ethic

This paper shows an equivalence result between the utility functions of secularagents who abide by a moral obligation to accumulate wealth and those of religiousagents who believe that salvation is immutable and preordained by God. Thisresult formalizes Weber's renowned thesis on the connection between the worldlyasceticism of Protestants and the religious premises of Calvinism. Furthermore,ongoing economies are often modeled with preference relations such as "Keeping upwith the Joneses" which are not associated with religion. Our results relate thesesecular economies of today and economies of the past shaped by religious ideas.

Credit constraints in general equilibrium: Experimental results

Our work attempts to investigate the influence of credit tightness orexpansion on activity and relative prices in a multimarket set-up. We report on somedouble- auction, two-market experiments where subjects had to satisfy an inequalityinvolving the use of credit. The experiments display two regimes, characterizedby high and low credit availability. The critical value of credit at the commonboundary of the two regimes has a compelling interpretation as the maximal credituse at the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of the abstract economy naturally associatedto our experimental environment. Our main results are that changes in theavailability of credit: (a): have minor and unsystematic effects on quantitiesand relative prices in the high-credit regime, (b): have substantial effects, bothon quantities and relative prices, in the low-credit regime.

Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study

We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intendingdefectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We compare our results of multiple games with single game PD-experiments and find no difference in aggregate behavior. Hence the multiple game technique is robust and might therefore be an important tool in the future for testing the use of mixed strategies.

An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game

We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firm in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well--specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such a situation.

Illusory correlation in the remuneration of chief executive officers: It pays to play golf, and well

Illusory correlation refers to the use of information in decisions that is uncorrelated with the relevantcriterion. We document illusory correlation in CEO compensation decisions by demonstrating thatinformation, that is uncorrelated with corporate performance, is related to CEO compensation. We usepublicly available data from the USA for the years 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 to examine the relationsbetween golf handicaps of CEOs and corporate performance, on the one hand, and CEO compensationand golf handicaps, on the other hand. Although we find no relation between handicap and corporateperformance, we do find a relation between handicap and CEO compensation. In short, golfers earnmore than non-golfers and pay increases with golfing ability. We relate these findings to the difficultiesof judging compensation for CEOs. To overcome this and possibly other illusory correlations inthese kinds of decisions, we recommend the use of explicit, mechanical decision rules.

Motivation, test scores and economic success

This paper argues that low-stakes test scores, available in surveys, may be partially determinedby test-taking motivation, which is associated with personality traits but not with cognitiveability. Therefore, such test score distributions may not be informative regarding cognitiveability distributions. Moreover, correlations, found in survey data, between high test scoresand economic success may be partially caused by favorable personality traits. To demonstratethese points, I use the coding speed test that was administered without incentives to NationalLongitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) participants. I suggest that due to its simplicityits scores may especially depend on individuals' test-taking motivation. I show that controllingfor conventional measures of cognitive skills, the coding speed scores are correlated with futureearnings of male NLSY participants. Moreover, the coding speed scores of highly motivated,though less educated, population (potential enlists to the armed forces) are higher than NLSYparticipants' scores. I then use controlled experiments to show that when no performance-basedincentives are provided, participants' characteristics, but not their cognitive skills, affect effortinvested in the coding speed test. Thus, participants with the same ability (measured by theirscores on an incentivized test) have significantly different scores on tests without performance-based incentives.

The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

Credit cycles in theory and experiment

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetricgame -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study itsevolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests itspredictions. The model provides conditions for the existence ofcredit markets and credit cycles. The theoretical predictions seemto be good approximations of the experimental results.

One, two, (three), infinity: Newspaper and lab beauty-contest experiments

"Beauty-contest" is a game in which participants have to choose, typically, a number in [0,100], the winner being the person whose number is closest to a proportion of the average of all chosen numbers. We describe and analyze Beauty-contest experiments run in newspapers in UK, Spain, and Germany and find stable patterns of behavior across them, despite the uncontrollability of these experiments. These results are then compared with lab experiments involving undergraduates and game theorists as subjects, in what must be one of the largest empirical corroborations of interactive behavior ever tried. We claim that all observed behavior, across a wide variety of treatments and subject pools, can be interpretedas iterative reasoning. Level-1 reasoning, Level-2 reasoning and Level-3 reasoning are commonly observed in all the samples, while the equilibrium choice (Level-Maximum reasoning) is only prominently chosen by newspaper readers and theorists. The results show the empirical power of experiments run with large subject-pools, and open the door for more experimental work performed on the rich platform offered by newspapers and magazines.

Econometrics and decision making: Effects of presentation mode

Much of empirical economics involves regression analysis. However, does thepresentation of results affect economists ability to make inferences for decision makingpurposes? In a survey, 257 academic economists were asked to make probabilisticinferences on the basis of the outputs of a regression analysis presented in a standardformat. Questions concerned the distribution of the dependent variable conditional onknown values of the independent variable. However, many respondents underestimateduncertainty by failing to take into account the standard deviation of the estimatedresiduals. The addition of graphs did not substantially improve inferences. On the otherhand, when only graphs were provided (i.e., with no statistics), respondents weresubstantially more accurate. We discuss implications for improving practice in reportingresults of regression analyses.

Entrepreneurial success and failure: Confidence and fallible judgement

Excess entry or the high failure rate of market-entry decisions is often attributed tooverconfidence exhibited by entreprene urs. We show analytically that whereas excess entryis an inevitable consequence of imperfect assessments of entrepreneurial skill, it does notimply overconfidence. Judgmental fallibility leads to excess entry even when everyone isunderconfident. Self-selection implies greater confidence (but not necessarilyoverconfidence) among those who start new businesses than those who do not and amongsuccessful entrants than failures. Our results question claims that entrepreneurs areoverconfident and emphasize the need to understand the role of judgmental fallibility inproducing economic outcomes.

Take-the-best and other simple strategies: Why and when they work 'well' in binary choice

The effectiveness of decision rules depends on characteristics of bothrules and environments. A theoretical analysis of environments specifiesthe relative predictive accuracies of the lexicographic rule 'take-the-best'(TTB) and other simple strategies for binary choice. We identify threefactors: how the environment weights variables; characteristics of choicesets; and error. For cases involving from three to five binary cues, TTBis effective across many environments. However, hybrids of equal weights(EW) and TTB models are more effective as environments become morecompensatory. In the presence of error, TTB and similar models do not predictmuch better than a naïve model that exploits dominance. We emphasizepsychological implications and the need for more complete theories of theenvironment that include the role of error.