INFO6003 (2013) Crowds: Anonymity for Web Transactions -- Paper

This is the original Crowds paper from Reiter and Rubin. Please consider it required reading.

Obfuscation and Strict Online Anonymity

I consider the case for genuinely anonymous web searching. Big data seems to have it in for privacy. The story is well known, particularly since the dawn of the web. Vastly more personal information, monumental and quotidian, is gathered than in the pre-digital days. Once gathered it can be aggregated and analyzed to produce rich portraits, which in turn permit unnerving prediction of our future behavior. The new information can then be shared widely, limiting prospects and threatening autonomy. How should we respond? Following Nissenbaum (2011) and Brunton and Nissenbaum (2011 and 2013), I will argue that the proposed solutions—consent, anonymity as conventionally practiced, corporate best practices, and law—fail to protect us against routine surveillance of our online behavior. Brunton and Nissenbaum rightly maintain that, given the power imbalance between data holders and data subjects, obfuscation of one’s online activities is justified. Obfuscation works by generating “misleading, false, or ambiguous data with the intention of confusing an adversary or simply adding to the time or cost of separating good data from bad,” thus decreasing the value of the data collected (Brunton and Nissenbaum, 2011). The phenomenon is as old as the hills. Natural selection evidently blundered upon the tactic long ago. Take a savory butterfly whose markings mimic those of a toxic cousin. From the point of view of a would-be predator the data conveyed by the pattern is ambiguous. Is the bug lunch or potential last meal? In the light of the steep costs of a mistake, the savvy predator goes hungry. Online obfuscation works similarly, attempting for instance to disguise the surfer’s identity (Tor) or the nature of her queries (Howe and Nissenbaum 2009). Yet online obfuscation comes with significant social costs. First, it implies free riding. If I’ve installed an effective obfuscating program, I’m enjoying the benefits of an apparently free internet without paying the costs of surveillance, which are shifted entirely onto non-obfuscators. Second, it permits sketchy actors, from child pornographers to fraudsters, to operate with near impunity. Third, online merchants could plausibly claim that, when we shop online, surveillance is the price we pay for convenience. If we don’t like it, we should take our business to the local brick-and-mortar and pay with cash. Brunton and Nissenbaum have not fully addressed the last two costs. Nevertheless, I think the strict defender of online anonymity can meet these objections. Regarding the third, the future doesn’t bode well for offline shopping. Consider music and books. Intrepid shoppers can still find most of what they want in a book or record store. Soon, though, this will probably not be the case. And then there are those who, for perfectly good reasons, are sensitive about doing some of their shopping in person, perhaps because of their weight or sexual tastes. I argue that consumers should not have to pay the price of surveillance every time they want to buy that catchy new hit, that New York Times bestseller, or a sex toy.

An anonymity revocation technology for anonymous communication

A number of privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) have been proposed in the last three decades offering unconditional communication anonymity to their users. Unconditional anonymity can, however, be a security threat because it allows users to employ a PET in order to act maliciously while hiding their identity. In the last few years, several technologies which revoke the identity of users who use PETs have been proposed. These are known as anonymity revocation technologies (ARTs). However, the construction of ARTs has been developed in an ad hoc manner without a theoretical basis outlining the goals and underlying principles. In this chapter we present a set of fundamental principles and requirements for construction of an ART, identifying the necessary features. We then propose an abstract scheme for construction of an ART based on these features.

Efficient web browsing with perfect anonymity using page prefetching

Anonymous web browsing is a hot topic with many potential applications for privacy reasons. The current dominant strategy to achieve anonymity is packet padding with dummy packets as cover traffic. However, this method introduces extra bandwidth cost and extra delay. Therefore, it is not practical for anonymous web browsing applications. In order to solve this problem, we propose to use the predicted web pages that users are going to access as the cover traffic rather than dummy packets. Moreover, we defined anonymity level as a metric to measure anonymity degrees, and established a mathematical model for anonymity systems, and transformed the anonymous communication problem into an optimization problem. As a result, users can find tradeoffs among anonymity level and cost. With the proposed model, we can describe and compare our proposal and the previous schemas in a theoretical style. The preliminary experiments on the real data set showed the huge potential of the proposed strategy in terms of resource saving.

Improvement of DDoS attack detection and web access anonymity

The thesis has covered a range of algorithms that help to improve the security of web services. The research focused on the problems of DDoS attack and traffic analysis attack against service availability and information privacy respectively. Finally, this research significantly advantaged DDoS attack detection and web access anonymity.

Beyond anonymity and the every-day: celebrity and the capture of educational leadership

This conceptual paper traces the development of the culture and capture of celebrity in the field of educational leadership. Drawing on Rojek’s (Celebrity. London: Reaktion Books, 2001) typology of celebrity, we examine the emergence of celebrity of leadership that is activated via the current policy environment that compels schools and school leaders to be recognised and well-known. It is this well-knownness that subsequently contributes to the school as a marketable commodity that “people like us” desire. We highlight the complex convergence of these two phenomena in our reading of the independent school sector in Victoria (Australia).

Payone : incentive for epidemic protocol-based anonymity system

Anonymity systems maintain the anonymity of communicating nodes by camouflaging them, either with peer nodes generating dummy traffic or with peer nodes participating in the actual communication process. The probability of any adversary breaking down the anonymity of the communicating nodes is inversely proportional to the number of peer nodes participating in the network. Hence to maintain the anonymity of the communicating nodes, a large number of peer nodes are needed. Lack of peer availability weakens the anonymity of any large scale anonymity system. This work proposes PayOne, an incentive based scheme for promoting peer availability. PayOne aims to increase the peer availability by encouraging nodes to participate in the anonymity system by awarding them with incentives and thereby promoting the anonymity strength. Existing incentive schemes are designed for single path based approaches. There is no incentive scheme for multipath based or epidemic based anonymity systems. This work has been specifically designed for epidemic protocols and has been implemented over MuON, one of the latest entries to the area of multicasting based anonymity systems. MuON is a peer-to-peer based anonymity system which uses epidemic protocol for data dissemination. Existing incentive schemes involve paying every intermediate node that is involved in the communication between the initiator and the receiver. These schemes are not appropriate for epidemic based anonymity systems due to the incurred overhead. PayOne differs from the existing schemes because it involves paying a single intermediate node that participates in the network. The intermediate node can be any random node that participates in the communication and does not necessarily need to lie in the communication path between the initiator and the receiver. The light-weight characteristics of PayOne make it viable for large-scale epidemic based anonymity systems.

Virtues and Perils of Anonymity: Should Intermediaries Bear the Burden?

On October 10, 2013, the Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) handed down a judgment (Delfi v. Estonia) condoning Estonia for a law which, as interpreted, held a news portal liable for the defamatory comments of its users. Amongst the considerations that led the Court to find no violation of freedom of expression in this particular case were, above all, the inadequacy of the automatic screening system adopted by the website and the users’ option to post their comments anonymously (i.e. without need for prior registration via email), which in the Court’s view rendered the protection conferred to the injured party via direct legal action against the authors of the comments ineffective. Drawing on the implications of this (not yet final) ruling, this paper discusses a few questions that the tension between the risk of wrongful use of information and the right to anonymity generates for the development of Internet communication, and examines the role that intermediary liability legislation can play to manage this tension.