The Treaty of Lisbon or intergovernmental temptation?

From the Introduction. This question goes to the very heart of the European project: it is fundamental for the future of the European Union and its role in the world. The Treaty of Lisbon emerged from the ashes of the European Constitution. Driven forward by Angela Merkel, as President of the European Council, Nicolas Sarkozy and José Manuel Barroso, the main advances made in the Constitution were preserved at the expense of a few concessions and symbolic sacrifices in order to make the Union more effective and more democratic.

Stigmatisation of EU mobile citizens: a ticking time bomb for the European project. EPC Commentary, 24 January 2014

The 2013 European Year of Citizens was profoundly marked by escalating attacks against one of the EU’s major achievement for EU citizens: freedom of movement. In April 2013, Home Affairs Ministers from Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK were party to a letter claiming that “a significant number of new immigrants draw social assistance in the host countries, frequently without genuine entitlement, burdening host societies’ social welfare systems”. This letter laid the groundwork for a “battle plan”, presented by David Cameron in November, which aimed to make the free movement of persons “less free” and put forward the idea of capping “EU migration”. Furthermore, in December, the German conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) took up a similar petty political discourse. After the end of the transitional period for Romania and Bulgaria on 1 January 2014, the debate continues with Chuka Umunna (British Labour Party) proposing to restrict the freedom of movement to highly skilled EU citizens and to citizens in possession of a firm job offer. Alongside this, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel announced the formation of a committee to investigate “poverty migration” in Germany. This wave of resentment has been more recently followed by the UK Prime Minister David Cameron, expressing his intention to re-negotiate EU law in order to be able to withdraw child benefits from EU citizens working in the UK, citing Polish citizens working in the UK as an example. Seeing this as a stigmatisation of the Polish population, the Polish foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, qualified Cameron’s discourse as “unacceptable”. The debate over limiting freedom of movement has continuously escalated and reached a worrying level. With the EP elections approaching in May 2014, this debate is likely to become worse.

The strength of the Christian Democrats, the weakness of the opposition. Germany before the parliamentary elections. OSW Commentary No. 114, 12.09.2013

The political campaign before Germany’s parliamentary elections to be held on 22 September has in all its glory reflected the trends visible during the last four years of the government of Chancellor Angela Merkel – the strength of the Christian Democrats, the weakness of the opposition and the increasing marginalisation of the coalition partner, the FDP. The CDU/CSU remains the most popular political choice in Germany, largely because Angela Merkel has consistently remained the most popular German politician. Everything indicates that the CDU/CSU will win the election, even though it has been running a passive campaign and the Chancellor herself has been avoiding confrontation, presenting herself as a kind of cross-party representative of the interests of all social groups. The Christian Democrats’ main competitors, the Social Democrats, have been unable to play to their strengths and present themselves as a serious alternative to the CDU/CSU. The Christian Democrats, despite their difficult cooperation with the liberal FDP, have declared their willingness to continue doing so during the next parliamentary term. If the numbers make that impossible, and the Social Democrats and the Greens have too few votes to be able to form a government, a grand coalition of the Christian Democrats and the SPD will be formed in Germany.

Forerunners or scaremongers? Germany to abandon nuclear power. OSW Commentary No. 58, 2011-07-21

The German government’s final decision to abandon nuclear power as of 2022 has been expected for months. However, instead of calming the waters, providing solutions and answering the question ‘What next?’, it has only fanned the flames. Even the adoption of legal amendments enforcing the government’s decision by the German parliament (both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) in late June and early July has not calmed the situation. It is more than apparent that these decisions have been made under emotional pressure: there was not enough time for accurate calculations to be made and consideration to be given to the consequences of Germany abandoning nuclear power. Chancellor Angela Merkel has so far been unable to fully convince the public that the ‘energy shift is a huge opportunity’ and that this process will be carried out on condition that ‘the supplies remain secure, the climate protected and the whole process economically efficient’1. German economic associations have warned against a politically motivated, ill-judged and irreversible abandonment of nuclear energy. They are anxious about an increase in electricity prices, the instability of supplies and environmental damage. The government believes, however, that green technologies will become a new driving force for the German economy and its main export commodity. Before that happens the industry will have to increase its use of electricity produced from fossil fuels, mainly natural gas imported from Russia. This may be exploited by Gazprom which will try to strengthen its position on the German market, and thus in the entire EU.

