Gender norms in Portuguese college sudents' judgments in familial homicides: bad men and mad women

The gender of the offender has been proved to be an important factor in judicial sentencing. In this study, we analyze the judgments of College students regarding perpetrators of familial homicides to evaluate the presence of these gender norms and biases in the larger society. The sample included 303 college students (54.8% female) enrolled in several social sciences and engineering courses. Participants were asked to read 12 vignettes based on real crimes taken from Portuguese newspapers. Half were related to infanticide, and half were related to intimate partner homicide. The sex of the offender was orthogonally manipulated to the type of crime. The results show that gender had an important impact on sentences, with males being more harshly penalized by reasons of perversity and women less penalized by reason of mental disorders. In addition, filicide was more heavily penalized than was intimate partner homicide. The results also revealed a tendency toward a retributive conception of punishment. We discuss how gender norms in justice seem to be embedded in society as well as the need for intervention against the punitive tendency of this population.

The viking age: the early history, manners, and customs of the ancestors of the English speaking nations ... by Paul B. Du Chaillu ...

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The viking age: the early history, manners, and customs of the ancestors of the English speaking nations ... by Paul B. Du Chaillu ...

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Oraibi natal customs and ceremonies / by H. R. Voth. The Stanley McCormick Hopi expedition. George A Dorsey --

v.6:no.2(1905)

The Cultural Olympiad of Barcelona in 1992: Good points and bad points. Lessons for the Future

This text was presented at the Symposium “Olympic Arts and Culture Festivals: Recent Experiences and Future Design”, held in Chicago on the 23-24 June 2008. It provides with an analysis of good and bad points of the Cultural Olympiad of Barcelona’92 in order to discover, from that past experience, any lessons for future Cultural Olympiads and Olympic Movement cultural policy in general, as well as to rethink, in a critical way, Catalan cultural policies.

The Good, the Bad and the Populist: A Model of Political Agency with Emotional Voters

This paper attempts to extend existing models of political agency to an environment in which voting may be divided between informed and instrumental, informed and ‘expressive’ (Brennan and Lomasky (1993)) and uninformed due to ‘rational irrationality’ (Caplan (2007)). It constructs a model where politicians may be good, bad or populist. Populists are more willing than good politicians to pander to voters who may choose inferior policies in a large-group electoral setting because their vote is insignificant compared with those that voters would choose were their vote decisive in determining the electoral outcome. Bad politicians would ideally like to extract tax revenue for their own ends. Initially we assume the existence of only good and populist politicians. The paper investigates the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists and focuses on three key issues – (1) how far the majority of voter’s preferences are from those held by the better informed incumbent politician (2) the extent to which the population exhibits rational irrationality and expressiveness (jointly labelled as emotional) and (3) the cost involved in persuading uninformed voters to change their views in terms of composing messages and spreading them. This paper goes on to consider how the inclusion of bad politicians may affect the behaviour of good politicians and suggests that a small amount of potential corruption may be socially useful. It is also argued that where bad politicians have an incentive to mimic the behaviour of good and populist politicians, the latter types of politician may have an incentive to separate from bad politicians by investing in costly public education signals. The paper also discusses the implications of the model for whether fiscal restraints should be soft or hard.

Correlated equilibria, good and bad: an experimental study

We report results from an experiment that explores the empirical validity of correlated equilibrium, an important generalization of the Nash equilibrium concept. Specifically, we seek to understand the conditions under which subjects playing the game of Chicken will condition their behavior on private, third–party recommendations drawn from known distributions. In a “good–recommendations” treatment, the distribution we use is a correlated equilibrium with payoffs better than any symmetric payoff in the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoff vectors. In a “bad–recommendations” treatment, the distribution is a correlated equilibrium with payoffs worse than any Nash equilibrium payoff vector. In a “Nash–recommendations” treatment, the distribution is a convex combination of Nash equilibrium outcomes (which is also a correlated equilibrium), and in a fourth “very–good–recommendations” treatment, the distribution yields high payoffs, but is not a correlated equilibrium. We compare behavior in all of these treatments to the case where subjects do not receive recommendations. We find that when recommendations are not given to subjects, behavior is very close to mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium play. When recommendations are given, behavior does differ from mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium, with the nature of the differ- ences varying according to the treatment. Our main finding is that subjects will follow third–party recommendations only if those recommendations derive from a correlated equilibrium, and further, if that correlated equilibrium is payoff–enhancing relative to the available Nash equilibria.

