Optimal auctions for multi-unit procurement with volume discount bids

Our attention, is focused on designing an optimal procurement mechanism which a buyer can use for procuring multiple units of a homogeneous item based on bids submitted by autonomous, rational, and intelligent suppliers. We design elegant optimal procurement mechanisms for two different situations. In the first situation, each supplier specifies the maximum quantity that can be supplied together with a per unit price. For this situation, we design an optimal mechanism S-OPT (Optimal with Simple bids). In the more generalized case, each supplier specifies discounts based on the volume of supply. In this case, we design an optimal mechanism VD-OPT (Optimal with Volume Discount, bids). The VD-OPT mechanism uses the S-OPT mechanism as a building block. The proposed mechanisms minimize the cost to the buyer, satisfying at the same time, (a) Bayesian, incentive compatibility and (b) interim individual rationality.

Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms for Multi-Slot Sponsored Searth Auctions

In pay-per click sponsored search auctions which are currently extensively used by search engines, the auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) competing for available slots (say m) to display their ads. This auction is typically conducted for a number of rounds (say T). There are click probabilities mu_ij associated with agent-slot pairs. The search engine's goal is to maximize social welfare, for example, the sum of values of the advertisers. The search engine does not know the true value of an advertiser for a click to her ad and also does not know the click probabilities mu_ij s. A key problem for the search engine therefore is to learn these during the T rounds of the auction and also to ensure that the auction mechanism is truthful. Mechanisms for addressing such learning and incentives issues have recently been introduced and would be referred to as multi-armed-bandit (MAB) mechanisms. When m = 1,characterizations for truthful MAB mechanisms are available in the literature and it has been shown that the regret for such mechanisms will be O(T^{2/3}). In this paper, we seek to derive a characterization in the realistic but nontrivial general case when m > 1 and obtain several interesting results.

Bidding Dynamics of Rational Advertisers in Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web

In this paper, we address a key problem faced by advertisers in sponsored search auctions on the web: how much to bid, given the bids of the other advertisers, so as to maximize individual payoffs? Assuming the generalized second price auction as the auction mechanism, we formulate this problem in the framework of an infinite horizon alternative-move game of advertiser bidding behavior. For a sponsored search auction involving two advertisers, we characterize all the pure strategy and mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We also prove that the bid prices will lead to a Nash equilibrium, if the advertisers follow a myopic best response bidding strategy. Following this, we investigate the bidding behavior of the advertisers if they use Q-learning. We discover empirically an interesting trend that the Q-values converge even if both the advertisers learn simultaneously.

Truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions

In pay-per-click sponsored search auctions which are currently extensively used by search engines, the auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) competing for available slots (say m) to display their advertisements (ads for short). A sponsored search auction for a keyword is typically conducted for a number of rounds (say T). There are click probabilities mu(ij) associated with each agent slot pair (agent i and slot j). The search engine would like to maximize the social welfare of the advertisers, that is, the sum of values of the advertisers for the keyword. However, the search engine does not know the true values advertisers have for a click to their respective advertisements and also does not know the click probabilities. A key problem for the search engine therefore is to learn these click probabilities during the initial rounds of the auction and also to ensure that the auction mechanism is truthful. Mechanisms for addressing such learning and incentives issues have recently been introduced. These mechanisms, due to their connection to the multi-armed bandit problem, are aptly referred to as multi-armed bandit (MAB) mechanisms. When m = 1, exact characterizations for truthful MAB mechanisms are available in the literature. Recent work has focused on the more realistic but non-trivial general case when m > 1 and a few promising results have started appearing. In this article, we consider this general case when m > 1 and prove several interesting results. Our contributions include: (1) When, mu(ij)s are unconstrained, we prove that any truthful mechanism must satisfy strong pointwise monotonicity and show that the regret will be Theta T7) for such mechanisms. (2) When the clicks on the ads follow a certain click precedence property, we show that weak pointwise monotonicity is necessary for MAB mechanisms to be truthful. (3) If the search engine has a certain coarse pre-estimate of mu(ij) values and wishes to update them during the course of the T rounds, we show that weak pointwise monotonicity and type-I separatedness are necessary while weak pointwise monotonicity and type-II separatedness are sufficient conditions for the MAB mechanisms to be truthful. (4) If the click probabilities are separable into agent-specific and slot-specific terms, we provide a characterization of MAB mechanisms that are truthful in expectation.