Political economy of the Agenda 2010 reforms: How Gerhard Schröder overcame the "blocked republic". ACES Cases No. 2008.3

This essay will show that the Schröder-led government managed to break the political gridlock and introduce the Agenda 2010 because key institutional structures of Germany‟s political economy had lost their obstructive powers. In other words, the formerly semi-sovereign state had reclaimed its sovereignty. To understand how this happened, Peter Katzenstein's concept of the semi-sovereign state is first explored as a framework through which to analyze economic policy continuity and change. Within this framework, the causes for constant reform inertia between 1982 and 2002, in spite of varying political constellations and changes in the country‟s economic structure, are then discussed. This analysis will demonstrate that the Agenda 2010 reforms are predominantly a result of underlying incremental change in the political economy and its effect on the political decision-making process. Finally, the findings of this analysis are summarized and discussed with the aim of better understanding the economic policies of the current grand coalition government of the CDU/CSU and the SPD government under Chancellor Angela Merkel.

Germany in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: a political or a humanitarian mission? OSW Commentary No. 163, 2015-02-18

Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, profound changes in Germany’s thinking about Russia, its political elite and foreign policy, can be observed. The trust most German politicians had in their former strategic partner has now lessened. At the same time, Germany has been particularly involved in the process of resolving the conflict, which was demonstrated by the intensive diplomatic actions it undertook. When these failed, Chancellor Angela Merkel did not hesitate to force through the introduction and maintenance of economic sanctions. At the same time, however, this evolution in Germany’s thinking about Russia has not translated into any change in the two basic assumptions of the German attitude towards a possible solution to the conflict. First, Germany supports the concept of ‘strategic patience’ in politics in the context of Russia’s aggression. Second, it is convinced that Europe is fated to cooperate with the Russian Federation, and Europe’s welfare and security are only possible with Russia as a partner in cooperation, not against it or without it. Therefore, in the immediate future no radical change in Germany’s policy as pursued so far should be expected. This provokes questions concerning not only the effectiveness of Berlin’s current actions, but also – in a broader sense – Germany’s ability to negotiate and achieve real, political solutions to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, reaching beyond (another) ceasefire. The Minsk agreements of 12 February can be considered a success worthy of a humanitarian mission carried out in the hope of reducing the number of casualties. However, the political mission undertaken by Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier aimed at “ensuring Europe’s security order”[1] has so far resulted in the sense of helplessness and frustration which have recently dominated Germany’s policy towards Russia[2].

A little discourse on method(s). European Policy Brief No. 2, June 2011

Especially after the entry into force and subsequent implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the traditional distinction (and opposition) between the so-called 'community' and 'inter-governmental' methods in EU policy-making is less and less relevant. Most common policies entail a 'mix' between them and different degrees of mutual contamination. Even the 'Union method' recently proposed by Chancellor Angela Merkel raises more questions than it solves – although it may trigger a constructive debate on how best to address today's policy challenges.

The New European Commission Presidency and the Advent of European Democracy. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 17, August 2014

On June 15, 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, the lead candidate of the European People’s Party, was elected President of the European Commission, with the support of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and some of the European Socialists and Greens. Amid unprecedented Euroscepticism, the media and many pundits predicted a record-low voter turnout and record-high results for Europhobic parties. The aforementioned parties then decided that the political outcome of these 2014 European elections would also be unprecedented. For the first time in EU history, the European political parties agreed to nominate candidates to chair the institution, which they justified by putting forward Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament has often characteristically used political discourse - the logos, to influence the EU’s institutional framework, even though it entails grappling with Member States. It took the form of reports and resolutions, like the official use of the phrase “European Parliament” in 1962, direct universal suffrage elections in 1975 and a European Union in 1984. Nominating contenders to chair the European Commission is no exception. It requires a specific political discourse whose origins can be traced back to the early years of the European Parliament, when it was still the “Common Assembly”. This political discourse is one of the elements thanks to which the European Parliament acquired visibility and new prerogatives, in pursuit of its legitimacy. However, the executive branch in all member states is not intent on yielding such prerogatives to the European Parliament. As a matter of fact, the European Parliament has often ended up strengthening the heads of state and governments, since MEPs are forced to resort to self-discipline. The symbolic significance of its logos and, consequently, its own politicisation as a source of legitimacy, is thus undermined. For instance, in 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker’s election actually strengthened German Chancellor Angela Merkel. First she questioned the fact that the candidate whose party holds the parliamentary majority after the election should be appointed President of the Commission. Then she seemed strongly intent on democratising the Union, when she confronted David Cameron, who openly opposed Juncker, believed to be too federalist and old-fashioned a candidate. By doing so, she eventually reduced the symbolic dimension of the European Parliament’s initiative, and Juncker’s election. She also unquestionably embodied EU leadership. This paper aims at analysing Juncker’s election to the Presidency of the European Commission, as well as other questions it raises. In the first part, I lay out some thoughts about the sociohistorical context of voting in European elections in order to make the readers understand why the European Parliament should be bolder. Secondly, I try to explain how the European Parliament has used the logos as a weapon to grapple with member states for more power, as was the case during the 2014 European elections. Last but not least, I seek to show how Angela Merkel got hold of that weapon and took advantage of it, thus proving that despite MEPs’ best efforts, Juncker’s task will be all the more complicated as he was not the consensual candidate of all the governments.

