993 resultados para Basel Committee on banking Supervision
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Item 1013-A, 1013-B (microfiche)
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"Serial no. 102-64."
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"February 26, 1991 ... April 23, 1991"--Vol. 1. "April 25, 1991 ... November 25, 1991"--Vol. 2.
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In the last few decades, banking has strongly internationalized and become more complex. Hence, bank supervision and regulation has taken global perspective, too. The most important international regulation are the Basel frameworks by the Basel committee on banking supervision. This study examines the effects of bank supervision and regulation, especially the Basel II, on bank risk and risk-taking. In order to separate and recognize the efficiency of these effects, the co-effects of many supervisory and regulatory tools together with other relevant factors must be taken into account. The focus of the study is on the effects of asymmetric information and banking procyclicality on the efficiency of the Basel II. This study tries to find an answer, if the Basel II, implemented in 2008, has decreased bank risk in banks of European Union member states. This study examines empirically, if the volatility on bank stock returns have changed after the implementation of the Basel II. Panel data consists of 62 bank stock returns, bank-specific variables, economic variables and variables concerning regulatory environment between 2003 and 2011. Fixed effects regression is used for panel data analysis. Results indicate that volatility on bank stock returns has increased after 2008 and the implementation of the Basel II. Result is statistically very significant and robustness has been verified in different model specifications. The result of this study contradicts with the goal of the Basel II about banking system stability. Banking procyclicality and wrong incentives for regulatory arbitrage under asymmetric information explained in theoretical part may explain this result. On the other hand, simultaneously with the implementation of the Basel II, the global financial crisis emerged and caused severe losses in banks and increased stock volatility. However, it is clear that supervision and regulation was unable to prevent the global financial crisis. After the financial crisis, supervision and regulation have been reformed globally. The main problems of the Basel II, examined in the theoretical part, have been recognized in order to prevent problems of procyclicality and wrong incentives in the future.
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Este trabalho é uma análise dos efeitos da implementação das últimas recomendações do Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) também conhecidas como o Basel III de 2010 que deverão ser faseadamente implementadas desde 1 de Janeiro de 2013 até 1 de Janeiro de 2019, no capital próprio dos bancos Portugueses. Neste trabalho assume-se que os ativos pesados pelo risco de 2012 mantêm-se constantes e o capital terá de ser aumentado segundo as recomendações ano após ano até ao fim de 2018. Com esta análise, pretende-se entender o nível de robustez do capital próprio dos bancos Portugueses e se os mesmos têm capital e reservas suficientes para satisfazer as recomendações de capital mínimo sugeridas pelo BCBS ou caso contrário, se necessitarão de novas injeções de capital ou terão de reduzir a sua atividade económica. O Basel III ainda não foi implementado em Portugal, pois a União Europeia está no processo de desenvolvimento e implementação do Credit Requirement Directive IV (CRD IV) que é uma recomendação que todos os bancos centrais dos países da zona Euro deverão impor aos respetivos bancos. Esta diretiva da União Europeia é baseada totalmente nas recomendações do Basel III e deverá ser implementada em 2014 ou nos anos seguintes. Até agora, os bancos Portugueses seguem um sistema com base no aviso 6/2010 do Banco de Portugal que recomenda o cálculo dos rácios core tier 1, tier 1 e tier 2 usando o método notações internas (IRB) de avaliação da exposição do banco aos riscos de crédito, operacional, etc. e onde os ativos ponderados pelo risco são calculados como 12,5 vezes o valor dos requisitos totais de fundos calculados pelo banco. Este método é baseado nas recomendações do Basel II que serão substituídas pelo Basel III. Dado que um dos principais motivos para a crise económica e financeira que assolou o mundo em 2007 foi a acumulação de alavancagem excessiva e gradual erosão da qualidade da base do capital próprio dos bancos, é importante analisar a posição dos bancos Portugueses, que embora não sejam muito grandes a nível global, controlam a economia do país. Espera-se que com a implementação das recomendações do Basel III não haja no futuro uma repetição dos choques sistémicos de 2007. Os resultados deste estudo usando o método padrão recomendado pelo BCBS mostram que de catorze bancos Portugueses incluídos neste estudo, apenas seis (BES, Montepio, Finantia, BIG, Invest e BIC) conseguem enquadrar nas recomendações mínimas do Basel III até 1-1- 2019 e alguns outros estão marginalmente abaixo dos rácios mínimos (CGD, Itaú e Crédito Agrícola).
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This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Item 1013-A, 1013-B (microfiche).
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"Serial no. 96-51."
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Mode of access: Internet.
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"Serial no. 96-65."
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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"Serial no. 96-69."
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"Serial no. 96-71."