Did Gold Remain Relevant in the Post-1971 International Monetary System?

The central hypothesis to be tested is the relevance of gold in the determination of the value of the US dollar as an international reserve currency after 1971. In the first section the market value of the US dollar is analysed by looking at new forms of value (financial derivative products), the dollar as a safe haven, the choice of a standard of value and the role of SDRs in reforming the international monetary system. Based on dimensional analysis, the second section analyses the definition and meaning of a numéraire for international currency and the justification for a variable standard of value based on a commodity (gold). The second section is the theoretical foundation for the empirical and econometric analysis in the third and fourth sections. The third section is devoted to the specification of an econometric model and a graphical analysis of the data. It is clear that an inverse relation exists between the value of the US dollar and the price of gold. The fourth section shows the estimations of the different specifications of the model including linear regression and cointegration analysis. The most important econometric result is that the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of a significant link between the price of gold and the value of the US dollar. There is also a positive relationship between gold price and inflation. An inverse statistically significant relation between gold price and monetary policy is shown by applying a dynamic model of cointegration with lags.

Essays in macro finance and monetary economics

Les questions abordées dans les deux premiers articles de ma thèse cherchent à comprendre les facteurs économiques qui affectent la structure à terme des taux d'intérêt et la prime de risque. Je construis des modèles non linéaires d'équilibre général en y intégrant des obligations de différentes échéances. Spécifiquement, le premier article a pour objectif de comprendre la relation entre les facteurs macroéconomiques et le niveau de prime de risque dans un cadre Néo-keynésien d'équilibre général avec incertitude. L'incertitude dans le modèle provient de trois sources : les chocs de productivité, les chocs monétaires et les chocs de préférences. Le modèle comporte deux types de rigidités réelles à savoir la formation des habitudes dans les préférences et les coûts d'ajustement du stock de capital. Le modèle est résolu par la méthode des perturbations à l'ordre deux et calibré à l'économie américaine. Puisque la prime de risque est par nature une compensation pour le risque, l'approximation d'ordre deux implique que la prime de risque est une combinaison linéaire des volatilités des trois chocs. Les résultats montrent qu'avec les paramètres calibrés, les chocs réels (productivité et préférences) jouent un rôle plus important dans la détermination du niveau de la prime de risque relativement aux chocs monétaires. Je montre que contrairement aux travaux précédents (dans lesquels le capital de production est fixe), l'effet du paramètre de la formation des habitudes sur la prime de risque dépend du degré des coûts d'ajustement du capital. Lorsque les coûts d'ajustement du capital sont élevés au point que le stock de capital est fixe à l'équilibre, une augmentation du paramètre de formation des habitudes entraine une augmentation de la prime de risque. Par contre, lorsque les agents peuvent librement ajuster le stock de capital sans coûts, l'effet du paramètre de la formation des habitudes sur la prime de risque est négligeable. Ce résultat s'explique par le fait que lorsque le stock de capital peut être ajusté sans coûts, cela ouvre un canal additionnel de lissage de consommation pour les agents. Par conséquent, l'effet de la formation des habitudes sur la prime de risque est amoindri. En outre, les résultats montrent que la façon dont la banque centrale conduit sa politique monétaire a un effet sur la prime de risque. Plus la banque centrale est agressive vis-à-vis de l'inflation, plus la prime de risque diminue et vice versa. Cela est due au fait que lorsque la banque centrale combat l'inflation cela entraine une baisse de la variance de l'inflation. Par suite, la prime de risque due au risque d'inflation diminue. Dans le deuxième article, je fais une extension du premier article en utilisant des préférences récursives de type Epstein -- Zin et en permettant aux volatilités conditionnelles des chocs de varier avec le temps. L'emploi de ce cadre est motivé par deux raisons. D'abord des études récentes (Doh, 2010, Rudebusch and Swanson, 2012) ont montré que ces préférences sont appropriées pour l'analyse du prix des actifs dans les modèles d'équilibre général. Ensuite, l'hétéroscedasticité est une caractéristique courante des données économiques et financières. Cela implique que contrairement au premier article, l'incertitude