Europe's refugee/migrant crisis: can 'illiberal' Turkey save 'liberal Europe' while helping Syrian refugees? EPC Policy Brief, 19 February 2016

Turkish democracy today has lost much of its shine. As the Turkish government continues to backtrack on reforms and infringe on basic freedoms, the country is beginning to look more and more like an ‘illiberal democracy’ at best. Ironically, as one of the most important destination and transit countries for Syrian refugees, it is also still uniquely positioned to help the EU deal with the current refugee crisis. In November 2015, the EU and Turkey signed a Joint Action Plan to better manage the situation, but both parties have fallen short of their promises. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, one of the biggest supporters of closer EU-Turkey cooperation, had hoped that this would allow for the refugees to be admitted into Europe in a more controlled and orderly manner. But it seems she is standing alone in a Europe that is becoming increasingly more hostile towards newcomers, drifting further and further from the liberal values it stands for. In this Policy Brief, Kemal Kirişci discusses the ways in which Turkey, Germany and the EU in general could all benefit from closer cooperation on this issue: “With the right frame of mind and will, the current ‘illiberal Turkey’ could indeed help ‘liberal Europe’. In the long run this would be a ‘win-win’ for Germany, Turkey, and the EU – but most importantly, for the Syrian refugees.”

Germany at a crossroads:the gathering crisis sharpens

In our book, The Gathering Crisis: The 2005 Federal Election and the Grand Coalition (Miskimmon et al, 2009), we argued that the German political and economic systems faced a number of serious challenges. The resource crunch in public finances has been particularly problematic in a country used to consensus politics- money had previously been used to oil the wheels of German federalism (and European integration). In the light of recent events- the global financial crisis, the Eurozone crisis, the 2009 federal election- we claim that the crisis in the German political economy has sharpened. The task of Angela Merkel and subsequent chancellors will be to navigate the new era, ensuring that Germany remains a leading political and economic power in the European Union and beyond. © 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

Przestrzeń możliwości według Haralda Welzera

Recenzja wydanej w 2013 roku pracy niemieckiego psychologa społecznego Haralda Welzera „Selbst Denken. Eine Anleitung zum Widerstand”. Welzer opisuje zachodni ekspansywny modelu rozwoju i poddaje go radykalnej krytyce. Psycholog twierdzi, że dotarł on do kresu swoich możliwości oraz przyczynił się do wybuchu wielu współczesnych kryzysów. Zdaniem Welzera sposób rozwiązywania najważniejszych kryzysów: finansowego, demograficznego, surowcowego i ekologicznego polega dziś głównie na prostym przestawieniu się z eksploatowania przestrzeni (Die Ausbeutung des Raumes) na eksploatowanie przyszłości (Die Ausbeutung des Zukunft). W recenzji pracy poruszone zostały zagadnienia takie jak: niewydolność tradycyjnych instytucji politycznych i społecznych, zmuszających jednostkę do wypracowania indywidualnej „polityki życia” – strategii przetrwania w coraz bardziej nieprzyjaznej rzeczywistości; dychotomia między wzrostem gospodarczym jako zmianą ilościową a rozwojem społecznym jako zmianą jakościową; polityka gabinetu Angeli Merkel, a także jej krytyka ze strony niemieckich intelektualistów; rola Niemiec w czasie kryzysu w Unii Europejskiej.

Germany’s ‘refugee’ problem. The most important test for Chancellor Merkel and the grand coalition. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 182/11.09.2015 2015-09-11

The rapid increase in the number of immigrants from outside of the EU coming to Germany has become the paramount political issue. According to new estimates, the number of individuals expected arrive in Germany in 2015 and apply for asylum there is 800,000, which is nearly twice as many as estimated in earlier forecasts. Various administrative, financial and social problems related to the influx of migrants are becoming increasingly apparent. The problem of ‘refugees’ (in public debate, the terms ‘immigrants’, ‘refugees’, ‘illegal immigrants’, ‘economic immigrants’ have not been clearly defined and have often been used interchangeably) has been culminating for over a year. Despite this, it was being disregarded by Angela Merkel’s government which was preoccupied with debates on how to rescue Greece. It was only daily reports of cases of refugee centres being set on fire that convinced Chancellor Merkel to speak and to make immigration problem a priority issue (Chefsache). Neither the ruling coalition nor the opposition parties have a consistent idea of how Germany should react to the growing number of refugees. In this matter, divisions run across parties. Various solutions have been proposed, from liberalisation of laws on the right to stay in Germany to combating illegal immigration more effectively, which would be possible if asylum granting procedures were accelerated. The proposed solutions have not been properly thought through, instead they are reactive measures inspired by the results of opinion polls. This is why their assumptions are often contradictory. The situation is similar regarding the actions proposed by Chancellor Merkel which involve faster procedures to expel individuals with no right to stay in Germany and a plan to convince other EU states to accept ‘refugees’. None of these ideas is new – they were already present in the German internal debate.

