Optimal taxation and the skill premium

The stylized facts suggest a negative relationship between tax progressivity and the skill premium from the early 1960s until the early 1990s, and a positive one thereafter. They also generally imply rising tax progressivity, except for the 1980s. In this paper, we ask whether optimal tax policy is consistent with these observations, taking into account the demographic and technological factors that have also affected the skill premium. To this end, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the skill premium and the progressivity of the tax system are endogenously determined, with the latter being optimally chosen by a benevolent government. We find that optimal policy delivers both a progressive tax system and model predictions which are generally consistent, except for the 1980s, with the stylized facts relating to the skill premium and progressivity. To capture the patterns in the data over the 1980s requires that we adopt a government policy which is biased towards the interests of skilled agents. Thus, in addition to demographic and technological factors, changes in the preferences of policy-makers appear to be a potentially important factor in determining the evolution of the observed skill premium.

Taxation and Total Government Take from the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) Following Phase 3 of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)

NORTH SEA STUDY OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 117

Anticipation, Learning and Welfare: the Case of Distortionary Taxation

We study the impact of anticipated fiscal policy changes in a Ramsey economy where agents form long-horizon expectations using adaptive learning. We extend the existing framework by introducing distortionary taxes as well as elastic labour supply, which makes agents. decisions non-predetermined but more realistic. We detect that the dynamic responses to anticipated tax changes under learning have oscillatory behaviour that can be interpreted as self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism emerging from systematic forecast errors. Moreover, we demonstrate that these waves can have important implications for the welfare consequences of .scal reforms. (JEL: E32, E62, D84)

Optimal progressive taxation in a model with endogenous skill supply.

This paper examines whether efficiency considerations require that optimal labour income taxation is progressive or regressive in a model with skill heterogeneity, endogenous skill acquisition and a production sector with capital-skill complementarity. We find that wage inequality driven by the resource requirements of skill-creation implies progressive labour income taxation in the steady-state as well as along the transition path from the exogenous to optimal policy steady-state. We find that these results are explained by a lower labour supply elasticity for skilled versus unskilled labour which results from the introduction of the skill acquisition technology.

Redistributive taxation, public expenditure, and size of governent

We introduce a model of redistributive income taxation and public expenditure. This joint treatment permits analyzing the interdependencies between the two policies: one cannot be chosen independently of the other. Empirical evidence reveals that partisan confrontation essentially falls on expenditure policies rather than on income taxation. We examine the case in which the expenditure policy (or the size of government) is chosen by majority voting and income taxation is consistently adjusted. This adjustment consists of designing the income tax schedule that, given the expenditure policy, achieves consensus among the population. The model determines the consensus in- come tax schedule, the composition of public expenditure and the size of government. The main results are that inequality is negatively related to the size of government and to the pro-rich bias in public expenditure, and positively or negatively related to the marginal income tax, depending on substitutability between government supplied and market goods. These implications are validated using OECD data.

Juridical double taxation by cross border transactions: the Block Case (C-67/08)

Treaty Establishing the European Community, operative until December 1st 2009, had already established in its article 2 the mission of the up until then European Community and actual European Union is to promote an harmonious, equilibrated and sustainable development of the economic activities of the whole Community. This Mission must be achieved by establishing a Common Market, an Economic and Monetary Union and the realization of Common Policies. One of the instruments to obtain these objectives is the use of free circulation of people, services and capitals inside the Common and Interior Market of the European Union. The European Union is characterized by the confirmation of the total movement of capitals, services and individuals and legal peoples’ freedom; freedom that was already predicated by the Maastricht Treaty, through the suppression of whatever obstacles which are in the way of the objectives before exposed. The old TEC in its Title III, now Title IV of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, covered the free circulation of people, services and capitals. Consequently, the inclusion of this mechanism inside one of the regulating texts of the European Union indicates the importance this freedom supposes for the European Union objectives’ development. Once stood up the relevance of the free movement of people, services and capitals, we must mention that in this paper we are going to centre our study in one of these freedoms of movement: the free movement of capital. In order to analyze in detail the free movement of capital within the European framework, we are going to depart from the analysis of the existent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The use of jurisprudence is basic to know how Community legislation is interpreted. For this reason, we are going to develop this work through judgements dictated by the European Union Court. This way we can observe how Member States’ regulating laws and the European Common Law affect the free movement of capital. The starting point of this paper will be the Judgement C-67/08 European Court of Justice of February 12th 2009, known as Block case. So, following the argumentation the Luxemburg Court did about the mentioned case, we are going to develop how free movement of capital could be affected by the current disparity of Member States’ legislation. This disparity can produce double taxation cases due to the lack of tax harmonized legislation within the interior market and the lack of treaties to avoid double taxation within the European Union. Developing this idea we are going to see how double taxation, at least indirectly, can infringe free movement of capital.