varie dans le temps. Le cadre dans cet article est donc plus général et plus réaliste que celui du premier article. L'objectif principal de cet article est d'examiner l'impact des chocs de volatilités conditionnelles sur le niveau et la dynamique des taux d'intérêt et de la prime de risque. Puisque la prime de risque est constante a l'approximation d'ordre deux, le modèle est résolu par la méthode des perturbations avec une approximation d'ordre trois. Ainsi on obtient une prime de risque qui varie dans le temps. L'avantage d'introduire des chocs de volatilités conditionnelles est que cela induit des variables d'état supplémentaires qui apportent une contribution additionnelle à la dynamique de la prime de risque. Je montre que l'approximation d'ordre trois implique que les primes de risque ont une représentation de type ARCH-M (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticty in Mean) comme celui introduit par Engle, Lilien et Robins (1987). La différence est que dans ce modèle les paramètres sont structurels et les volatilités sont des volatilités conditionnelles de chocs économiques et non celles des variables elles-mêmes. J'estime les paramètres du modèle par la méthode des moments simulés (SMM) en utilisant des données de l'économie américaine. Les résultats de l'estimation montrent qu'il y a une évidence de volatilité stochastique dans les trois chocs. De plus, la contribution des volatilités conditionnelles des chocs au niveau et à la dynamique de la prime de risque est significative. En particulier, les effets des volatilités conditionnelles des chocs de productivité et de préférences sont significatifs. La volatilité conditionnelle du choc de productivité contribue positivement aux moyennes et aux écart-types des primes de risque. Ces contributions varient avec la maturité des bonds. La volatilité conditionnelle du choc de préférences quant à elle contribue négativement aux moyennes et positivement aux variances des primes de risque. Quant au choc de volatilité de la politique monétaire, son impact sur les primes de risque est négligeable. Le troisième article (coécrit avec Eric Schaling, Alain Kabundi, révisé et resoumis au journal of Economic Modelling) traite de l'hétérogénéité dans la formation des attentes d'inflation de divers groupes économiques et de leur impact sur la politique monétaire en Afrique du sud. La question principale est d'examiner si différents groupes d'agents économiques forment leurs attentes d'inflation de la même façon et s'ils perçoivent de la même façon la politique monétaire de la banque centrale (South African Reserve Bank). Ainsi on spécifie un modèle de prédiction d'inflation qui nous permet de tester l'arrimage des attentes d'inflation à la bande d'inflation cible (3% - 6%) de la banque centrale. Les données utilisées sont des données d'enquête réalisée par la banque centrale auprès de trois groupes d'agents : les analystes financiers, les firmes et les syndicats. On exploite donc la structure de panel des données pour tester l'hétérogénéité dans les attentes d'inflation et déduire leur perception de la politique monétaire. Les résultats montrent qu'il y a évidence d'hétérogénéité dans la manière dont les différents groupes forment leurs attentes. Les attentes des analystes financiers sont arrimées à la bande d'inflation cible alors que celles des firmes et des syndicats ne sont pas arrimées. En effet, les firmes et les syndicats accordent un poids significatif à l'inflation retardée d'une période et leurs prédictions varient avec l'inflation réalisée (retardée). Ce qui dénote un manque de crédibilité parfaite de la banque centrale au vu de ces agents.

The known unknowns and the unknown unknowns of the EMU. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/18, October 2012

Extensive prior research on the economics of European monetary union highlighted some potential risks (the known unknowns) but overlooked others (the unknown unknowns). Asymmetries among participating countries, the potentially destabilising character of a one-size-fits all monetary policy, the weakness of adjustment mechanisms, the lack of incentives for fiscal discipline, the possibility of sovereign solvency crises and their adverse consequences were all known and understood. But policymakers often relied on a complacent reading of the evidence. • The potential for financial disruption was vastly underestimated. Economists generally did not consider, or underestimated, the possibility of balance of payment crises such as those experienced by southern European countries, or the risk of a feedback loop between banks and sovereigns. • Remedying EMU’s systemic deficiencies is on the policy agenda. Banking union would go a long way towards addressing the fault lines. The urgent question for economists is if it is going to be enough and, if not, what else should complement the ‘bare-bones’ EMU of Maastricht.

