Market Power in the Spanish Electricity Auction

Published as an article in: Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2010, vol. 37, issue 1, pages 42-69.

Asynchronous Auction for Distributed Nonlinear Resource Allocation Problem

Resource Allocation Problems (RAPs) are concerned with the optimal allocation of resources to tasks. Problems in fields such as search theory, statistics, finance, economics, logistics, sensor & wireless networks fit this formulation. In literature, several centralized/synchronous algorithms have been proposed including recently proposed auction algorithm, RAP Auction. Here we present asynchronous implementation of RAP Auction for distributed RAPs.

Auction of financial transmission rights in electricity market environment

An auction model is used to increase the individual profits for market players with products they do not use. A Financial Transmission Rights Auction has the goal of trade transmission rights between Bidders and helps them raise their own profits. The ISO plays a major rule on keep the system in technical limits without interfere on the auctions offers. In some auction models the ISO decide want bids are implemented on the network, always with the objective maximize the individual profits for all bidders in the auction. This paper proposes a methodology for a Financial Transmission Rights Auction and an informatics application. The application receives offers from the purchase and sale side and considers bilateral contracts as Base Case. This goal is maximize the individual profits within the system in their technical limits. The paper includes a case study for the 30 bus IEEE test case.

Broadside advertising a Real Estate Auction in the Village of Niagara Falls [New York], July, 1836.

Benjamin Rathburn (1790-1873) was a builder, banker and hotel-keeper who was well-known for his work in the development and expansion of Buffalo in the 1830s. He also conducted business in the Village of Niagara Falls. He purchased large tracts of land (largely on credit) with the intent to sell the land at a profit. However, the sales did not meet his expectations and Rathburn found himself over-extended on credit, ultimately leading to his financial ruin.Jesse P. Haines (1793-1877) was an American cartographer who is credited with mapping the Villages of Lockport and Niagara Falls, New York.

Broadside advertising a Real Estate Auction in the Village of Niagara Falls [New York], July, 1836.

Benjamin Rathburn (1790-1873) was a builder, banker and hotel-keeper who was well-known for his work in the development and expansion of Buffalo in the 1830s. He also conducted business in the Village of Niagara Falls. He purchased large tracts of land (largely on credit) with the intent to sell the land at a profit. However, the sales did not meet his expectations and Rathburn found himself over-extended on credit, ultimately leading to his financial ruin. Jesse P. Haines (1793-1877) was an American cartographer who is credited with mapping the Villages of Lockport and Niagara Falls, New York.

Notice from the Crown Lands Department of Ottawa that the lands on Long Point, Lake Erie would be offered at public auction on May 4, 1866

Notice from the Crown Lands Department of Ottawa that the lands on Long Point, Lake Erie would be offered at public auction on May 4, 1866. This is attached to a small newspaper clipping with the same information, dated April 20, 1866.

Clipping advertising the auction to be held at 28 College Street in Toronto, Ontario

Clipping advertising the auction to be held at 28 College Street in Toronto, Ontario, April 1939.

Catalogue of items from Devaux [DeVeaux] Hall to be sold in Toronto at auction

Catalogue of items from Devaux [DeVeaux] Hall to be sold in Toronto at auction on April 24-26, 1939. The list of items included items such as lamps, curtain rods, furniture, original art, vases, kitchen items and books. The auction was held in 6 sessions over a 3 day period. There were 855 items listed in the 45 page catalogue. The auction was put on by Ward-Price Auctioneers of Toronto, Apr. 1939.

Auction Sale Notice

Auction Sale notice concerning a brick and stone carpenter shop; a frame wheel-house building and a stone machine shop building all located on Cascade Street in Niagara Falls, Ontario. The Superintendent of the State Reservation at Niagara is listed as Thomas W. Welch. The names Thomas Dolphin – Suspension Bridge; W.A. Frazer – Suspension Bridge; Alice L. [illegible] – Niagara Falls and James C. [illegible] are written on the notice in blue pencil. There is a tear at the top of the notice and wear along the sides. Text is not affected. The item is slightly discoloured and mounted on cardboard, 28 cm x 20 cm, January 27, 1886.

Corruption and individual ethics: insights from a public procurement auction

This article proposes an auction model where two firms compete for obtaining the license for a public project and an auctioneer acting as a public official representing the political power, decides the winner of the contest. Players as firms face a social dilemma in the sense that the higher is the bribe offered, the higher would be the willingness of a pure monetary maximizer public official to give her the license. However, it implies inducing a cost of reducing all players’ payoffs as far as our model includes an endogenous externality, which depends on bribe. All players’ payoffs decrease with the bribe (and increase with higher quality). We find that the presence of bribe aversion in either the officials’ or the firms’ utility function shifts equilibrium towards more pro-social behavior. When the quality and bribe-bid strategy space is discrete, multiple equilibria emerge including more pro-social bids than would be predicted under a continuous strategy space.