Topics in public finance: social security and taxation

Summary The field of public finance focuses on the spending and taxing activities of governments and their influence on the allocation of resources and distribution of income. This work covers in three parts different topics related to public finance which are currently widely discussed in media and politics. The first two parts deal with issues on social security, which is in general one of the biggest spending shares of governments. The third part looks at the main income source of governments by analyzing the perceived value of tax competition. Part one deals with the current problem of increased early retirement by focusing on Switzerland as a special case. Early retirement is predominantly considered to be the result of incentives set by social security and the tax system. But the Swiss example demonstrates that the incidence of early retirement has dramatically increased even in the absence of institutional changes. We argue that the wealth effect also plays an important role in the retirement decision for middle and high income earners. An actuarially fair, but mandatory funded system with a relatively high replacement rate may thus contribute to a low labor market participation rate of elderly workers. We provide evidence using a unique dataset on individual retirement decisions in Swiss pension funds, allowing us to perfectly control for pension scheme details. Our findings suggest that affordability is a key determinant in the retirement decisions. The higher the accumulated pension capital, the earlier men, and to a smaller extent women, tend to leave the workforce. The fact that early retirement has become much more prevalent in the last 15 years is a further indicator of the importance of a wealth effect, as the maturing of the Swiss mandatory funded pension system over that period has led to an increase in the effective replacement rates for middle and high income earners. Part two covers the theoretical side of social security. Theories analyzing optimal social security benefits provide important qualitative results, by mainly using one general type of an economy. Economies are however very diverse concerning numerous aspects, one of the most important being the wealth level. This can lead to significant quantitative benefit differences that imply differences in replacement rates and levels of labor supply. We focus on several aspects related to this fact. In a within cohort social security model, we introduce disability insurance with an imperfect screening mechanism. We then vary the wealth level of the model economy and analyze how the optimal social security benefit structure or equivalently, the optimal replacement rates, changes depending on the wealth level of the economy, and if the introduction of disability insurance into a social security system is preferable for all economies. Second, the screening mechanism of disability insurance and the threshold level at which people are defined as disabled can differ. For economies with different wealth levels, we determine for different thresholds the screening level that maximizes social welfare. Finally, part three turns to the income of governments, by adding an element to the controversy on tax competition versus tax harmonization.2 Inter-jurisdictional tax competition can generate at least two potential benefits or costs: On a public level, tax competition may result in a lower or higher efficiency in the production of public services. But there is also a more private benefit in the form of an option for individuals to move to a community with a lower tax rate in the future. To explore the value citizens attach to tax competition we analyze a unique popular vote for a complete tax harmonization between communities in the third largest Swiss canton, Vaud. Although a majority of voters would have seemingly benefited from replacing the current tax rate by a revenue-neutral average tax rate, the proposal was rejected by a large margin. Our estimates suggest that the estimated combined perceived benefit from tax competition is in the range of 10%.

Economic and environmental effects of the CO2 taxation: an input-output analysis for Spain

CO2 emissions induced by human activities are the major cause of climate change; hence, strong environmental policy that limits the growing dependence on fossil fuel is indispensable. Tradable permits and environmental taxes are the usual tools used in CO2 reduction strategies. Such economic tools provide incentives to polluting industries to reduce their emissions through market signals. The aim of this work is to investigate the direct and indirect effects of an environmental tax on Spanish products and services. We apply an environmentally extended input-output (EIO) model to identify CO2 emission intensities of products and services and, accordingly, we estimate the tax proportional to these intensities. The short-term price effects are analyzed using an input-output price model. The effect of tax introduction on consumption prices and its influence on consumers’ welfare are determined. We also quantify the environmental impacts of such taxation in terms of the reduction in CO2 emissions. The results, based on the Spanish economy for the year 2007, show that sectors with relatively poor environmental profile are subjected to high environmental tax rates. And consequently, applying a CO2 tax on these sectors, increases production prices and induces a slight increase in consumer price index and a decrease in private welfare. The revenue from the tax could be used to counter balance the negative effects on social welfare and also to stimulate the increase of renewable energy shares in the most impacting sectors. Finally, our analysis highlights that the environmental and economic goals cannot be met at the same time with the environmental taxation and this shows the necessity of finding other (complementary or alternative) measures to ensure both the economic and ecological efficiencies. Keywords: CO2 emissions; environmental tax; input-output model, effects of environmental taxation.

