The relationship between banking market competition and risk-taking: Do size and capitalization matter?

This paper addresses the effects of bank competition on the risk-taking behaviors of banks in 10 Latin American countries between 2003 and 2008. We conduct our empirical approach in two steps. First, we estimate the Boone indicator, which is a measure of competition. We then regress this measure and other explanatory variables on the banking "stability inefficiency" derived simultaneously from the estimation of a stability stochastic frontier. Unlike previous findings, this paper concludes that competition affects risk-taking behavior in a non-linear way as both high and low competition levels enhance financial stability, while we find the opposite effect for average competition. In addition, bank size and capitalization are essential factors in explaining this relationship. On the one hand, the larger a bank is, the more it benefits from competition. On the other hand, a greater capital ratio is advantageous for banks that operate in collusive markets, while capitalization only enhances the stability of larger banks under high and average competition. These results are of extreme importance when considering bank regulations, especially in light of the recent turmoil in the global financial markets. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Risk sharing with Multilateral Financial Institutions in infrastructure and energy project financing : effect on capital relief for commercial banks

(Matsukawa and Habeck, 2007) analyse the main instruments for risk mitigation in infrastructure financing with Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFIs). Their review coincided with the global financial crisis of 2007-08, and is highly relevant in current times considering the sovereign debt crisis, the lack of available capital and the increases in bank regulation in Western economies. The current macroeconomic environment has seen a slowdown in the level of finance for infrastructure projects, as they pose a higher credit risk given their requirements for long term investments. The rationale for this work is to look for innovative solutions that are focused on the credit risk mitigation of infrastructure and energy projects whilst optimizing the economic capital allocation for commercial banks. This objective is achieved through risk-sharing with MFIs and looking for capital relief in project finance transactions. This research finds out the answer to the main question: "What is the impact of risk-sharing with MFIs on project finance transactions to increase their efficiency and viability?", and is developed from the perspective of a commercial bank assessing the economic capital used and analysing the relevant variables for it: Probability of Default, Loss Given Default and Recovery Rates, (Altman, 2010). An overview of project finance for the infrastructure and energy sectors in terms of the volume of transactions worldwide is outlined, along with a summary of risk-sharing financing with MFIs. A review of the current regulatory framework beneath risk-sharing in structured finance with MFIs is also analysed. From here, the impact of risk-sharing and the diversification effect in infrastructure and energy projects is assessed, from the perspective of economic capital allocation for a commercial bank. CreditMetrics (J. P. Morgan, 1997) is applied over an existing well diversified portfolio of project finance infrastructure and energy investments, working with the main risk capital measures: economic capital, RAROC, and EVA. The conclusions of this research show that economic capital allocation on a portfolio of project finance along with risk-sharing with MFIs have a huge impact on capital relief whilst increasing performance profitability for commercial banks. There is an outstanding diversification effect due to the portfolio, which is combined with risk mitigation and an improvement in recovery rates through Partial Credit Guarantees issued by MFIs. A stress test scenario analysis is applied to the current assumptions and credit risk model, considering a downgrade in the rating for the commercial bank (lender) and an increase of default in emerging countries, presenting a direct impact on economic capital, through an increase in expected loss and a decrease in performance profitability. Getting capital relief through risk-sharing makes it more viable for commercial banks to finance infrastructure and energy projects, with the beneficial effect of a direct impact of these investments on GDP growth and employment. The main contribution of this work is to promote a strategic economic capital allocation in infrastructure and energy financing through innovative risk-sharing with MFIs and economic pricing to create economic value added for banks, and to allow the financing of more infrastructure and energy projects. This work suggests several topics for further research in relation to issues analysed. (Matsukawa and Habeck, 2007) analizan los principales instrumentos de mitigación de riesgos en las Instituciones Financieras Multilaterales (IFMs) para la financiación de infraestructuras. Su presentación coincidió con el inicio de la crisis financiera en Agosto de 2007, y sus consecuencias persisten en la actualidad, destacando la deuda soberana en economías desarrolladas y los problemas capitalización de los bancos. Este entorno macroeconómico ha ralentizado la financiación de proyectos de infraestructuras. El actual trabajo de investigación tiene su motivación en la búsqueda de soluciones para la financiación de proyectos de infraestructuras y de energía, mitigando los riesgos inherentes, con el objeto de reducir el consumo de capital económico en los bancos financiadores. Este objetivo se alcanza compartiendo el riesgo de la financiación con IFMs, a través de estructuras de risk-sharing. La investigación responde la pregunta: "Cuál es el impacto de risk-sharing con IFMs, en la financiación de proyectos para aumentar su eficiencia y viabilidad?". El trabajo se desarrolla desde el enfoque de un banco comercial, estimando el consumo de capital económico en la financiación de proyectos y analizando las principales variables del riesgo de crédito, Probability of Default, Loss Given Default and Recovery Rates, (Altman, 2010). La investigación presenta las cifras globales de Project Finance en los sectores de infraestructuras y de energía, y analiza el marco regulatorio internacional en relación al consumo de capital económico en la financiación de proyectos en los que participan IFMs. A continuación, el trabajo modeliza una cartera real, bien diversificada, de Project Finance de infraestructuras y de energía, aplicando la metodología CreditMet- rics (J. P. Morgan, 1997). Su objeto es estimar el consumo de capital económico y la rentabilidad de la cartera de proyectos a través del RAROC y EVA. La modelización permite estimar el efecto diversificación y la liberación de capital económico consecuencia del risk-sharing. Los resultados muestran el enorme impacto del efecto diversificación de la cartera, así como de las garantías parciales de las IFMs que mitigan riesgos, mejoran el recovery rate de los proyectos y reducen el consumo de capital económico para el banco comercial, mientras aumentan la rentabilidad, RAROC, y crean valor económico, EVA. En escenarios económicos de inestabilidad, empeoramiento del rating de los bancos, aumentos de default en los proyectos y de correlación en las carteras, hay un impacto directo en el capital económico y en la pérdida de rentabilidad. La liberación de capital económico, como se plantea en la presente investigación, permitirá financiar más proyectos de infraestructuras y de energía, lo que repercutirá en un mayor crecimiento económico y creación de empleo. La principal contribución de este trabajo es promover la gestión activa del capital económico en la financiación de infraestructuras y de proyectos energéticos, a través de estructuras innovadoras de risk-sharing con IFMs y de creación de valor económico en los bancos comerciales, lo que mejoraría su eficiencia y capitalización. La aportación metodológica del trabajo se convierte por su originalidad en una contribución, que sugiere y facilita nuevas líneas de investigación académica en las principales variables del riesgo de crédito que afectan al capital económico en la financiación de proyectos.