Resale in Auctions with Financial Constraints

This paper analyzes auctions where bidders face nancial constraints that may force them to resell part of the property of the good (or subcontract part of a project) at a resale market. First we show that the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria of second- price auctions (Garratt and Tröger, 2006) generalizes to situations with partial resale where only the high value bidder is nancially constrained. However, when all players face nancial constraints the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria disappear. Therefore, for auctioning big facilities or contracts where all bidders are nancially constrained and there is a resale market, the second price auction remains a simple and appropriate mechanism to achieve an e¢ cient allocation.

Using choice experiments to explore the spatial distribution of willingness to pay for rural landscape improvements

We report findings from a choice experiment survey designed to estimate the economic benefits of policy measures to improve the rural landscape in the Republic of Ireland. Using a panel mixed logit specification to account for unobserved taste heterogeneity we derived individual-specific willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates for each respondent in the sample. We subsequently investigated the spatial dependence of these estimates. Results suggest the existence of positive spatial autocorrelation for all rural landscape attributes. As a means of benefit transfer, kriging methods were employed to interpolate WTP estimates across the whole of the Republic of Ireland. The kriged WTP surfaces confirm the existence of spatial dependence and illustrate the implied spatial variation and regional disparities in WTP for all the rural landscape improvements investigated.

National and Provincial Influences on Public Sector Pay: Northern Ireland after 1945

This article examines the national and regional pressures in Northern Ireland in the post-war period for parity in public sector pay with the rest of the UK. Northern Ireland had a devolved legislature and government within the UK from 192 1 and was constitutionality in all essentially federal relationship with the rest of the UK. However, the Stormont Government chose to use legislative devolution to minimize policy differences with the rest of the UK. The article highlights the national industrial relations environment as the backdrop for provincial developments in pay setting. It establishes the important role Played by the Social Services Agreement negotiated with the Labour Government at Westminster in triggering the principle of parity in public sector pay in the early post-war years. The principle of pay parity subsequently became a benchmark for regional trade union coercive comparisons in collective bargaining across the devolved public sector. The article highlights the Policy relevance of these developments both to the UK Treasury and to devolved Governments in the UK, as they address the issue of regional public sector pay.

Why Do Firms Pay Dividends?: Evidence from an Early and Unregulated Capital Market

Why do firms pay dividends? To answer this question, we use a hand-collected data set of companies traded on the London stock market between 1825 and 1870. As tax rates were effectively zero, the capital market was unregulated, and there were no institutional stockholders, we can rule out these potential determinants ex ante. We find that, even though they were legal, share repurchases were not used by firms to return cash to shareholders. Instead, our evidence provides support for the information–communication explanation for dividends, while providing little support for agency, illiquidity, catering, or behavioral explanations. © The Authors 2013. Published by Oxford University Press [on behalf of the European Finance Association]. All rights reserved.

The marginal willingness-to-pay for attributes of a hypothetical HIV vaccine

This paper estimates the marginal willingness-to-pay for attributes of a hypothetical HIV vaccine using discrete choice modeling. We use primary data from 326 respondents from Bangkok and Chiang Mai, Thailand, in 2008–2009, selected using purposive, venue-based sampling across two strata. Participants completed a structured questionnaire and full rank discrete choice modeling task administered using computer-assisted personal interviewing. The choice experiment was used to rank eight hypothetical HIV vaccine scenarios, with each scenario comprising seven attributes (including cost) each of which had two levels. The data were analyzed in two alternative specifications: (1) best-worst; and (2) full-rank, using logit likelihood functions estimated with custom routines in Gauss matrix programming language. In the full-rank specification, all vaccine attributes are significant predictors of probability of vaccine choice. The biomedical attributes of the hypothetical HIV vaccine (efficacy, absence of VISP, absence of side effects, and duration of effect) are the most important attributes for HIV vaccine choice. On average respondents are more than twice as likely to accept a vaccine with 99% efficacy, than a vaccine with 50% efficacy. This translates to a willingness to pay US$383 more for a high efficacy vaccine compared with the low efficacy vaccine. Knowledge of the relative importance of determinants of HIV vaccine acceptability is important to ensure the success of future vaccination programs. Future acceptability studies of hypothetical HIV vaccines should use more finely grained biomedical attributes, and could also improve the external validity of results by including more levels of the cost attribute.