Leader of the pack? German monetary dominance in Europe prior to EMU

In this paper, the monetary policy independence of European nations in the years before European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is investigated using cointegration techniques. Daily data is used to assess pairwise relationships between individual EMU nations and ‘lead’ nation Germany, to assess the hypothesis that Germany was the dominant European nation prior to EMU. By and large our econometric investigations support this hypothesis, and lead us to conclude that the only European nation to lose monetary policy independence in the light of monetary union was Germany. Our results have important policy implications. Given that the loss of monetary policy independence is generally viewed as the main cost of monetary unification, our findings suggest a reconsideration of the costs and benefits of monetary integration. A country can only lose what it has, and in Europe the countries that joined EMU — spare Germany — apparently did not have much to lose, at least not in terms of monetary independence. Instead, they actually gained monetary policy influence by getting a seat in the ECB's governing council which is responsible for setting interest policy in the euro area.

Monetary arrangements for emerging economies

In this paper we look at various alternatives for monetary regimes: dollarization, monetary union and local currency. We use an extension of the debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([3], [4] and [5]), although we do not necessarily follow their sunspot interpretation. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country which is heavily dependent on international capital due to low savings, for example, and might suffer a speculative attack on its external public debt. We study the conditions under which countries will be better off adopting each one of the regimes described above. If it belongs to a monetary union or to a local currency regime, a default may be avoided by an ination tax on debt denominated in common or local currency, respectively. Under the former regime, the decision to inate depends on each member country's political inuence over the union's central bank, while, in the latter one, the country has full autonomy to decide about its monetary policy. The possibility that the government inuences the central bank to create ination tax for political reasons adversely affects the expected welfare of both regimes. Under dollarization, ination is ruled out and the country that is subject to an external debt crisis has no other option than to default. Accordingly, one of our main results is that shared ination control strengthens currencies and a common-currency regime is superior in terms of expected welfare to the local-currency one and to dollarization if external shocks that member countries suffer are strongly correlated to each other. On the other hand, dollarization is dominant if the room for political ination under the alternative regime is high. Finally, local currency is dominant if external shocks are uncorrelated and the room for political pressure is mild. We nish by comparing Brazil's and Argentina's recent experiences which resemble the dollarization and the local currency regimes, and appraising the incentives that member countries would have to unify their currencies in the following common markets: Southern Common Market, Andean Community of Nations and Central American Common Market.

On testing the Phillips curves, the IS Curves, and the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies

Esta tese é composta por três ensaios sobre testes empíricos de curvas de Phillips, curvas IS e a interação entre as políticas fiscal e monetária. O primeiro ensaio ("Curvas de Phillips: um Teste Abrangente") testa curvas de Phillips usando uma especificação autoregressiva de defasagem distribuída (ADL) que abrange a curva de Phillips Aceleracionista (APC), a curva de Phillips Novo Keynesiana (NKPC), a curva de Phillips Híbrida (HPC) e a curva de Phillips de Informação Rígida (SIPC). Utilizamos dados dos Estados Unidos (1985Q1--2007Q4) e do Brasil (1996Q1--2012Q2), usando o hiato do produto e alternativamente o custo marginal real como medida de pressão inflacionária. A evidência empírica rejeita as restrições decorrentes da NKPC, da HPC e da SIPC, mas não rejeita aquelas da APC. O segundo ensaio ("Curvas IS: um Teste Abrangente") testa curvas IS usando uma especificação ADL que abrange a curva IS Keynesiana tradicional (KISC), a curva IS Novo Keynesiana (NKISC) e a curva IS Híbrida (HISC). Utilizamos dados dos Estados Unidos (1985Q1--2007Q4) e do Brasil (1996Q1--2012Q2). A evidência empírica rejeita as restrições decorrentes da NKISC e da HISC, mas não rejeita aquelas da KISC. O terceiro ensaio ("Os Efeitos da Política Fiscal e suas Interações com a Política Monetária") analisa os efeitos de choques na política fiscal sobre a dinâmica da economia e a interação entre as políticas fiscal e monetária usando modelos SVARs. Testamos a Teoria Fiscal do Nível de Preços para o Brasil analisando a resposta do passivo do setor público a choques no superávit primário. Para a identificação híbrida, encontramos que não é possível distinguir empiricamente entre os regimes Ricardiano (Dominância Monetária) e não-Ricardiano (Dominância Fiscal). Entretanto, utilizando a identificação de restrições de sinais, existe evidência que o governo seguiu um regime Ricardiano (Dominância Monetária) de janeiro de 2000 a junho de 2008.