THE COSTS OF RAISING EQUITY RATIO FOR BANKS Evidence from publicly listed banks operating in Finland

The solvency rate of banks differs from the other corporations. The equity rate of a bank is lower than it is in corporations of other field of business. However, functional banking industry has huge impact on the whole society. The equity rate of a bank needs to be higher because that makes the banking industry more stable as the probability of the banks going under will decrease. If a bank goes belly up, the government will be compensating the deposits since it has granted the bank’s depositors a deposit insurance. This means that the payment comes from the tax payers in the last resort. Economic conversation has long concentrated on the costs of raising equity ratio. It has been a common belief that raising equity ratio also increases the banks’ funding costs in the same phase and these costs will be redistributed to the banks customers as higher service charges. Regardless of the common belief, the actual reaction of the funding costs to the higher equity ratio has been studied only a little in Europe and no study has been constructed in Finland. Before it can be calculated whether the higher stability of the banking industry that is caused by the raise in equity levels compensates the extra costs in funding costs, it must be calculated how much the actual increase in the funding costs is. Currently the banking industry is controlled by complex and heavy regulation. To maintain such a complex system inflicts major costs in itself. This research leans on the Modigliani and Miller theory, which shows that the finance structure of a firm is irrelevant to their funding costs. In addition, this research follows the calculations of Miller, Yang ja Marcheggianon (2012) and Vale (2011) where they calculate the funding costs after the doubling of specific banks’ equity ratios. The Finnish banks studied in this research are Nordea and Danske Bank because they are the two largest banks operating in Finland and they both also have the right company form to able the calculations. To calculate the costs of halving their leverages this study used the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The halving of the leverage of Danske Bank raised its funding costs for 16—257 basis points depending on the method of assessment. For Nordea the increase in funding costs was 11—186 basis points when its leverage was halved. On the behalf of the results found in this study it can be said that the doubling of an equity ratio does not increase the funding costs of a bank one by one. Actually the increase is quite modest. More solvent banks would increase the stability of the banking industry enormously while the increase in funding costs is low. If the costs of bank regulation exceeds the increase in funding costs after the higher equity ratio, it can be thought that this is the better way of stabilizing the banking industry rather than heavy regulation.