, Lexicographic Preferences in Discrete Choice Experiments: Consequences on Individual-Specific Willingness to Pay Estimates

In discrete choice experiments respondents are generally assumed to consider all of the attributes across each of the alternatives, and to choose their most preferred. However, results in this paper indicate that many respondents employ simplified lexicographic decision-making rules, whereby they have a ranking of the attributes, but their choice of an alternative is based solely on the level of their most important attribute(s). Not accounting for these simple decision-making heuristics introduces systemic errors and leads to biased point estimates, as they are a violation of the continuity axiom and a departure from the use of compensatory decision-making. In this paper the implications of lexicographic preferences are examined. In particular, using a mixed logit specification this paper investigates the sensitivity of individual-specific willingness to pay (WTP) estimates conditional on whether lexicographic decision-making rules are accounted for in the modelling of discrete choice responses. Empirical results are obtained from a discrete choice experiment that was carried out to address the value of a number of rural landscape attributes in Ireland

The gender pay gap among university professors: the role of individual and organizational determinants

Cette étude de cas, composée de trois articles, examine les diverses sources d’explication de l’écart salarial selon le genre chez les professeurs d’une grande université de recherche canadienne. Le premier article analyse les écarts selon le genre sur les primes “de marché” à partir de données d’un sondage réalisé auprès des professeurs en 2002. Une analyse des correspondances donne une solution à deux facteurs dans laquelle le second facteur oppose clairement les professeurs qui ont reçu une prime à ceux qui n’en n’ont pas reçue. Le genre est fortement associé à ce facteur, la catégorie “femme” se retrouvant du côté de l’axe associé à l’absence de primes de marché. Les résultats de la régression logistique confirment que le secteur d’activité, la fréquence des contrats de recherche, la valorisation du salaire ainsi que le rang combiné à l’ancienneté sont reliés à la présence de primes de marché, tel que proposé par les hypothèses. Toutefois, même après avoir contrôlé pour ces relations, les femmes sont toujours près de trois fois moins susceptibles de s’être vu attribuer des primes de marché que leurs homologues masculins. Dans l’ensemble, les résultats suggèrent que dans un contexte où les salaires sont déterminés par convention collective, la réindividualisation du processus de détermination des salaires — en particulier le versement de primes de marché aux professeurs d’université — peut favoriser la réapparition d’écarts de salaire selon le genre. Le second article est réalisé à partir de données administratives portant sur les années 1997 à 2006. Les contributions respectives de quatre composantes de la rémunération à l’écart salarial selon le genre y sont analysées, soit le salaire de base, l’accès au rang de professeur titulaire, l’accès aux primes de marché et chaires de recherche du Canada, de même que les montants reçus. Les composantes varient quant à leur degré de formalisation. Ceci permet de tester l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’ampleur de l’écart salarial selon le genre varie en fonction du degré de formalisation des composantes salariales. Nous déterminons également dans quelle mesure l’écart selon le genre sur les diverses composantes de la rémunération varie en fonction de la représentation relative des femmes professeurs au sein des unités. Les résultats démontrent l’existence de variations dans l’ampleur des différences selon le genre en fonction du degré de formalisation des pratiques de rémunération. Qui plus est, après contrôles, la rémunération est plus faible dans les unités où les femmes sont fortement représentées. Le dernier article examine les mécanismes pouvant mener à un écart selon le genre en ce qui a trait à l’accès aux primes de marché chez les professeurs de l’institution. Les processus d’attribution de ces suppléments salariaux sont examinés à partir d’entretiens réalisés avec 17 administrateurs à tous les niveaux hiérarchiques de l’institution et dans une diversité d’unités académiques. Les résultats suggèrent que les différences selon le genre pourraient être liées à des caractéristiques spécifiques du processus d’attribution et à une distribution inégale des primes aux unités à forte représentation féminine. De façon générale, les résultats démontrent que l’écart de rémunération selon le genre chez les professeurs de cette université n’est pas totalement expliqué par des différences dans les caractéristiques individuelles des hommes et femmes. L’analyse révèle que l’écart réside dans des différences selon le genre en ce qui a trait à l’accès aux primes de marché et aux chaires de recherches du Canada et, dans une moindre mesure, au rang de professeur titulaire. Aucune différence n’est observée sur le salaire de base et le montant des primes salariales reçues, que celles-ci soient dites de “marché” ou associées à une chaire de recherche du Canada. Qui plus est, on constate que la rémunération est plus faible dans les unités où les femmes sont le mieux représentées. L’accès différencié selon le genre aux primes de marché qui est observé pourrait être lié à certains processus organisationnels qui limitent les probabilités d’octrois à des femmes. Les femmes pourraient être particulièrement désavantagées dans ce système d’octroi, pour plusieurs raisons. L’existence de différences selon le genre en ce qui a trait aux dispositions ou habiletés des individus à négocier leur salaire est évoquée et supposée par certains administrateurs. Un accès limité aux informations concernant la politique de primes pourrait réduire la probabilité que des femmes tentent d’obtenir ces suppléments salariaux. Les directeurs d’unités, qui sont en majorité des hommes, pourraient être biaisées en faveur des professeurs masculins dans leurs évaluations s’ils tendent à favoriser ceux qui leurs ressemblent. Il est également possible que les directeurs d’unités où les femmes sont les mieux représentées n’aient pas reçu d’information sur les primes de marché ou que des traditions disciplinaires les aient rendu réticents à demander des primes.

