DSGE model with banking sector for emerging economies : estimated using Bayesian methodology for Brazil

Economias emergentes sofrem importantes restrições de crédito quando comparadas com economias desenvolvidas, entretanto, modelos estocásticos de equilíbrio geral (DSGE) desenhados para economias emergentes ainda precisam avançar nessa discussão. Nós propomos um modelo DSGE que pretende representar uma economia emergente com setor bancário baseado em Gerali et al. (2010). Nossa contribuição é considerar uma parcela da renda esperada como colateral para empréstimos das famílias. Nós estimamos o modelo proposto para o Brasil utilizando estimação Bayesiana e encontramos que economias que sofrem restrição de colateral por parte das famílias tendem a sentir o impacto de choques monetários mais rapidamente devido a exposição do setor bancário a mudanças no salário esperado.

The impact of privatisation on the banking sector in the Caribbean

Includes bibliography

A journey through the capital structure of the banking sector: Empirical evidence for Europe from 2008 to 2012

Systemic risk is the protagonist of the recent financial crisis. This thesis proposes a definition and a propagation mechanism for systemic risk. Risk management has a direct linkage with capital management, when addressing the question that the risk handled by a financial institution is compatible with the amount of equity available. This thesis proposes a risk management of liquid market variables, which compose the assets of a bank, based on the statistical tool of PCA. The principal component analysis will define the PCR, or Principal Components of Risk. Such definition of Risk will be adopted to test if the risk represented by PCR is explanatory of the movements of equity and/or debt for the banks included in the in the index Itraxx financial senior: the results of these regressions will be compared with a formal Capital Adequacy test in order to assess the financial soundness of the main financial European institutions.

Market discipline by depositors : impact of deposit insurance on the Indonesian banking sector

This paper investigates market discipline by depositors in the Indonesian banking sector. Does depositor discipline fulfill its role in Indonesia? Does deposit insurance affect depositor behavior thereby imposing discipline on banks? These questions are empirically examined using panel data on Indonesian commercial banks from 1998 to 2009. In Indonesia deposit insurance was introduced in 2005. Depositor discipline is examined by two measures: change in the amount of deposits and interest rate. The empirical results show that depositors pay attention to bank soundness and riskiness and select banks based on the bank's condition with particular attention paid to equity ratio. It is found that depositors impose discipline on banks, but it varies according to regulatory and economic circumstances.

Impact of foreign capital entry in the Indonesian banking sector

After the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, the Indonesian banking sector experienced significant changes. Ownership structure of banking sector is substantially-changed. Currently, ownership of major commercial banks is dominated by foreign capital through acquisition. This paper examines whether foreign ownership changes a bank’s lending behavior and performance. Foreign banks tend to lend mainly to large firms; this paper examines whether the credit to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is affected by foreign capital entry into the Indonesian banking sector. Empirical results show that banks owned by foreign capital tend to decrease SME credit.

Banking Sector Soundness, Innovation, and Development: Emerging Europe and South Asia. ACES Working Papers, 2012

While most academic and practitioner researchers agree that a country’s commercial banking sector’s soundness is a very significant indicator of a country’s financial market health, there is considerably less agreement and substantial confusion surrounding what constitutes a healthy bank in the aftermath of 2007+ financial crisis. Global banks’ balance sheets, corporate governance, management compensation and bonuses, toxic assets, and risky behavior are all under scrutiny as academics and regulators alike are trying to quantify what are “healthy, safe and good practices” for these various elements of banking. The current need to quantify, measure, evaluate, and compare is driven by the desire to spot troubled banks, “bad and risky” behavior, and prevent real damage and contagion in the financial markets, investors, and tax payers as it did in the recent crisis. Moreover, future financial crisis has taken on a new urgency as vast amounts of capital flows (over $1 trillion) are being redirected to emerging markets. This study differs from existing methods in the literature as it entail designing, constructing, and validating a critical dimension of financial innovation in respect to the eight developing countries in the South Asia region as well as eight countries in emerging Europe at the country level for the period 2001 – 2008, with regional and systemic differentials taken into account. Preliminary findings reveal that higher stages of payment systems development have generated efficiency gains by reducing the settlement risk and improving financial intermediation; such efficiency gains are viewed as positive financial innovations and positively impact the banking soundness. Potential EU candidate countries: Albania; Montenegro; Serbia

Restructuring the Greek banking sector with an empty purse. CEPS Commentary, 13 July 2015

Greek banks are close to collapse, even if a new bail-out programme is agreed soon. The deterioration of the economy means that their fragile capital position is deteriorating further. In this CEPS Commentary, Daniel Gros observes that any new programme needs to include recapitalisation, comprising possibly a bail-in and restructuring to get the banking system working again. With only a small part of the assets unencumbered and a government with empty pockets, the depositors might have to take a large part of the burden. As private investors are unlikely to participate in a recapitalisation, foreign official funds will be needed. A direct equity investment by the EIB or the EBRD could be used to transfer control rights, and special ESM bonds could be used to provide additional capital without entailing additional risk to the creditors

Conditional risk, return and contagion in the banking sector in Asia

This paper investigates risk and return in the banking sector in three Asian markets of Taiwan, China and Hong Kong. The study focuses on the risk-return relation in a conditional factor GARCH-M framework that controls for time-series effects. The factor approach is adopted to incorporate intra-industry contagion and an analysis of spillovers between large banks and small banks. Finally, the study provides evidence on these relations before and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The results are generally consistent across the markets and with expectations.