CDKN2A is not the principal target of deletions on the short arm of chromosome 9 in neuroendocrine (Merkel cell) carcinoma of the skin

The majority of small-cell lung cancers (SCLCs) express p16 but not pRb. Given our previous study showing loss of pRb in Merkel cell carcinoma (MCC)/neuroendocrine carcinoma of the skin and the clinicopathological similarities between SCLC and MCC, we wished to determine if this was also the case in MCC. Twenty-nine MCC specimens from 23 patients were examined for deletions at 10 loci on 9p and 1 on 9q. No loss of heterozygosity (LOH) was seen in 9 patients including 2 for which tumour and cell line DNAs were examined. Four patients had LOH for all informative loci on 9p. Ten tumours showed more limited regions of loss on 9p, and from these 2 common regions of deletion were determined. Half of all informative cases had LOH at D9S168, the most telomeric marker examined, and 3 specimens showed loss of only D9S168. A second region (IFNA-D9S126) showed LOH in 10 (44%) cases, and case MCC26 showed LOH for only D9S126, implicating genes centromeric of the CDKN2A locus. No mutations in the coding regions of p16 were seen in 7 cell lines tested, and reactivity to anti-p16 antibody was seen in all 11 tumour specimens examined and in 6 of 7 cell lines from 6 patients. Furthermore, all cell lines examined reacted with anti-p14(ARF) antibody. These results suggest that neither transcript of the CDKN2A locus is the target of deletions on 9p in MCC and imply the existence of tumour-suppressor genes mapping both centromeric and telomeric of this locus.

Queensland floods anniversary : Angela Emmerson

"We're marking the anniversary of the destructive floods that hit Queensland a year ago this week with our series of interviews from survivors. Today's story is from Helidon teenager and university student Angela Emmerson, who tells Amanda Gearing how she and her sister scrambled to the roof to escape the dangerous flash flood which suddenly engulfed their house on the 10th of January last year. Tomorrow we'll hear from Grantham resident Rob Wilkin who rescued 31 local people using his car and boat. He helped them escape to safety as 138 houses in the town were destroyed. To mark the anniversary of the floods in Queensland, ABC Open has compiled Aftermath, an extensive look at the Queensland floods as well as floods in NSW, Victoria and remote Western Australia; Cyclone Yasi and the 2009 Victorian 'Black Saturday' bushfires. Australia certainly has been hit by a few disasters in the past two or so years. The site has a timeline showing content from these six disasters, with links to about 40 people effected by these disasters. If you go to that site you will be able to choose a person to watch videos about them."

Fine-needle aspiration cytology of Merkel cell carcinoma-A review of 69 cases

Background This study reviewed the clinical presentation, cytologic findings and the immunophenotype of 69 Merkel Cell Carcinoma (MCC) cases sampled by FNA. Methods Demographic and clinical data, the cytology findings and results of ancillary testing were reviewed. Results Median patient age was 78 years (37 – 104) with a 1:1.8 female to male ratio. The most common FNA sites sampled included lymph nodes in the neck, the axillary region, the inguinal region and the parotid gland. Most patients had a history of MCC (68%) &/or non-MCC malignancy (70%). The common cytologic pattern was a cellular smear with malignant cells arranged in a dispersed pattern with variable numbers of disorganised groups of cells. Cytoplasm was scant or absent and nuclei showed mild to moderate anisokaryosis, stippled chromatin, inconspicuous nucleoli and nuclear molding. Numerous apoptotic bodies were often present. Cell block samples (28 cases) were usually positive for cytokeratins in a perinuclear dot pattern, including 88% of cases with CK20 positivity. CD56 was the most sensitive (95%) neuroendocrine marker on cell blocks and was also positive with flow cytometry in 9 cases tested. Conclusions MCC is most commonly seen in FNA specimens from the head and neck of elderly patients, often with a history of previous skin lesions. Occasional cases present in younger patients and some may be mistaken for other round blue cell tumors, such as lymphoma. CD 56 may be a useful marker in cell block preparations and in flow cytometric analysis of MCC.