Fiscal policy in Brazil: from counter-cyclical response to crisis

The main goal of this article is to identify the dynamic effects of fiscal policy on output in Brazil from 1997 to 2014, and, more specifically, to estimate those effects when the output falls below its potential level. To do so, we estimate VAR (vector autoregressive) models to generate impulse-response functions and causality/endogeneity tests. Our most remarkable results indicate the following channel of economic policy in Brazil: to foster output, government spending increases causing increases in both tax rates and revenue and the short-term interest rate. A fiscal stimulus via spending seems efficient for economic performance as well as monetary policy; however, the latter operates pro-cyclically in the way we defined here, while the former is predominantly countercyclical. As the monetary shock had a negative effect on GDP growth and GDP growth responded positively to the fiscal shock, it seems that the economic policy has given poise to growth with one hand and taken it with the other one. The monetary policy is only reacting to the fiscal stimuli. We were not able to find any statistically significant response of the output to tax changes, but vice versa seems work in the Brazilian case.

Macroeconomic constraints to growth of Brazilian economy diagnosis and some policy proposals

The recent process of accelerated expansion of the Brazilian economy was driven by exports and fixed capital formation. Although the pace of growth was more robust than in the 1990´s, we can still witness the existence of certain macroeconomic constraints to its continuation in the long run such as, for instance, the exchange rate overvaluation in particular since 2005, and in general the modus operandi of monetary policy. Such constraints may jeopardize the sustainability of the current pace of growth. Therefore, we argue that Brazil still lies in a trap made up of high interest and low exchange rates. The elimination of the exchange rate misalignment would bring about a great increase in the rate of interest, which on its turn would impact negatively upon investment and hence upon the sustainability of long run economic growth. We outline a set of policy measures to eliminate such a trap, in particular, the adoption of an implicit target for the exchange rate, capital controls and the abandonment of the present regime of inflation targeting. Recent events seem to go in this direction.

The economics of wage-led recovery: analysis and policy recommendations

The financial crisis and Great Recession have been followed by a jobs shortage crisis that most forecasts predict will persist for years given current policies. This paper argues for a wage-led recovery and growth program which is the only way to remedy the deep causes of the crisis and escape the jobs crisis. Such a program is the polar opposite of the current policy orthodoxy, showing how much is at stake. Winning the argument for wage-led recovery will require winning the war of ideas about economics that has its roots going back to Keynes’ challenge of classical macroeconomics in the 1920s and 1930s. That will involve showing how the financial crisis and Great Recession were the ultimate result of three decades of neoliberal policy, which produced wage stagnation by severing the wage productivity growth link and made asset price inflation and debt the engine of demand growth in place of wages; showing how wage-led policy resolves the current problem of global demand shortage without pricing out labor; and developing a detailed set of policy proposals that flow from these understandings. The essence of a wage-led policy approach is to rebuild the link between wages and productivity growth, combined with expansionary macroeconomic policy that fills the current demand shortfall so as to push the economy on to a recovery path. Both sets of measures are necessary. Expansionary macro policy (i.e. fiscal stimulus and easy monetary policy) without rebuilding the wage mechanism will not produce sustainable recovery and may end in fiscal crisis. Rebuilding the wage mechanism without expansionary macro policy is likely to leave the economy stuck in the orbit of stagnation.

Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 2010-2011: Internacional integration and macroeconomic policy challenges amid global economic turmoil

Includes bibliography

Essays on European economic and monetary integration

This thesis focuses on two aspects of European economic integration: exchange rate stabilization between non-euro Countries and the Euro Area, and real and nominal convergence of Central and Eastern European Countries. Each Chapter covers these aspects from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. Chapter 1 investigates whether the introduction of the euro was accompanied by a shift in the de facto exchange rate policy of European countries outside the euro area, using methods recently developed by the literature to detect "Fear of Floating" episodes. I find that European Inflation Targeters have tried to stabilize the euro exchange rate, after its introduction; fixed exchange rate arrangements, instead, apart from official policy changes, remained stable. Finally, the euro seems to have gained a relevant role as a reference currency even outside Europe. Chapter 2 proposes an approach to estimate Central Bank preferences starting from the Central Bank's optimization problem within a small open economy, using Sweden as a case study, to find whether stabilization of the exchange rate played a role in the Monetary Policy rule of the Riksbank. The results show that it did not influence interest rate setting; exchange rate stabilization probably occurred as a result of increased economic integration and business cycle convergence. Chapter 3 studies the interactions between wages in the public sector, the traded private sector and the closed sector in ten EU Transition Countries. The theoretical literature on wage spillovers suggests that the traded sector should be the leader in wage setting, with non-traded sectors wages adjusting. We show that large heterogeneity across countries is present, and sheltered and public sector wages are often leaders in wage determination. This result is relevant from a policy perspective since wage spillovers, leading to costs growing faster than productivity, may affect the international cost competitiveness of the traded sector.

What Ended the Great Depression? Re-Evaluating the Role of Fiscal Policy

Conventional wisdom contends that fiscal policy was of secondary importance for the economic recovery in the 1930s. The recovery is then connected to monetary policy that allowed non-sterilised gold inflows to increase the money supply. Often this is shown by measuring the fiscal multipliers and demonstrating that they were relatively small. This paper shows that problems with the conventional measures of fiscal multipliers in the 1930s may have created an incorrect consensus on the irrelevance of fiscal policy. The rehabilitation of fiscal policy is seen as a necessary step in the reinterpretation of the positive role of New Deal policies for the recovery.

Daily monetary impulses and security prices

This paper uses Swiss data to study the real long-run effects of monetary policy. Daily unexpected changes in the monetary base are found to be negatively correlated with security price changes. This result is unaffected when, implicitly following Geske and Roll (1983), we try to measure the autonomous component of monetary policy by taking into account a reaction function of monetary policy to changes in real variables.

A General Schema for Optimal Monetary Policymaking: Objectives and Rules

This paper examines four equivalent methods of optimal monetary policymaking, committing to the social loss function, using discretion with the central bank long-run and short-run loss functions, and following monetary policy rules. All lead to optimal economic performance. The same performance emerges from these different policymaking methods because the central bank actually follows the same (similar) policy rules. These objectives (the social loss function, the central bank long-run and short-run loss functions) and monetary policy rules imply a complete regime for optimal policy making. The central bank long-run and short-run loss functions that produce the optimal policy with discretion differ from the social loss function. Moreover, the optimal policy rule emerges from the optimization of these different central bank loss functions.

Exchange Rate Stabilization and IMF High Interest Rate Policy: A Critical Reconsideration Using a Dynamic Model

This paper examines whether the IMF high interest rate policy was suitable for crisis-ridden East Asian economies. Using an "overshoot" model similar to that of Dornbusch's (1976), it shows that this sort of policy might cause an unnecessary deflationary adjusting process and have no effect on containing the real depreciation of exchange rates in the long run. The study also demonstrates that Thai economic data coincides quite well with the model presented here. Finally, it points out that the high interest policy itself might provoke high risk-premium, the existence of which, in turn, justifies the policy. This means that the policy has a self-fulfilling property. In conclusion, a "one-size-fits-all" adaptation of high interest rate policy in a currency crisis is very dangerous in general, and was inappropriate for East Asia. The desirable policy would have been to let currencies depreciate and keep interest rates stable.