Strategy-proof social choice

This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 2, Edited by K. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura

Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results

We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. We characterize the social choice functions that satisfy each one of them and whose ranges consist of two alternatives, in terms of two types of basic properties.

Ethnic and religious polarization and social conflict

In this paper we examine the link between ethnic and religious polarization and conflict using interpersonal distances for ethnic and religious attitudes obtained from the World Values Survey. We use the Duclos et al (2004) polarization index. We measure conflict by means on an index of social unrest, as well as by the standard conflict onset or incidence based on a threshold number of deaths. Our results show that taking distances into account significantly improves the quality of the fit. Our measure of polarization outperforms the measure used by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and the fractionalization index. We also obtain that both ethnic and religious polarization are significant in explaining conflict. The results improve when we use an indicator of social unrest as the dependent variable.

Understanding social enterprise country models: Spain

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to describe the historical institutional context of Spain in the past 40 years and to analyze the influence of institutional factors in the current model of social enterprise existing in the country. Design/methodology/approach – This study draws on the theory of historical institutionalism, national-level empirical data and Kerlin conceptual framework (2013) that informs models of social enterprise. Findings – This paper describe some traits of Spain’s social enterprise that can be explained by the evolution of its institutional context in the past 40 years. It helps to validate, from a historical institutionalistic perspective, aspects of the Kerlin framework for social enterprise models. It also begins to show that the analysis of regional differences in the context should be taken into consideration when examining a country’s social enterprise space. Research limitations/implications – This discussion paper encourages academics to analyze regional differences in the emergence of social enterprise within a country. The main limitation of the paper is the lack of an “official” definition of social enterprise in Spain. Originality/value – This paper applies a valuable framework to a country with a unique political and economic history in the past 40 years. It contributes to enrich the research on the emergence and development of social enterprises in a variety of contexts and advances understanding of how regional differences inside a country influence the development of social enterprises.

Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

The effect of candidate quality on electoral equilibrium: an experimental study

When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments, and find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they canbe explained by quantal response equilibrium.

Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule

We present a new domain of preferences under which the majority relation is always quasi-transitive and thus Condorcet winners always exist. We model situations where a set of individuals must choose one individual in the group. Agents are connected through some relationship that can be interpreted as expressing neighborhood, and which is formalized by a graph. Our restriction on preferences is as follows: each agent can freely rank his immediate neighbors, but then he is indifferent between each neighbor and all other agents that this neighbor "leads to". Hence, agents can be highly perceptive regarding their neighbors, while being insensitive to the differences between these and other agents which are further removed from them. We show quasi-transitivity of the majority relation when the graph expressing the neighborhood relation is a tree. We also discuss a further restriction allowing to extend the result for more general graphs. Finally, we compare the proposed restriction with others in the literature, to conclude that it is independent of any previously discussed domain restriction.

Voting by committees with exit

We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.

Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Voting by committees under constraints

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme

This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game

Social exclusion mobility in Spain, 1994-2000

Social exclusion can be defined as a process leading to a state of multiple functioning deprivations. Cross-sectional headcount ratios of social exclusion may overstate the extent of the problem if most individuals do not remain in the same state in successive years. To address this issue, we need to focus on mobility. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyse changes in the individual levels of social exclusion focusing on the extent to which individuals change place in social exclusion distribution.

Two different 3D biogeochemical models for the NW mediterranean sea: validation with Meris data and intercomparison

Report for the scientific sojourn carried out at the University of New South Wales from February to June the 2007. Two different biogeochemical models are coupled to a three dimensional configuration of the Princeton Ocean Model (POM) for the Northwestern Mediterranean Sea (Ahumada and Cruzado, 2007). The first biogeochemical model (BLANES) is the three-dimensional version of the model described by Bahamon and Cruzado (2003) and computes the nitrogen fluxes through six compartments using semi-empirical descriptions of biological processes. The second biogeochemical model (BIOMEC) is the biomechanical NPZD model described in Baird et al. (2004), which uses a combination of physiological and physical descriptions to quantify the rates of planktonic interactions. Physical descriptions include, for example, the diffusion of nutrients to phytoplankton cells and the encounter rate of predators and prey. The link between physical and biogeochemical processes in both models is expressed by the advection-diffusion of the non-conservative tracers. The similarities in the mathematical formulation of the biogeochemical processes in the two models are exploited to determine the parameter set for the biomechanical model that best fits the parameter set used in the first model. Three years of integration have been carried out for each model to reach the so called perpetual year run for biogeochemical conditions. Outputs from both models are averaged monthly and then compared to remote sensing images obtained from sensor MERIS for chlorophyll.