Stabilization versus insurance: Welfare effects of procyclical taxation under incomplete markets

We construct and calibrate a general equilibrium business cycle model with unemployment and precautionary saving. We compute the cost of business cycles and locate the optimum in a set of simple cyclical fiscal policies. Our economy exhibits productivity shocks, giving firms an incentive to hire more when productivity is high. However, business cycles make workers' income riskier, both by increasing the unconditional probability of unusuallylong unemployment spells, and by making wages more variable, and therefore they decrease social welfare by around one-fourth or one-third of 1% of consumption. Optimal fiscal policy offsets the cycle, holding unemployment benefits constant but varying the tax rate procyclically to smooth hiring. By running a deficit of 4% to 5% of output in recessions, the government eliminates half the variation in the unemployment rate, most of the variation in workers'aggregate consumption, and most of the welfare cost of business cycles.

Optimal taxation without state-contingent debt

To recover a version of Barro's (1979) `random walk'tax smoothing outcome, we modify Lucas and Stokey's (1983) economyto permit only risk--free debt. This imparts near unit root like behaviorto government debt, independently of the government expenditureprocess, a realistic outcome in the spirit of Barro's. We showhow the risk--free--debt--only economy confronts the Ramsey plannerwith additional constraints on equilibrium allocations thattake the form of a sequence of measurability conditions.We solve the Ramsey problem by formulating it in terms of a Lagrangian,and applying a Parameterized Expectations Algorithm tothe associated first--order conditions. The first--order conditions andnumerical impulse response functions partially affirmBarro's random walk outcome. Though the behaviors oftax rates, government surpluses, and government debts differ, allocationsare very close for computed Ramsey policies across incomplete and completemarkets economies.

Income taxation in a frictional labor market

A new model of wage dispersion is used to examine welfare aspects of income taxation. The model retains the dynamics of wage posting modelswhile exogenizing search e¤ort, therefore allowing more insight into policy issues. The results highlight effects that standard analyses do not take into account. The optimal income tax should depend on an incidenceeffect between workers and firms. This incidence effect arises from firmstrying to lower wages as much as possible. An employment tax proves, incertain cases, to be the best method to encourage labor force participation.

Effects of differential taxation on factor accumulation and growth

In this paper we try to analyze the role of fiscal policy in fostering a higher participation of the different production factors in the human capital production sector in the long-run. Introducing a tax on physical capital and differentiating both a tax on raw labor wage and a tax on skills or human capital we also attempt to present a way to influence inequality as measured by the skill premium, thus trying to relate the increase in human capital with the decrease in income inequality. We will do that in the context of a non-scale growth model.The model here is capable to alter the shares of private factors devoted to each of the two production sectors, final output and human capital, and affect inequality in a different way according to the different tax changes. The simulation results derived in the paper show how a human capital (skills) tax cut, which could be interpreted as a reduction in progressivity, ends up increasing both the shares of labor and physical capital devoted to the production of knowledge and decreasing inequality. Moreover, a raw labor wage tax decrease, which could also be interpreted as an increase in the progressivity of the system, increases the share of labor devoted to the production of final output and increases inequality. Finally, a physical capital tax decrease reduces the share of physical capital devoted to the production of knowledge and allows for a lower inequality value. Nevertheless, none of the various types of taxes ends up changing the share of human capital in the knowledge production, which will deserve our future attention

Effects of differential taxation on factor accumulation and growth

In this paper we try to analyze the role of fiscal policy in fostering a higher participation of the different production factors in the human capital production sector in the long-run. Introducing a tax on physical capital and differentiating both a tax on raw labor wage and a tax on skills or human capital we also attempt to present a way to influence inequality as measured by the skill premium, thus trying to relate the increase in human capital with the decrease in income inequality. We will do that in the context of a non-scale growth model.The model here is capable to alter the shares of private factors devoted to each of the two production sectors, final output and human capital, and affect inequality in a different way according to the different tax changes. The simulation results derived in the paper show how a human capital (skills) tax cut, which could be interpreted as a reduction in progressivity, ends up increasing both the shares of labor and physical capital devoted to the production of knowledge and decreasing inequality. Moreover, a raw labor wage tax decrease, which could also be interpreted as an increase in the progressivity of the system, increases the share of labor devoted to the production of final output and increases inequality. Finally, a physical capital tax decrease reduces the share of physical capital devoted to the production of knowledge and allows for a lower inequality value. Nevertheless, none of the various types of taxes ends up changing the share of human capital in the knowledge production, which will deserve our future attention