Human resource management and organizational performance:evidence from the retail banking sector

Underpinned by the resource-based view (RBV), social exchange theory (SET), and a theory of intrinsic motivation (empowerment), I proposed and tested a multi-level model that simultaneously examines the intermediate linkages or mechanisms through which HPWS impact individual and organizational performance. First and underpinned by RBV, I examined at the unit level, collective human capital and competitive advantage as path-ways through which the use of HPWS influences – branch market performance. Second and-, underpinned by social exchange (perceived organizational support) and intrinsic motivation (psychological empowerment) theories, I examined cross and individual level mechanisms through which experienced HPWS may influence employee performance. I tested the propositions of this study with multisource data obtained from junior and senior customer contact employees, and managers of 37 branches of two banks in Ghana. Results of the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) analysis revealed that (i) collective human capital partially mediated the relationship between management-rated HPWS and competitive advantage, while competitive advantage completely mediated the influence of human capital on branch market performance. Consequently, management-rated HPWS influenced branch market performance indirectly through collective human capital and competitive advantage. Additionally, results of hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) tests of the cross-level influences on the motivational implications of HPWS revealed that (i) management-rated HPWS influenced experienced HPWS; (ii) perceived organizational support (POS) and psychological empowerment fully mediated the influence of experienced HPWS on service-oriented organizational citizenship behaviour (OCB), and; (iii) service-oriented OCB mediated the influence of psychological empowerment and POS on service quality and task performance. I discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.

Does lending behaviour of banks in emerging economies vary by ownership? Evidence from the Indian banking sector

While much has been discussed about the relationship between ownership and financial performance of banks in emerging markets, literature about cross-ownership differences in credit market behaviour of banks in emerging economies is sparse. Using a portfolio choice model and bank-level data from India for 9 years (1995–96 to 2003–04), we examine banks’ behaviour in the context of credit markets of an emerging market economy. Our results indicate that, in India, the data for the domestic banks fit well the aforementioned portfolio-choice model, especially for private banks, but the model cannot explain the behaviour of foreign banks. In general, allocation of assets between risk-free government securities and risky credit is affected by past allocation patterns, stock exchange listing (for private banks), risk averseness of banks, regulations regarding treatment of NPA, and ability of banks to recover doubtful credit. It is also evident that banks deal with changing levels of systematic risk by altering the ratio of securitized to non-securitized credit.

How important is ownership in a market with a level playing field? The Indian banking sector revisited

Private ownership of firms is often argued to lead to better firm performance than public ownership. However, the theoretical literature and the empirical evidence indicate that agency problems may affect the performance of privately owned firms. At the same time, competition and hard budget constraints can induce state-owned firms to operate efficiently. In India, banking sector reforms and deregulation were initiated in 1992, encouraging entry and establishing a level playing field for all banks. Data for the financial years 1995–1996 through 2000–2001 suggest that, by 1999–2000, ownership was no longer a significant determinant of performance. Rather, competition induced public-sector banks to eliminate the performance gap that existed between them and both domestic and foreign private-sector banks.

The value of risk reporting:a critical analysis of value-at-risk disclosures in the banking sector

This paper critically reviews the evolution of financial reporting in the banking sector with specific reference to the reporting of market risk and the growing use of the measure known as Value at Risk (VaR). The paper investigates the process by which VaR became 'institutionalised'. The analysis highlights a number of inherent limitations of VaR as a risk measure and questions the usefulness of published VaR disclosures, concluding that risk 'disclosure' might be more apparent than real. It also looks at some of the implications for risk reporting practice and the accounting profession more generally.

The paradoxes of risk management in the banking sector

This paper uses empirical evidence to examine the operational dynamics and paradoxical nature of risk management systems in the banking sector. It demonstrates how a core paradox of market versus regulatory demands and an accompanying variety of performance, learning and belonging paradoxes underlie evident tensions in the interaction between front and back office staff in banks. Organisational responses to such paradoxes are found to range from passive to proactive, reflecting differing organisational, departmental and individual risk culture(s), and performance management systems. Nonetheless, a common feature of regulatory initiatives designed to secure a more structurally independent risk management function is that they have failed to rectify a critical imbalance of power - with the back office control functions continuing to be dominated by front office trading and investment functions. Ultimately, viewing the 'core' of risk management systems as a series of connected paradoxes rather than a set of assured, robust practices, requires a fundamental switch in emphasis away from a normative, standards-based approach to risk management to one which gives greater recognition to its behavioural dimensions.