THE COSTS OF RAISING EQUITY RATIO FOR BANKS Evidence from publicly listed banks operating in Finland

The solvency rate of banks differs from the other corporations. The equity rate of a bank is lower than it is in corporations of other field of business. However, functional banking industry has huge impact on the whole society. The equity rate of a bank needs to be higher because that makes the banking industry more stable as the probability of the banks going under will decrease. If a bank goes belly up, the government will be compensating the deposits since it has granted the bank’s depositors a deposit insurance. This means that the payment comes from the tax payers in the last resort. Economic conversation has long concentrated on the costs of raising equity ratio. It has been a common belief that raising equity ratio also increases the banks’ funding costs in the same phase and these costs will be redistributed to the banks customers as higher service charges. Regardless of the common belief, the actual reaction of the funding costs to the higher equity ratio has been studied only a little in Europe and no study has been constructed in Finland. Before it can be calculated whether the higher stability of the banking industry that is caused by the raise in equity levels compensates the extra costs in funding costs, it must be calculated how much the actual increase in the funding costs is. Currently the banking industry is controlled by complex and heavy regulation. To maintain such a complex system inflicts major costs in itself. This research leans on the Modigliani and Miller theory, which shows that the finance structure of a firm is irrelevant to their funding costs. In addition, this research follows the calculations of Miller, Yang ja Marcheggianon (2012) and Vale (2011) where they calculate the funding costs after the doubling of specific banks’ equity ratios. The Finnish banks studied in this research are Nordea and Danske Bank because they are the two largest banks operating in Finland and they both also have the right company form to able the calculations. To calculate the costs of halving their leverages this study used the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The halving of the leverage of Danske Bank raised its funding costs for 16—257 basis points depending on the method of assessment. For Nordea the increase in funding costs was 11—186 basis points when its leverage was halved. On the behalf of the results found in this study it can be said that the doubling of an equity ratio does not increase the funding costs of a bank one by one. Actually the increase is quite modest. More solvent banks would increase the stability of the banking industry enormously while the increase in funding costs is low. If the costs of bank regulation exceeds the increase in funding costs after the higher equity ratio, it can be thought that this is the better way of stabilizing the banking industry rather than heavy regulation.

The impact of deregulation and re-regulation on bank efficiency: evidence from Asia

Following the 1997 crisis, banking sector reforms in Asia have been characterised by the emphasis on prudential regulation, associated with increased financial liberalisation. Using a panel data set of commercial banks from eight major Asian economies over the period 2001-2010, this study explores how the coexistence of liberalisation and prudential regulation affects banks’ cost characteristics. Given the presence of heterogeneity of technologies across countries, we use a stochastic frontier approach followed by the estimation of a deterministic meta-frontier to provide ‘true’ estimates of bank cost efficiency measures. Our results show that the liberalization of bank interest rates and the increase in foreign banks' presence have had a positive and significant impact on technological progress and cost efficiency. On the other hand, we find that prudential regulation might adversely affect bank cost performance. When designing an optimal regulatory framework, policy makers should combine policies which aim to foster financial stability without hindering financial intermediation.

Contagion and regulation in endogenous bank networks

We develop a simple model of endogenous bank networks to study financial contagion and how leverage regulation may affect it. Banks maximize expected profit by choosing the optimal allocation of resources between three different classes of assets. An interbank network arise as result of loans between banks, creating a direct channel of contagion in the financial system. Contagion may occur when the realized return of the risky asset is sufficiently low to make a bank insolvent, subsequently triggering a cascade effect that propagates through default in interbank loans. Contrary to what would be expected, our results show that despite forcing banks to deleverage, increasing minimum capital requirements may lead to a system with higher aggregate levels of default.

Brazil's derivatives markets: hedging, Central Bank intervention and regulation

Includes bibliography

Ordinances of the corporation of the city of Philadelphia; to which are prefixed, the original charter, the Act of incorporation, and other acts of Assembly relating to the city; with an appendix, containing the regulation of the bank of the river Delaware, the portraiture of the city, as originally laid out by the proprietor, &c. &c.

Shaw-Shoemaker #26440.