Labelling schemes for organic food: Consumer attitudes, preferences and willingness-to-pay in six European countries

Since July 2010, all pre-packed organic food produced in the European Union (EU) must carry the new mandatory EU logo for organic food. Voluntary organic labels (such as national governmental logos and logos of private farmers’ associations and control bodies) can still be used, but only in addition to the mandatory EU logo. This change in the regulatory environment of organic labelling raises a number of questions regarding consumer preferences for different kinds of organic certification logos, which the present dissertation addressed. The first objective was to explore and analyse consumer perceptions, attitudes, preferences and willingness-to-pay (WTP) regarding different voluntary organic labels. The second objective was to investigate consumer perceptions and attitudes towards a mandatory EU logo. A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods of consumer research in six European countries was employed including focus group discussions, choice experiments and structured interviews. Based on the empirical results, recommendations are drawn for different actors in the organic sector.

Selecting Scientific Papers for Publication via Citation Auctions

The scientific community has been suffering from peer review for decades. This process (also called refereeing) subjects an author's scientific work or ideas to the scrutiny of one or more experts in the field. Publishers use it to select and screen manuscript submissions, and funding agencies use it to award research funds. The goal is to get authors to meet their discipline's standards and thus achieve scientific objectivity. Publications and awards that haven't undergone peer review are often regarded with suspicion by scholars and professionals in many fields. However, peer review, although universally used, has many drawbacks. We propose replacing peer review with an auction-based approach: the better the submitted paper, the more scientific currency the author likely bid to have it published. If the bid correctly reflects the paper's quality, the author is rewarded in this new scientific currency; otherwise, the author loses this currency. We argue that citations are an appropriate currency for all scientists. We believe that citation auctions encourage scientists to better control their submissions' quality. It also inspire them to prepare more exciting talks for accepted papers and to invite discussion of their results at congresses and conferences and among their colleagues. In the long run, citation auctions could have the power to greatly improve scientific research

Information provision in procurement auctions

We analyze the optimal provision of information in a procurement auction with horizontally differentiated goods. The buyer has private information about her preferred location on the product space and has access to a costless communication device. A seller who pays the entry cost may submit a bid comprising a location and a minimum price. We characterize the optimal information structure and show that the buyer prefers to attract only two bids. Further, additional sellers are inefficient since they reduce total and consumer surplus, gross of entry costs. We show that the buyer will not find it optimal to send public information to all sellers. On the other hand, she may profit from setting a minimum price and that a severe hold-up problem arises if she lacks commitment to set up the rules of the auction ex-ante.