No Good Deals - No Bad Models

Faced with the problem of pricing complex contingent claims, an investor seeks to make his valuations robust to model uncertainty. We construct a notion of a model- uncertainty-induced utility function and show that model uncertainty increases the investor's eff ective risk aversion. Using the model-uncertainty-induced utility function, we extend the \No Good Deals" methodology of Cochrane and Sa a-Requejo [2000] to compute lower and upper good deal bounds in the presence of model uncertainty. We illustrate the methodology using some numerical examples.

The NLRP3 inflammasome in health and disease: the good, the bad and the ugly.

While interleukin (IL)-1β plays an important role in combating the invading pathogen as part of the innate immune response, its dysregulation is responsible for a number of autoinflammatory disorders. Large IL-1β activating platforms, known as inflammasomes, can assemble in response to the detection of endogenous host and pathogen-associated danger molecules. Formation of these protein complexes results in the autocatalysis and activation of caspase-1, which processes precursor IL-1β into its secreted biologically active form. Inflammasome and IL-1β activity is required to efficiently control viral, bacterial and fungal pathogen infections. Conversely, excess IL-1β activity contributes to human disease, and its inhibition has proved therapeutically beneficial in the treatment of a spectrum of serious, yet relatively rare, heritable inflammasomopathies. Recently, inflammasome function has been implicated in more common human conditions, such as gout, type II diabetes and cancer. This raises the possibility that anti-IL-1 therapeutics may have broader applications than anticipated previously, and may be utilized across diverse disease states that are linked insidiously through unwanted or heightened inflammasome activity.

Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies

This paper addresses the puzzle of why legislation, even highly inefficient legislation, may pass with overwhelming majorities. We model a egislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by romising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because a ote in favor maintains the chance for membership in the minimum winning coalition in the future. The model thus generates situations in which egislators approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that enefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust: some institutional arrangements, such as super-majority rules or sequential voting, imit but do not eliminate the agenda setter's power to exploit the legislature, and other institutions such as secret voting do not limit his power.

Neither Bad Apple nor Bad Barrel: How the Societal Context Impacts Unethical Behavior in Organizations

Every time another corporate scandal captures media headlines, the 'bad apple vs. bad barrel' discussion starts anew. Yet this debate overlooks the influence of the broader societal context on organizational behavior. In this article, we argue that misbehaviors of organizations (the 'barrels') and their members (the 'apples') cannot be addressed properly without a clear understanding of their broader context (the 'larder'). Whereas previously, a strong societal framework dampened the practical application of the Homo economicus concept (business actors as perfectly rational and egocentric utility-maximizing agents without any moral concern), specialization, individualization and globalization led to a business world disembedded from broader societal norms. This emancipated business world promotes a literal interpretation of Homo economicus among business organizations and their members. Consequently, we argue that the first step toward 'healthier' apples and barrels is to sanitize the larder, that is, adapt the framework in which organizations and their members evolve.Chaque fois qu'un nouveau scandale fait la une des médias, la question de savoir si le problème se situe au niveau des individus (des 'pommes isolées') ou au niveau des organisations (les 'caisses de pommes') refait surface. Ce débat tend néanmoins à sous-estimer l'influence du contexte sociétal plus large sur le comportement dans les organisations. Dans cet article, nous soutenons l'idée que les scandales éthiques dans les organisations ou parmi leurs membres ne peuvent être compris correctement sans une vision plus précise de leur contexte plus large (la 'cave à pommes'). Si dans le passé un contexte sociétal fort permettait d'adoucir les applications pratiques de l'Homo economicus (qui considère l'acteur économique comme un agent parfaitement rationnel et égocentrique cherchant à maximiser son utilité sans réflexion morale), l'individualisation et la globalisation ont conduit à un monde économique désencastré et déconnecté des normes sociales plus larges. Ce monde économique autonome promouvoit une interprétation littérale de l'Homo economicus parmi les entreprises et leurs employés. Il en résulte que le premier pas vers des pommes moins pourries passe par un assainissement de la cave, c'est-à-dire l'adoption d'un cadre socio-normatif qui permet un recadrage du contexte dans lequel les organisations économiques et leurs acteurs agissent.