RE Kevin and the right of transsexual persons to marry in Australia

This article considers the decision of the Family Court of Australia in Re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of a Transsexual) [2001] FamCA 1074, which was upheld by the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in February 2003. Re Kevin was the first case in Australia to deal directly with the question of whether a transsexual person could marry under Australian law. In the past, Australia had adhered to the judgement of Ormrod J in Corbett v Corbett [1971] P. 83, which set the benchmark for what is ‘male’ and what is ‘female’ under the common law. Prior to Re Kevin the question of what is a man and what is a woman for the purposes of marriage in Australia mirrored the strict biological test established in Corbett. In other words, the Australian courts relied upon biological factors, as espoused by Ormrod J, when determining a person's true sex. In Re Kevin, Chisholm J examined in detail what it is to be a man or woman, but unlike Ormrod J considered ‘brain sex’ to have a significant impact on a person's view of their own innate sexual identity. The Full Court of the Family Court agreed with the powerful and well-reasoned judgement of Chisholm J at first instance.

Preventative detention and the right of personal liberty and security under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966

Preventive detention enables a person to be deprived of liberty, by executive determination, for the purposes of safeguarding national security or public order without that person being charged or brought to trial. This paper examines Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 to assess whether preventive detention is prohibited by the phrase 'arbitrary arrest and detention '. To analyse this Article, this paper uses a textual and structural analysis of the Article, as well as reference to the travaux preparatoires and case law of the Human Rights Committee. This paper argues that preventive detention is not explicitly prohibited by Article 9(1) ofthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. If preventive detention is 'arbitrary', within the wide interpretation of that term as argued in this paper, it will be a permissible deprivation of personal liberty under Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. Preventive detention will, however, always be considered 'arbitrary' if sajeguards for those arrested and detained are not complied with, in particular the right to judicial review of the lawfulness of detention.

No more!: the right of women to live a life free of violence in Latin America and the Caribbean

Includes bibliography

The right of children and adolescents to a healthy environment. A diagnosis from Latin America and the Caribbean

Healthy environment: unresolved debts that affect childhood and adolescenceIn this new edition, we point out the right of children and adolescents to live in a healthy environment with emphasis on adequate access to drinking water and sanitation, including diagnosis as well as policy perspective. It is our contribution to the challenges set out by the Millennium Development Goals and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.